The Good in the Human Being in Friedrich Nietzsche

7.8.2022

Autor: Tobias O. R. Alke

A standpoint, not a lexicon entry. This article is a scholarly and at the same time expressly subjective engagement – an excerpt from the specialist book „Ausgewählte Perspektiven des Altruismus” (Selected Perspectives on Altruism; Tobias O. R. Alke, 2017). The neutral background knowledge on the theme is in the lexicon entry Loving-kindness & altruism. A reading is advanced here, not a last word.

Translator’s note: Nietzsche is quoted verbatim in the original German from the Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 5 (ed. Colli/Montinari; “Nietzsche 2010”), and every quotation has been checked against the text of the Digital Critical Edition (eKGWB). Where a quotation carries the argument, our own English rendering follows in square brackets – “[our translation: …]”; these renderings are ours and not taken from any published English edition. The bibliography and source citations remain in the original.

Friedrich Nietzsche is often read as a despiser of compassion and an advocate of pure egoism – as though the good in the human being did not exist for him. This picture falls short. If one reads the guiding threads of his writings together, the opposite appears: behind his critique of “slave morality” stands an idea of giving out of abundance – Nietzsche calls it the “bestowing virtue” and, expressly, a selfishness to be called “hale and holy”. We read it as genuine, voluntary altruism – embodied in the “strong human being” who takes responsibility instead of ceding it to a dogma.

The following text is deliberately demanding and worked through with references to Nietzsche’s work: work and section (JGB = Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Beyond Good and Evil; GM = Zur Genealogie der Moral, On the Genealogy of Morality; Za I = Also sprach Zarathustra, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, first part), plus the page of the Kritische Studienausgabe, vol. 5 (“Nietzsche 2010”). For a first overview you may safely skip the citation references; in the quotations – as is usual in scholarly citation – the original spelling has been retained. Nietzsche’s terms remain his – also where he speaks of the “herd” (Heerde), of “race” (Rasse) or of a “people” (Volk): his wording then stands as a quotation with its reference, our assessment beside it. Where the text transfers Nietzsche’s images to the present, this is marked as our reading.

Altruism in Friedrich Nietzsche

With Friedrich Nietzsche, altruism is, according to Hillmann (2007: 23), conceived of as „[…] als eine verdeckte, nivellierend wirkende Form des Egoismus schwacher Menschen (…) (→ Sklavenmoral)“ (ibid.) [our translation: “as a concealed, levelling form of the egoism of weak human beings (…) (→ slave morality)”]. However, this formulation is only partly borne out, since precisely this slave morality is not altruism, unless one follows the exposition of Auguste Comte (see Altruism in Comte) or Fehr/Gächter (see below). The following presentation of his philosophy will provide a clearer differentiation of the conception of slave morality (which can equally be understood as a critique of state altruism and of charity in general) and of what, even according to Nietzsche, can constitute real altruism. For even if Hillmann presents altruism according to Nietzsche as concealed egoism, Nietzsche himself also describes its opposite: giving out of abundance. „[E]ine schenkende Tugend ist die höchste Tugend“ [our translation: “a bestowing virtue is the highest virtue”], says his Zarathustra – and calls it, without hesitation, selfishness: „heil und heilig heisse ich diese Selbstsucht“ [our translation: “hale and holy I call this selfishness”], in contrast to that other one, the „allzuarme[n], […] hungernde[n], die immer stehlen will“ [our translation: “all-too-poor, hungry one that always wants to steal”], the „kranke[n] Selbstsucht“ [“sick selfishness”] (Za I, “Von der schenkenden Tugend” / “On the Bestowing Virtue”). Nietzsche does not call this altruism. I read it as real altruism!

To begin, I turn to the derivation and definition of slave morality in Nietzsche. According to his observations, the human being is (mostly) an instinct-driven being (Nietzsche 2010: 17) that seeks, in the mass, to secure a preservation of its way of life (ibid.), by which the centre of its egoism is in essence named, since the human being seeks to assert this against changes (cf. GM III § 13; ibid.: 366). They simply resist their own nature. In my reading, it is only this resistance to development, the reluctance towards development (human-moral and not technological), the fighting of deviation from the old (the breaking with traditions in their central features; by this are meant not styles of clothing or a particular etiquette, but fundamental conceptions of good and evil, right and wrong, good and bad, which lie immanently at the basis of all these cultural differentiations of our society in their manifold milieus (and, strictly speaking, differentiate them into classes), simply as the result of a tradition lasting thousands of years) – that describes at its core the actual slave morality. Nietzsche himself derives it from the resentment of the defeated: „Der Sklavenaufstand in der Moral beginnt damit, dass das Ressentiment selbst schöpferisch wird und Werthe gebiert“ (GM I § 10; Nietzsche 2010: 270) [our translation: “The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values”]. Its representatives are, in this reading, the „asketische[n] Priester“ [“ascetic priests”] (GM III § 11; ibid.: 361), its defenders the „Heerde“ [“herd”] (JGB § 199; ibid.: 120; hereafter1 referred to as the herd) as the subordinate mass of the people, the „Schaf[e]“ [“sheep”] whom, in Nietzsche, their shepherd, the priest, defends (GM III § 15; ibid.: 375). These ascetic priests are by no means only religious leaders, even if here their strongest, or rather most traditional, presence is to be recorded. No, the ascetic priest appears in manifold forms, whereby one can distinguish them here in five groups: (a) the religious leaders (religious office-holders of every tradition), (b) the economic leaders (entrepreneurs, economists in general), (c) the political leaders (politicians, kings, dictators), (d) the scientific leaders (academics of all kinds) and (e) the cultural leaders (artists, musicians, actors, etc.). These five groups are my transfer of Nietzsche’s image to the present: in Nietzsche himself, the philosopher and the scholar stand beside the priest, and the artists he calls „Kammerdiener einer Moral oder Philosophie oder Religion“ [our translation: “valets of a morality or philosophy or religion”] (GM III § 5, § 11, § 25); the economy and politics I add myself. Yet let it be noted that these five groups are interwoven among themselves, and that at least in the history of humanity both political and economic leaders were (and probably in part still are) obliged to seek justification from religious leaders (cf. Nietzsche 2010: 71f), while Nietzsche sees the scientific leaders (among them in particular the philosophers) as closest to the religious ones, with the cultural leaders as lackeys of the other leaders (Nietzsche 2010). I will now differentiate these five groups and finally set out their instruments of power over the herd and the edifice of their dominance as rulers over the ruled, the order following the preceding arrangement of the various leaders.

What lies at the basis of all these ascetic priests is the defence of their ideals, as a kind of self-preservation drive in their „Heerden-Organisation“ [“herd organisation”] (GM III § 19; ibid.: 384). The life of the ascetic priest is an „Irrweg“ [“wrong path”] (ibid.: 362) in the confusion between his strength to bind the masses and at the same time to follow his religion of suffering, which holds him in a lasting contradiction with himself and hinders, or at least slows, the way to knowledge, to the recognition of reality and thereby of himself. „[…] [D]ie kleine Freude [an] der ‚Nächstenliebe‘ […]“ (ibid.: 384) [“the small joy of ‘loving one’s neighbour’”], „[…] die Erweckung des Gemeinde-Machtgefühls [und] der Verdruss des Einzelnen […]“ (ibid.) [“the awakening of the community’s feeling of power and the individual’s vexation”] is his support. He corrupts the „[…] seelische Gesundheit […], wo […] auch [immer er] zur Herrschaft gekommen ist […]“ (GM III § 22; ibid.: 392) [“health of the soul … wherever he has come to rule”]. Their perhaps most important representatives are the ascetic priests of the great religions.

The ascetic priests of the religions

Great books of the religions need, according to Nietzsche, a „von Aussen kommende Tyrannei von Autorität“ [our translation: “a tyranny of authority coming from outside”] in order to last through the millennia needed to exhaust them – and the way in which reverence for the Bible is maintained in Europe he calls „vielleicht das beste Stück Zucht und Verfeinerung der Sitte, das Europa dem Christenthume verdankt“ (JGB § 263; Nietzsche 2010: 218) [our translation: “perhaps the best piece of discipline and refinement of manners that Europe owes to Christianity”]. From this he distinguishes a „[…] grosse Leiter der religiösen Grausamkeit […]“ [“great ladder of religious cruelty”] (JGB § 55; ibid.: 74) with three most important rungs – three epochs of religious cruelty (cf. ibid.):

(1) The „Vorzeit-Religionen“ [“religions of prehistory”] (ibid.), which offered their god human sacrifices, and indeed precisely such „Menschen“ (ibid.) as were dearest to one, which he calls the „Erstlings-Opfer“ [“sacrifice of the first-born”] (ibid.).

(2) The „[…] moralisch[e] Epoche der Menschheit […]“ [“moral epoch of humanity”] (ibid.), which sacrifices to its „[…] Gotte die stärksten Instinkte […]“ [“to its god the strongest instincts”] (ibid.), „seine ‚Natur‘“ [“its ‘nature’”] (Nietzsche 2010: 74), „[…] allen Glauben an verborgene Harmonie, an zukünftige Seligkeiten und Gerechtigkeit […]“ [“all faith in hidden harmony, in future bliss and justice”] (ibid.).

(3) The sacrifice of God himself, as „Grausamkeit“ [“cruelty”] (ibid.) against oneself. „Für das Nichts Gott opfern — dieses paradoxe Mysterium der letzten Grausamkeit blieb dem Geschlechte, welches jetzt eben herauf kommt, aufgespart: wir alle kennen schon etwas davon. —“ (ibid.) [our translation: “To sacrifice God for nothingness — this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate cruelty was reserved for the generation that is just now coming up: we all already know something of it. —”] By this third stage Nietzsche means the nihilism of his own present.

Nietzsche calls the Christian faith of its beginnings an „Opferung aller Freiheit, alles Stolzes, aller Selbstgewissheit des Geistes; zugleich Verknechtung und Selbst-Verhöhnung, Selbst-Verstümmelung“ (JGB § 46; ibid.: 66) [our translation: “a sacrifice of all freedom, all pride, all self-assurance of the spirit; at the same time enslavement and self-mockery, self-mutilation”] – freedom here in the sense of what, in our reading, Comte’s programme of order also demands of the individual. I read in it the dogmas of any teaching that obliges the individual to serve an authority. This reading suggests itself if one considers the Fall in the first book of Moses (Genesis 2–3). Thus Adam and Eve were driven from Paradise because they dared to eat from the tree of knowledge, figuratively to break through an illusion and to develop themselves. Knowledge, as one understands it today, always has something to do with development. The empirical findings of a study are valuable insights for dealing better with the specific questions, and theoretical findings help us to interpret empirical findings better, or where appropriate to specify them better. In my reading, the story of the Fall tells of the price of knowledge – of the fact that it costs something to recognise connections in the environment, to remove veils and to perceive oneself better. The story is interpreted in its own and very different ways in the traditions that hand it down – in Judaism, in Christianity, in Islam; none of these interpretations is meant here. The passage, quoted from the German Elberfelder translation:

„[Mose 2.9:] Und Jehova Gott ließ aus dem Erdboden allerlei Bäume wachsen, lieblich anzusehen und gut zur Speise; und den Baum des Lebens in der Mitte des Gartens, und den Baum der Erkenntnis des Guten und Bösen. […] Mose 3: […] (5.) Sondern Gott weiß, daß, welches Tages ihr davon [dem Baum der Erkenntnis] esset, eure Augen aufgetan werden und ihr sein werdet wie Gott, erkennend Gut und Böses. (6.) Und das Weib sah, daß der Baum gut zur Speise und daß er eine Lust für die Augen und daß der Baum begehrenswert wäre, um Einsicht zu geben; und sie nahm von seiner Frucht und aß, und sie gab auch ihrem Manne mit ihr, und er aß. (7.) Da wurde ihrer beiden Augen aufgetan, und sie erkannten, daß sie nackt waren; und sie hefteten Feigenblätter zusammen und machten sich Schürzen. […] (11) Und er [Jehova] sprach: Wer hat dir kundgetan, daß du nackt bist? Hast du gegessen von dem Baume, von dem ich dir geboten habe, nicht davon zu essen? (12) Und der Mensch sprach: das Weib, das du mir beigegeben hast, sie gab mir von dem Baume, und ich aß. (13) Und Jehova sprach zu dem Weibe: Was hast du da getan! Und das Weib sprach: Die Schlange betrog mich, und ich aß. (14) Und Jehova Gott sprach zu der Schlange: Weil du dieses getan hast, sollst du verflucht sein vor allem Vieh und vor allem Getier des Feldes! Auf deinem Bauche sollst du kriechen und Staub fressen alle Tage deines Lebens. (15) Und ich werde Feindschaft setzen zwischen dir und dem Weibe und zwischen deinem Samen und ihrem Samen; er wird dir den Kopf zermalmen, und du, du wirst ihm die Ferse zermalmen. (16) Zu dem Weibe sprach er: Ich werde sehr mehren die Mühsal deiner Schwangerschaft, mit Schmerzen sollst du Kinder gebären; und nach deinem Manne wird dein Verlangen sein, er aber wird über dich herrschen. (17) Und zu Adam sprach er: Weil du auf die Stimme deines Weibes gehört und gegessen hast von dem Baume, von dem ich dir geboten und gesprochen habe: Du sollst nicht davon essen, so sei der Erdboden verflucht um deinetwillen: mit Mühsal sollst du davon essen alle Tage deines Lebens; […]“2 (Genesis 2:9; 3:5–7, 11–17, Elberfelder translation; emphasis by the author. In English, e.g. in the King James Version.)

All the worse, he says, is today’s „Abstumpfung“ [“dulling”] (JGB § 46; Nietzsche 2010: 66 f.) of modern man towards the „christliche[n] Nomenklatur“ [“Christian nomenclature”] (ibid.), which has taken from him the awareness of these structures and has let the human being become a „zahme[n] Hausthier“ [“tame domestic animal”] (cf. JGB § 52; ibid.: 72) with the need for this morality (here one may recall Pavlov’s dog). This self-derision of the human being, he says, finds its expression in the „gefährlichen Diät-Verordnungen“ [“dangerous dietary prescriptions”] (JGB § 47; ibid.: 67) of the „religiösen Neurose“ [“religious neurosis”] (ibid.): „[…] Einsamkeit, Fasten und geschlechtlicher Enthaltsamkeit […]“ (ibid.) [our translation: “solitude, fasting and sexual abstinence”]. Nietzsche expressly leaves open „was da Ursache, was Wirkung sei“ (ibid.) [our translation: “what is cause here, what effect”]. That a prescribed abstinence can separate the human being from their own nature is my conclusion from this; a freely chosen practice is something else.

The “Old Testament”, by contrast, Nietzsche admires as the testimony of a great style; the taste for it, he says, is „ein Prüfstein in Hinsicht auf ‚Gross‘ und ‚Klein‘“ (JGB § 52; Nietzsche 2010: 72) [our translation: “a touchstone with regard to ‘great’ and ‘small’”] – a touchstone for the reader, not a division of human beings. The distinction between rulers and ruled he develops elsewhere (cf. JGB § 61; ibid.: 79 f.).

Through its attempt to hold fast to everything conceivable in life, almost at any price, religion becomes a religion of the suffering, since through changes some things or persons will inevitably leave one’s life, or one simply loses sight of one another. In this morality of suffering they receive, through their clinging to the old and their fighting of development, the confirmation of their suffering by the great religions. In my reading, dogmas, through this rejection of the development of the human being, of society, of nature as such and of all the connected facets of knowledge, invert the human being in their attitude to the environment and turn the actually necessary development into a resistance to their own existence. Formerly natural appreciations are reversed, the good becomes evil, development becomes a danger and is no longer regarded as an opportunity, joy becomes suffering, love becomes hatred (cf. ibid.: 82), mercy becomes revenge (cf. GM I § 7, § 10).

The ascetic priests of the religions maintain their position by comforting the masses, their herd of people, who seek in religion their redemption through the alleviation of their morality of suffering – with which, admittedly, they have also again contributed to a certain development. Thus God sacrifices himself for the human beings – „der Gläubiger sich für seinen Schuldner opfernd, aus Liebe“ (GM II § 21; Nietzsche 2010: 331) [our translation: “the creditor sacrificing himself for his debtor, out of love”] – and delivers a comfort for their sufferings. Thus the believing religious person owes their dogma allegiance, and if they refuse it (by resisting this inhibition or deviating from the mass, no longer wanting to be a sheep), they deserve the „Strafe“ [“punishment”] (cf. GM II § 6–7; ibid.: 302) – cf. on this the instruments of the ascetic priests further below (Nietzsche 2010: 190f, 282, 330ff, 377). Yet let it be emphasised that the religions as such do not constitute the problem of these ills, but rather the dogmas that are derived from them (cf. JGB § 54; ibid.: 73):

„Die neuere Philosophie, als eine erkenntnisstheoretische Skepsis, ist, versteckt oder offen, antichristlich: obschon, für feinere Ohren gesagt, keineswegs antireligiös.“ (JGB § 54; Nietzsche 2010: 73) [our translation: “Modern philosophy, as an epistemological scepticism, is, covertly or openly, anti-Christian: although, said for finer ears, by no means anti-religious.”]

The ascetic priests of the economy

A „Nützlichkeits-Moral“ [“morality of utility”] is what Nietzsche calls slave morality (JGB § 260; Nietzsche 2010: 211). I connect it with possession and growth: with the „Kitzel des Unendlichen“ [“tickle of the infinite”] (JGB § 224; ibid.: 160) and that „tropische[n] Tempo im Wetteifer des Wachsthums“ [“tropical tempo in the rivalry of growth”] (JGB § 262; ibid.: 216) in which Nietzsche sees old aristocratic communities perish from „gleichsam explodirenden Egoismen“ [“egoisms that, as it were, explode”] (ibid.) – for me a metaphor for modern man’s race for possessions.

Nietzsche himself does not criticise dependence here; he affirms it. Every elevation of the type “man”, he says, is the work of an aristocratic society „welche an eine lange Leiter der Rangordnung und Werthverschiedenheit von Mensch und Mensch glaubt und Sklaverei in irgend einem Sinne nöthig hat“ (JGB § 257; ibid.: 205) [our translation: “which believes in a long ladder of rank order and difference in value between human being and human being, and needs slavery in some sense”]; the „Demokratisirung Europa’s“ [“democratisation of Europe”] aims „auf die Erzeugung eines zur Sklaverei im feinsten Sinne vorbereiteten Typus“ (JGB § 242; ibid.: 182 f.) [our translation: “at the production of a type prepared for slavery in the subtlest sense”]. Slavery “in some sense” is, for Nietzsche, a condition of higher culture. Here our paths part.

What I describe at this point – a society of ever richer rich and ever poorer poor, the subjugation of the weak and their education into a sheep that, in humility and diligence, accepts work as the only possible content of life3 – is my thesis, not Nietzsche’s. And it does not apply to free exchange. A free market does not exist; what is usually criticised as capitalism is a regulated, distorted market in which allocation, privilege and steering take the place of free exchange. Dependence arises where things are allocated rather than exchanged. Friedrich August von Hayek showed that no steering authority can possess the dispersed knowledge expressed in the exchange of many individuals (Hayek 1945) – from this follows his critique of steering. My own thesis goes further: free exchange is individualistic and the foundation of altruism. Whoever can exchange freely can also give freely. Marcel Mauss sets against work as an end in itself the certainty of being paid loyally, for a whole lifetime, for work loyally performed (Mauss4 1990: 174).

Namely the „machinale[…] Thätigkeit“ [“mechanical activity”] (GM III § 18; Nietzsche 2010: 382)5 – in Nietzsche a means by which the ascetic priest diverts the interest of the sufferer „grundsätzlich vom Leiden“ [“fundamentally away from suffering”] and which today one calls, „etwas unehrlich, ‚den Segen der Arbeit‘“ (ibid.) [our translation: “somewhat dishonestly, ‘the blessing of work’”] – keeps the human being, transferred in this way to the world of work, through „absolute“ (ibid.) regulatedness (cf. ibid.), „[…] pünktliche[n] besinnungslosen Gehorsam, das Ein-für-alle-Mal der Lebensweise [und] Ausfüllung der Zeit [in] ‚Unpersönlichkeit‘ […]“ (ibid.) [our translation: “punctual, unthinking obedience, the once-and-for-all of the way of life and the filling of time … ‘impersonality’”], well on the way to forgetting their own self, and dampened in their sensibility. The foundations of this morality of the rulers are the past predominance of the religions, or rather of their dogmas, yet anchored still more deeply in the „Gefühl der Schuld“ [“feeling of guilt”] (GM II § 8; ibid.: 305 f.) – and the morality of suffering as a requirement of life – „[…] der persönlichen Verpflichtung […]“ [“personal obligation”] (ibid.), which according to Nietzsche has its origin in the „[…] Verhältniss zwischen Käufer und Verkäufer, Gläubiger und Schuldner […]“ [“relationship between buyer and seller, creditor and debtor”] (ibid.), older than „[…] die Anfänge irgend welcher gesellschaftlichen Organisationsformen und Verbände […]“ [“the beginnings of any social forms of organisation and associations”] (ibid.: 306; cf. ibid.: 210 f.). From this Nietzsche derives the oldest proposition of morality: „‚jedes Ding hat ein Preis; Alles kann abgezahlt werden‘6 — dem ältesten und naivsten Moral-Kanon der Gerechtigkeit, dem Anfange aller ‚Gutmüthigkeit‘, aller ‚Billigkeit‘, alles ‚guten Willens‘, aller ‚Objektivität‘ auf Erden“ (ibid.: 306 f.) [our translation: “‘every thing has its price; everything can be paid off’ — the oldest and most naive moral canon of justice, the beginning of all ‘good-naturedness’, all ‘fairness’, all ‘good will’, all ‘objectivity’ on earth”]. According to this principle of equalisation, the powerful one tends, „in Bezug auf weniger Mächtige, diese unter sich zu einem Ausgleich zu zwingen“ (ibid.: 307) [our translation: “with regard to the less powerful, to force them into an equalisation among themselves”], and to punish them in case of resistance (see further below in The instruments of the ascetic priests). The „Vorrecht des Mächtigsten“ [“privilege of the most powerful”], however, is in Nietzsche precisely the opposite: mercy, letting the one who did harm go unpunished (GM II § 10; ibid.: 309; see below, The strong human being).

The ascetic priests of politics

The „Befehlenden“ [“those who command”] (JGB § 199; ibid.: 119) are the „moralische[n] Heuch[ler]“ [“moral hypocrites”] (ibid.) of society. Their speech is „[…] Eine Gattung öffentlicher und ungefähr kunstmässiger Rede […] von der Kanzel herab“ [our translation: “a kind of public and roughly artful speech … from the pulpit”] (JGB § 247; ibid.: 190 f.) – in Nietzsche a remark about the sermon as the school of style of German prose, here transferred to political speech. They regard the herd human being as the only permitted kind of human being. Their tool is the constitution and the command-needing herd human being as such, whereby this morality is designated as „Heerdenthier-Moral“ [“herd-animal morality”] (JGB § 202; ibid.: 124). The organisation of the herd-animal morality is that of a Christian democracy in which the „[…] ‚Mitleiden[…] mit Gott‘ […]“ [“‘suffering-with God’”] (ibid.: 125) is a central component. These commanders, in conflict with the other commanders (regarding „Buddhismus“ (ibid.)), proclaim „[…] die ‚allgemeine Wohlfahrt‘ […]“ [“the ‘general welfare’”] as the virtue of society – a formula that Nietzsche holds against the English utilitarians (JGB § 228; ibid.: 165; cf. ibid.: 127 f.). The democratisation of Europe is for him at the same time „[…] eine unfreiwillige Veranstaltung zur Züchtung von Tyrannen […]“ (JGB § 242; ibid.: 183) [our translation: “an involuntary arrangement for the breeding of tyrants”].

The feeling of inhibition that orders of rank and estate leave behind in human beings is described by Nietzsche himself – with a derivation that is entirely his own:

„Ein solches Hemmungsgefühl kann verschiedenster Abkunft sein: etwa als Folge der Kreuzung von zu fremdartigen Rassen (oder von Ständen — Stände drücken immer auch Abkunfts- und Rassen-Differenzen aus: der europäische ‚Weltschmerz‘, der ‚Pessimismus‘ des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts ist wesentlich die Folge einer unsinnig plötzlichen Stände-Mischung) […]“ (GM III § 17; Nietzsche 2010: 377 f.) [our translation: “Such a feeling of inhibition can be of the most varied origin: perhaps as the consequence of the crossing of races that are too alien to one another (or of estates — estates always also express differences of descent and race: the European ‘world-weariness’, the ‘pessimism’ of the nineteenth century is essentially the consequence of an absurdly sudden mixing of estates) …”]

This is Nietzsche’s physiological speculation about the causes of depression, not a political analysis – and not one that we share. All that can be taken up from it is the observation that estates and rank orders can produce a feeling of inhibition in human beings; for us, this has nothing to do with origin.

The ascetic priests of the sciences

Among the scientists there prevails above all the need for self-presentation, especially among the philosophers (cf. JGB § 5–6; ibid.: 19 f.), while their profession of growing knowledge is rather a „Trieb“ [“drive”] (ibid.: 20) of „Verkenntnis!“ [“misapprehension!”] (ibid.), and they lose sight of the actual purpose of the discussion through their manifold „Interpretation[en]“ (ibid.: 56). They determine the angles of research, according to the „[…] Princip der ‚kleinstmöglichen Kraft‘ […]“ [“principle of ‘the least possible force’”] (JGB § 14; ibid.: 28), and in doing so lose sight of the great whole in their diversification of research (cf. ibid.: 132) into ever smaller sub-areas and disciplinary demarcation, in determining the foreign position as the fundamentally false one (simply because it is a different perspective) – something one can probably find intensified today in the exaggerated faith in statistics (cf. Wehr 2014). And so the scholar behaves in accordance with the masses in the goodwill of the authorities, and falls dutifully into „Reih und Glied“ [“rank and file”] (JGB § 206; Nietzsche 2010: 133), rendering obedience to the authorities (Selke 2013), not least out of their „[A]bhängig[keit]“ [“dependence”] (Nietzsche 2010: 134) on them:

„‚Wo der Mensch nichts mehr zu sehen und zu greifen hat, da hat er auch nichts mehr zu suchen‘ […]“ (JGB § 14; Nietzsche 2010: 28) [our translation: “‘Where man has nothing more to see and to grasp, he also has nothing more to look for’”]

Nietzsche mocks that the „[…] hundertfach widerlegte Theorie vom ‚freien Willen‘ [verdanke] ihre Fortdauer nur noch diesem Reize“, of being refutable: „immer wieder kommt Jemand und fühlt sich stark genug, sie zu widerlegen“ (JGB § 18; Nietzsche 2010: 31 f.) [our translation: “the hundredfold refuted theory of ‘free will’ owes its persistence only to this charm …: again and again someone comes along and feels strong enough to refute it”]. Whoever today wants to refute individual freedom in order to confirm a social determinism follows, in my reading, this charm rather than a real advance of knowledge – and thereby serves misapprehension rather than knowledge. Among those who live apart from religion, Nietzsche finds, besides „[…] ‚Freidenkerei‘ […]“ [“free-thinking”], above all those „[…] denen Arbeitsamkeit, von Geschlecht zu Geschlecht, die religiösen Instinkte aufgelöst hat: so dass sie gar nicht mehr wissen, wozu Religionen nütze sind, und nur mit einer Art stumpfen Erstaunens ihr Vorhandensein in der Welt gleichsam registriren“ (JGB § 58; ibid.: 76 f.) [our translation: “in whom industriousness has, from generation to generation, dissolved the religious instincts: so that they no longer even know what religions are good for, and merely register, as it were, their existence in the world with a kind of dull astonishment”] – whereby Nietzsche does not restrict this to scientists alone. The undoing of the scholar is the „Mittelmässigkeit seiner Art“ [“mediocrity of his kind”] (JGB § 206; ibid.: 134), which stems from the „Jesuitismus der Mittelmässigkeit“ [“Jesuitism of mediocrity”] (ibid.). It springs from the pen of the „Religion des Mitleidens“ [“religion of pity”] (ibid.), which seeks to suppress every uniqueness, the unusual in the human being, and to reduce as far as possible the tension of its „Bogens“ [“bow”] (ibid.) – metaphorically the reach of this uniqueness of the strong human being, who could reach the masses, the sheep, in order to seduce them to knowledge and lead them to mental independence – or even seeks to abolish it entirely, which finds its climax in the „[…] Entselbstung und Entpersönlichung des Geistes […]“ [“de-selfing and depersonalisation of the spirit”] (ibid.: 135), the „[…] dem ‚interesselosen Erkennen‘ […]“ [“‘disinterested knowing’”] (JGB § 207; ibid.).

And this transfiguration of the spirit of the scholars is the fact that „[…] ‚Jeder […] sich selbst der Fernste‘ […]“ [“‘each is furthest from himself’”] (GM Preface § 1; ibid.: 248). And their debasement they find in the words of the philosophers „Thomas Hobbes“ (Nagel 2005: 19) – the compulsive preservation of the system – „David Hume“ (ibid.: 20) – the justification through self-preservation for the good of the majority, or rather of the dogma to which they render allegiance – and „Locke“ (ibid.: 195), who try to transfigure human „Natur“ (ibid.: 236). Nietzsche himself directs his reproach at a contemporary, Eugen Dühring: out of the „Geist des Ressentiment“ [“spirit of ressentiment”], he says, there grows a „neue Nuance von wissenschaftlicher Billigkeit (zu Gunsten von Hass, Neid, Missgunst, Argwohn, Rancune, Rache)“ (GM II § 11; Nietzsche 2010: 310 f.) [our translation: “new nuance of scientific fairness (in favour of hatred, envy, resentment, suspicion, rancour, revenge)”] that seeks justice on the ground of the reactive feeling. I see the same movement in Hobbes. And the greatest error is the fighting of the „aktive[n] […] Gefühls“ [“active feeling”] (ibid.: 311), the basis of initiative, of the readiness to act, whereby the scholar has not least lost faith in himself and, in his „[…] Selbst-Betäubung […]“ [“self-anaesthesia”] (GM III § 23; ibid.: 396 f.), already „[…] fürchte[t] [zu] Bewusstsein zu kommen …“ [“fears coming to consciousness”] (ibid.: 398):

„Der aktive, der angreifende, übergreifende Mensch ist immer noch der Gerechtigkeit hundert Schritte näher gestellt als der reaktive; es ist eben für ihn durchaus nicht nöthig, in der Art, wie es der reaktive Mensch thut, thun muss, sein Objekt falsch und voreingenommen abzuschätzen. Thatsächlich hat deshalb zu allen Zeiten der aggressive Mensch, als der Stärkere, Muthigere, Vornehmere, auch das freiere Auge, das bessere Gewissen auf seiner Seite gehabt: umgekehrt erräth man schon, wer überhaupt die Erfindung des ‚schlechten Gewissens‘ auf dem Gewissen hat, — der Mensch des Ressentiment!“ (GM II § 11; Nietzsche 2010: 311) [our translation: “The active, the attacking, overreaching human being is still placed a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive one; for him it is simply not at all necessary to appraise his object falsely and with prejudice, in the way the reactive human being does, must do. In fact, therefore, at all times the aggressive human being, as the stronger, more courageous, nobler one, has also had the freer eye, the better conscience on his side: conversely, one can already guess who has the invention of ‘bad conscience’ on his conscience at all — the human being of ressentiment!”]

And their proximity to the „asketische[n] Ideal“ [“ascetic ideal”] (GM III § 25; Nietzsche 2010: 402) expresses itself most clearly in the „Verarmung des Lebens“7 [“impoverishment of life”] (ibid.: 403 f.) of a „Gelehrte[n]“ [“scholar”] (ibid.), through which he has even become a strengthening of this ideal, instead of seeing through it by knowledge and resisting this new dogma (cf. ibid.: 402), which mostly shows itself in the garb of positivism (cf. JGB § 204; ibid.: 131)8:

„[…] die Affekte kühl geworden, das tempo verlangsamt, die Dialektik an Stelle des Instinktes, der Ernst den Gesichtern und Gebärden aufgedrückt (der Ernst, dieses unmissverständlichste Abzeichen des mühsameren Stoffwechsels, des ringenden, schwerer arbeitenden Lebens).“ (GM III § 25; Nietzsche 2010: 403) [our translation: “the affects grown cool, the tempo slowed, dialectics in place of instinct, seriousness stamped on faces and gestures (seriousness, this most unmistakable badge of a more laborious metabolism, of struggling, harder-working life).”]

The ascetic priests of culture

“The artists” too, „die Künstler“ (GM III § 5; Nietzsche 2010: 344), are anything but independent, still less than the scholars – Nietzsche calls them „zu allen Zeiten Kammerdiener einer Moral oder Philosophie oder Religion“ (ibid.) [our translation: “at all times valets of a morality or philosophy or religion”] – dependent on the favour of a „Gönner[s]“ [“patron”] (ibid.), in his service, in order to grant their visions free scope undisturbed (cf. ibid.: 344 f.). Of the upbringing and education of his time, Nietzsche speaks in a section that begins with the inheritance of qualities from one’s forebears – „Dies ist das Problem der Rasse“ [our translation: “This is the problem of race”], he writes there (JGB § 264; ibid.: 219):

„In unsrem sehr volksthümlichen, will sagen pöbelhaften Zeitalter muss ‚Erziehung‘ und ‚Bildung‘ wesentlich die Kunst, zu täuschen, sein, — über die Herkunft, den vererbten Pöbel in Leib und Seele hinweg zu täuschen.“ (JGB § 264; Nietzsche 2010: 219) [our translation: “In our very popular, that is to say plebeian age, ‘upbringing’ and ‘education’ must essentially be the art of deceiving — of deceiving about origin, about the inherited plebeian in body and soul.”]

This is Nietzsche’s doctrine of heredity, not ours. From the passage we take only the reproach against an education that deceives instead of educating.

Even „der Musiker“ [“the musician”] (GM III § 5; Nietzsche 2010: 346) now becomes an „[…] Orakel, [einem] Priester, [dieser] Bauchredner Gottes […]“ [“oracle, a priest, … this ventriloquist of God”] (ibid.) and proclaims the ascetic ideals. Of older humanity Nietzsche says, moreover, „auch an der Strafe ist so viel Festliches“ (GM II § 6; ibid.: 302) [our translation: “in punishment too there is so much that is festive”]. C. W. Mills (1962: 388) would here probably speak of the American Boy, while their most essential counterweight is the „[…] Komödiant[…] dieses Ideals […]“ [“comedian of this ideal”] (GM III § 27; Nietzsche 2010: 409), who awakens „Misstrauen“ [“mistrust”] (ibid.) and is able to bring the masses to reflection.

The instruments of the ascetic priests

The instruments of the ascetics have thereby already been mirrored in outline in the preceding explanations. The ascetic priests are bearers and servants of these ideals of suffering at once, and exploit the need for harmony (cf. ibid.: 19, 74) of the masses to their advantage, and veil their intentions in the dogmas they place as self-fulfilling „[…] Wahrheit[en] […]“ [“truths”] (cf. JGB § 9; ibid.: 23), whether these are of a religious, economic, political, cultural or otherwise constituted nature. „[…] [U]nser[e] [Körper sind] nur ein Gesellschaftsbau vieler Seelen […]“9 [“our bodies are only a social structure of many souls”] (JGB § 19; ibid.: 33), with a will to self-preservation – which Nietzsche, of all things, does not consider the basic drive: „Leben selbst ist Wille zur Macht —: die Selbsterhaltung ist nur eine der indirekten und häufigsten Folgen davon“ (JGB § 13; ibid.: 27 f.) [our translation: “Life itself is will to power —: self-preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it”].

The need for harmony of the human being, especially of that human being who feels safe only as a sheep in the herd, is susceptible to the „Vordergrunds-Glaube[n]“ [“foreground belief”] (JGB § 11; ibid.: 26) of these various dogmas, with „Positivismus“ (cf. JGB § 10; ibid.: 23 f.) on top. The weak-willed, Nietzsche says, like to dress themselves in „eine Art von socialistischem Mitleiden“ [“a kind of socialist pity”] – „ihre gefälligste Verkleidung“ [“their most pleasing disguise”] (JGB § 21; ibid.: 36). By „Sprach-Verwandtschaft“ [“linguistic kinship”] (JGB § 20; ibid.: 34) Nietzsche means the shared grammar that pre-shapes philosophising; that dogmas secure their followers through a shared language is my reading. It lays the foundation for the „[…] ‚unfreie[n] Wille[n]‘ […]“ [“‘unfree will’”] (JGB § 21; ibid.: 36), which exists and also again does not exist (cf. ibid.), for in the end life is a distinction into „[…] starken und schwachen Willen“ [“strong and weak wills”] (ibid.), not into free or unfree will (cf. ibid.).

Through the education of the human being into a herd-being, they recognise in every deviation a ressentiment against their existence. Their own existence is adorned with „[…] Zauber und Zucker in jenen Gefühlen des ‚für Andere‘, des ‚nicht für mich‘ […]“ [“magic and sugar in those feelings of ‘for others’, of ‘not for me’”] (JGB § 33; ibid.: 52), whereby the „[…] moralische[…] Vorurtheil, dass Wahrheit mehr werth ist als Schein […]“ [“moral prejudice that truth is worth more than appearance”] (ibid.: 53) is mere imagination (JGB § 34). For this reason there is no one truth, since it is always bound to a morality, or rather its dogma (cf. ibid.: 54). Thus even „[…] ‚der alte Mensch‘ […]“ [“‘the old man’”] (JGB § 57; Nietzsche 2010: 75 f.) remains „ein ewiges Kind“ [“an eternal child”] (ibid.), caught up in its dogma of truth(s). Under the cloak of these truths, ideals of beauty and appreciations, among other things, are inverted, and the human being is shaken in their foundations, yet in a controlled way under the continual protection of the majority, under the guidance of the ascetic priests, whose manner of implementation already borders on arbitrariness (cf. ibid.: 80ff, 109). Nietzsche himself regards the long discipline of thinking „[…] innerhalb einer kirchlichen und höfischen Richtschnur […]“ [“within an ecclesiastical and courtly guideline”] as the school that made the European spirit strong and subtle (JGB § 188; Nietzsche 2010: 106 f.); I ask what this education of the human being into a sheep in the herd has cost the individual – in my reading, the enslavement of their spirit. In this „Heerden-Nützlichkeit“ [“herd utility”] (JGB § 201; ibid.: 121) as a self-liberating body of workers and consumers lies their redemption through work, through service to the ruler, as the meaning of their life, the redemption from suffering. And those who resist, who wish to refuse allegiance to the system of suffering (for instance because they are not content with mediocrity and strive for something higher, for nobler values, or simply wish to consider the whole and not only specific sub-areas (cf. ibid.: 217, 277)), are threatened with exclusion or even persecution (cf. JGB § 212; ibid.: 147):

„Heute umgekehrt, wo in Europa das Heerdenthier allein zu Ehren kommt und Ehren vertheilt, wo die ‚Gleichheit der Rechte‘ allzuleicht sich in die Gleichheit im Unrechte umwandeln könnte: ich will sagen in gemeinsame Bekriegung alles Seltenen, Fremden, Bevorrechtigten, des höheren Menschen, der höheren Seele, der höheren Pflicht, der höheren Verantwortlichkeit, der schöpferischen Machtfülle und Herrschaftlichkeit […]“ (JGB § 212; Nietzsche 2010: 147) [our translation: “Today, conversely, when in Europe the herd animal alone attains honours and distributes honours, when ‘equality of rights’ could all too easily turn into equality in wrongdoing: I mean into a common war against everything rare, strange, privileged, against the higher human being, the higher soul, the higher duty, the higher responsibility, the creative fullness of power and mastery …”]

And the punishment that follows this deviation, as the representation and body of the „Sklaven-Moral“ [“slave morality”] (GM I § 10; Nietzsche 2010: 270) by the masses as representatives of the ascetic priests, or rather of the dogmas to which both the sheep and the ascetic priests are obliged, constitutes this securing of collective compulsion, the calculability (cf. GM II § 2; ibid.: 293) of the human being as a sheep in the herd – in Nietzsche, to be sure, the preliminary stage of the „souveraine[n] Individuum[s]“ [“sovereign individual”] (ibid.) – and the fighting of uniqueness as an independently thinking being.

Yet without this uniqueness, these rule-breakers and outsiders (see the founder in Sigmund (see above): Steffen Sigmund describes the founder of a foundation as a figure on the border between altruism and the wish for recognition; the connection to Nietzsche’s strong human being is my reading), slave morality would in turn lose its basis of existence, since it finds its legitimation only in resistance to the individuals, this „Gegen- und Aussenwelt“ [“counter- and outer world”] (GM I § 10; ibid.: 271) of independent spirits. And in their „persönlichen Verpflichtung“ [“personal obligation”] (GM II § 8; ibid.: 306) towards their truth, they must render allegiance to their ascetic priest, the mouthpiece of their dogma, and punish the outsider, in an act of festivity, the triumph and goodwill of their truth.

The punishment

The „[…] Furcht vor dem Nächsten“ [“fear of one’s neighbour”] (JGB § 201; Nietzsche 2010: 122) creates this „moralische[…] Werthschätzung“ [“moral valuation”] (ibid.) of the independence of the spirit, of uniqueness „und Selbst-Verantwortlichkeit“ [“and self-responsibility”] (ibid.: 123), of the „Wissbegierde“ [“thirst for knowledge”] (GM III § 9; ibid.: 359) of the individual, as a danger against the self, against one’s own herd and above all its dogma (its slave morality), its all-surpassing truth, its need for the „[…] ‚Gleichheit Aller vor Gott‘ […]“10 [“‘equality of all before God’”] (JGB § 219; Nietzsche 2010: 153), which is now pervaded by mistrust so long as this rule-breaker, the uncooperative one, persists (cf. ibid.: 307):

„Das moralische Urtheilen und Verurtheilen ist die Lieblings-Rache der Geistig-Beschränkten an Denen, die es weniger sind, auch eine Art Schadenersatz dafür, dass sie von der Natur schlecht bedacht wurden, endlich eine Gelegenheit, Geist zu bekommen und fein zu werden: — Bosheit vergeistigt.“ (JGB § 219; Nietzsche 2010: 152 f.) [our translation: “Moral judging and condemning is the favourite revenge of the intellectually limited on those who are less so, also a kind of compensation for having been poorly endowed by nature, finally an opportunity to acquire spirit and to become refined: — malice spiritualised.”]

Nietzsche himself traces the reversal of values back to the priests, „[…] die ganz grossen Hasser in der Weltgeschichte […]“ [“the truly great haters in world history”] (GM I § 7; Nietzsche 2010: 267), and ascribes it to a particular people – in his wording:

„[…] die Juden, jenes priesterliche Volk, das sich an seinen Feinden und Überwältigern zuletzt nur durch eine radikale Umwerthung von deren Werthen, also durch einen Akt der geistigsten Rache Genugthuung zu schaffen wusste. […] nämlich ‚die Elenden sind allein die Guten, die Armen, Ohnmächtigen, Niedrigen sind allein die Guten, die Leidenden, Entbehrenden, Kranken, Hässlichen sind auch die einzig Frommen […] — dagegen ihr, ihr Vornehmen und Gewaltigen, ihr seid in alle Ewigkeit die Bösen […]‘“ (GM I § 7; Nietzsche 2010: 267) [our translation: “the Jews, that priestly people, which in the end knew how to obtain satisfaction against its enemies and conquerors only through a radical revaluation of their values, that is, through an act of the most spiritual revenge. … namely ‘the wretched alone are the good, the poor, powerless, lowly alone are the good, the suffering, deprived, sick, ugly are also the only pious ones … — whereas you, you noble and mighty ones, you are for all eternity the evil ones …’”]

The long path of this revaluation he calls the „[…] geheime schwarze Kunst einer wahrhaft grossen Politik der Rache […]“ (GM I § 8; ibid.: 269) [our translation: “secret black art of a truly great politics of revenge”]. This is Nietzsche’s thesis. It lays a morality at the door of a people and its religion; we do not adopt this attribution – it is a judgement about a people and a religion, not a finding. What we retain from the passage is the mechanism Nietzsche describes: only through this revaluation does the strong one become “evil”, while only the suffering and the „Ohnmächtigen“ [“powerless”] (ibid.: 267) are the good ones – good sheep of their ascetic priests.

How close religion and politics come to each other wherever a god is invoked as judge over opponents is shown by a psalm that Jews and Christians alike pray:

„Gott der Rache, Jehova, Gott der Rache, strahle hervor! Erhebe dich, Richter der Erde, vergilt den Hoffärtigen ihr Tun! Bis wann werden die Gesetzlosen, Jehova, bis wann werden die Gesetzlosen frohlocken, werden übersprudeln, Freches reden, sich rühmen alle, die Frevel tun? […]“ (Ps 94:1–4, Elberfelder translation – http://www.bibliaonline.com.br/elb/sl/94 [2014.01.08: 19:54]) [King James Version: “O Lord God, to whom vengeance belongeth; O God, to whom vengeance belongeth, shew thyself. Lift up thyself, thou judge of the earth: render a reward to the proud. Lord, how long shall the wicked, how long shall the wicked triumph? How long shall they utter and speak hard things? and all the workers of iniquity boast themselves?”]

Nietzsche’s thesis and this psalm both show what arises when religion and politics become mixed: a prayer for justice becomes readable as a programme of retribution, a teaching becomes an instrument of power. Our conclusion from this is not a statement about the essence of any religion, but a demand on every order: to separate politics and religion strictly – for every religion alike, none above another.

Thus one makes use of „Mnemotechnik“ [“mnemonics”] (GM II § 3; Nietzsche 2010: 295), „[…] ‚[Man] brennt Etwas ein, damit es im Gedächtniss bleibt: nur was nicht aufhört, weh zu thun, bleibt im Gedächtniss‘ […]“ (ibid.) [our translation: “‘One burns something in so that it stays in the memory: only what does not cease to hurt stays in the memory’”], in order to ensure that even the most dull-witted remains mindful of this punishment, in fear, of their morality of suffering, of submissiveness before the ruler, the stronger one and their sole right to punishment over the lower (cf. GM II § 5; ibid.: 299 f.) – “master morality” („Herren-Moral“), by contrast, is in Nietzsche the valuation of the rulers themselves, not submissiveness before them (JGB § 260; ibid.: 208 f.) – to compel them as the weaker to „Ausgleich“ [“equalisation”] (ibid.: 299) (cf. ibid.: 306f). Yet how can this truth of justice through pain be a satisfaction; does it not lead again to suffering, hatred and revenge, according to the principle an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, or the „Strafe als Kriegserklärung“ [“punishment as a declaration of war”] (GM II § 13; ibid.: 318; cf. ibid.: 301)? Yet everything has its price and can be settled by the rich, the possessing one, „[…] dem ältesten und naivsten Moral-Kanon der Gerechtigkeit […]“ [“the oldest and most naive moral canon of justice”] (GM II § 8; ibid.: 306 f.; cf. ibid.: 309), or at least by the contentment of „Scham“ [“shame”] (ibid.: 152):

„[…] der Erfinder des ‚schlechten Gewissens‘. Mit ihm aber war die grösste und unheimlichste Erkrankung eingeleitet, von welcher die Menschheit bis heute nicht genesen ist, das Leiden des Menschen am Menschen, an sich: als die Folge einer gewaltsamen Abtrennung von der thierischen Vergangenheit, eines Sprunges und Sturzes gleichsam in neue Lagen und Daseins-Bedingungen, einer Kriegserklärung gegen die alten Instinkte, auf denen bis dahin seine Kraft, Lust und Furchtbarkeit beruhte.“ (GM II § 16; Nietzsche 2010: 323 f.) [our translation: “the inventor of ‘bad conscience’. With him, however, the greatest and most uncanny illness was introduced, from which humanity has not recovered to this day: the suffering of man from man, from himself – as the consequence of a violent separation from the animal past, of a leap and fall, as it were, into new situations and conditions of existence, of a declaration of war against the old instincts on which his strength, pleasure and fearsomeness had until then rested.”] The inventor of bad conscience, Nietzsche sees in the human being himself; the priest makes use of it.

Yet through punishment the human being by no means becomes a better human being. They are tamed, but the professed improvement turns rather into its „Gegentheil“ [“opposite”] (GM II § 15; Nietzsche 2010: 321 f.):

„[…]; indem er dann den Schmerz stillt, den die Wunde macht, vergiftet er zugleich die Wunde — darauf vor Allem nämlich versteht er sich, dieser Zauberer und Raubthier-Bändiger, in dessen Umkreis alles Gesunde nothwendig krank und alles Kranke nothwendig zahm wird.“ (GM III § 15; Nietzsche 2010: 373) [our translation: “…; by then stilling the pain the wound causes, he at the same time poisons the wound — for this above all is what he understands, this sorcerer and tamer of beasts of prey, in whose vicinity everything healthy necessarily becomes sick and everything sick necessarily becomes tame.”]

In my reading, judge and converted punished remain in their „Ressentiment[…]“ (GM III § 15; Nietzsche 2010: 375) against the foreign, the unknown and uncontrollable, which by its nature appears uncooperative; in Nietzsche, the priest directs ressentiment inwards – he is „der Richtungs-Veränderer des Ressentiment“ [our translation: “the changer of direction of ressentiment”] (ibid.): the sufferer is to seek the blame in himself. Thus the herd – to put it pointedly: the cattle of the ascetic priests – must be controlled and, in case of deviation from the ruling moral canon, punished, in order to subject itself again to their flock:

„Die Milderung des Leidens, das ‚Trösten‘ jeder Art, — das erweist sich als sein Genie selbst: wie erfinderisch hat er seine Tröster-Aufgabe verstanden, wie unbedenklich und kühn hat er zu ihr die Mittel gewählt! Das Christenthum in Sonderheit dürfte man eine grosse Schatzkammer geistreichster Trostmittel nennen, so viel Erquickliches, Milderndes, Narkotisirendes ist in ihm gehäuft, so viel Gefährlichstes und Verwegenstes zu diesem Zweck gewagt, so fein, so raffinirt, […]“ (GM III § 17; Nietzsche 2010: 377) [our translation: “The alleviation of suffering, ‘consolation’ of every kind — that proves to be his very genius: how inventively he has understood his task as consoler, how unscrupulously and boldly he has chosen the means for it! Christianity in particular might be called a great treasure-house of the most ingenious means of consolation, so much that is refreshing, soothing, narcotising is heaped up in it, so much of the most dangerous and daring has been ventured for this purpose, so subtly, so refinedly …”]

The “cattle” of the ascetic priests

“Cattle” is my word – a sharpening of Nietzsche’s „Heerde“ [“herd”], meant to translate his image into the language of today. Nietzsche himself speaks of herd and sheep, whom their shepherd, the priest, defends (GM III § 15): images for a role that anyone can take on, not a judgement about human beings.

What is meant is a flock of people who willingly subject themselves to the „Willen“ [“will”] (JGB § 19; Nietzsche 2010: 32) of the stronger one, the representative of their dogma, precisely this ascetic priest (cf. ibid.: 32 f.). Their language11 is a mark of distinction and a signal of their kind-alikeness (cf. JGB § 20–21; ibid.: 34, 36) and of their pity among one another, as Nietzsche describes it.

They are „[e]ntrüstet[…]“ [“indignant”] (JGB § 26; ibid.: 45) at resistance and fail to recognise their own dulling (cf. ibid.: 66f) towards the „christliche[n] Nomenklatur“ (JGB § 46; ibid.: 67), which consolidates them still further in their dogmas, willingly to render allegiance to this „verborgene[n]“ [“hidden”] (ibid.) principle of suffering. And should a moment of knowledge nonetheless smoulder up once, they are mostly willing to extinguish it quickly (cf. ibid.: 113), fall willingly into rank and file, in accordance with the mediocrity that they have sworn to hold in honour (cf. ibid.: 121), and only its strictest defender is really the good one: dumb, not too dumb to perform the imposed work, his burden, but not so clever as to become dangerous to anyone, at least to none of his ascetic priests — „[…] weil der Gute innerhalb der Sklaven-Denkweise jedenfalls der ungefährliche Mensch sein muss: er ist gutmüthig, leicht zu betrügen, ein bischen dumm vielleicht, un bonhomme“ (JGB § 260; ibid.: 212) [our translation: “because within the slave way of thinking the good man must in any case be the harmless human being: he is good-natured, easy to deceive, perhaps a little stupid, un bonhomme”]. They wallow in the customary praise of their mediocrity and even deny themselves, for this pleasure of self-castigation belongs to cruelty, to their little joys (cf. ibid.: 383), to their morality of suffering:

„Der Mensch, das tapferste und leidgewohnteste Thier, verneint an sich nicht das Leiden: er will es, er sucht es selbst auf, vorausgesetzt, dass man ihm einen Sinn dafür aufzeigt, ein Dazu des Leidens. Die Sinnlosigkeit des Leidens, nicht das Leiden, war der Fluch, der bisher über der Menschheit ausgebreitet lag, — und das asketische Ideal bot ihr einen Sinn!“ (GM III § 28; Nietzsche 2010: 411) [our translation: “Man, the bravest animal and the one most accustomed to suffering, does not in himself deny suffering: he wills it, he even seeks it out, provided one shows him a meaning for it, a what-for of suffering. The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that has so far lain spread over humanity — and the ascetic ideal offered it a meaning!”]

And in their sickness (cf. GM III § 9; Nietzsche 2010: 358), as self-fighting and self-despising sheep of their shepherds, the ascetic priests, they feel the „[L]ehrreich[e]“ [“instructive”] (ibid.) of their existence. The „Schwächsten“ [“weakest”] (GM III § 14; ibid.: 368) are, in Nietzsche, the sick, „[d]ie von vornherein Verunglückten, Niedergeworfnen, Zerbrochnen“ (ibid.) [our translation: “those who are failures from the outset, the downtrodden, the broken”] – it is they, he says, „[…] welche am Meisten das Leben unter Menschen unterminiren, welche unser Vertrauen zum Leben, zum Menschen, zu uns am gefährlichsten vergiften und in Frage stellen“ (ibid.; cf. ibid.: 252) [our translation: “who most undermine life among human beings, who most dangerously poison and call into question our trust in life, in man, in ourselves”]. This is Nietzsche’s rank order; no group of the present is meant by it. I take from it only the image of the one who remains trapped in the role of the sheep: unable to take the position of the other (cf. Nagel 2005: 118), persisting in their “emotional conditioning”12.

Those who do not feel they belong to this ideal sheep13, and yet do not decide to „Handeln“ [“act”] (JGB § 274; Nietzsche 2010: 228), are undone by „[…] [d]as Problem der Wartenden“ [“the problem of those who wait”] (ibid.), since they mostly miss the moment of their possibility of fostering their society, fail to give a drop into the water and to bring movement again into the rigid allegiance of the ascetic priests, to attain „— ‚zum Ausbruch‘ […]“ [“‘to break out’”] (ibid.). For „[d]er aktive, der angreifende, übergreifende Mensch ist immer noch der Gerechtigkeit hundert Schritte näher gestellt als der reaktive“ (GM II § 11; ibid.: 311) [our translation: “the active, the attacking, overreaching human being is still placed a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive one”], as it is mirrored for example in the „Komödianten“ [“comedian”] (GM III § 27; ibid.: 409), an approach to the strong human being:

The strong human being

In this sense, „der starke Mensch“ [“the strong human being”] (JGB § 242; Nietzsche 2010: 183) – whom, according to Nietzsche, the democratisation of Europe brings forth as an exception – represents the escapee from the herd, the affront to the ascetic priests as representatives of their dogma. They break the rules of the community, dare to educate themselves, indeed even to declare themselves independent and to make independent decisions (cf. JGB § 29; ibid.: 47 f.):

„[…] — und er kann nicht mehr zurück! er kann auch zum Mitleiden der Menschen nicht mehr zurück! — —“ (JGB § 29; Nietzsche 2010: 48) [our translation: “— and he can no longer go back! he can no longer go back even to the pity of human beings! — —”]

They seek to understand the hidden elements of society, to fathom the underlying truth, far from the prescribed dogmas of the ascetic priests. They set themselves apart from the opinions of the masses, especially those of the ascetic priests. The strong human being follows, of necessity, their own „Gesetzgebung“ [“legislation”] (JGB § 262; Nietzsche 2010: 216) and represents the ideal of individuality, the affront to the morality of suffering, the dogmas of the masses; they dare to develop, outside the prescribed barriers (as, in our reading, Comte among others sets them), and themselves take „Verantwort[ung]“ [“responsibility”] for their own life (JGB § 272; Nietzsche 2010: 228). In my reading, they are characterised, as an active human being, as a strong human being, by the following qualities: fidelity to principles, rule without violence, a sense of fairness; they love life and enjoy it (apart from the morality of suffering); they follow their goals. Nietzsche’s own picture is harsher (JGB § 293; cf. ibid.: 235 f.):

„Ein Mann, der sagt: ‚das gefällt mir, das nehme ich zu eigen und will es schützen und gegen Jedermann vertheidigen‘; ein Mann, der eine Sache führen, einen Entschluss durchführen, einem Gedanken Treue wahren, ein Weib festhalten, einen Verwegenen strafen und niederwerfen kann; ein Mann, der seinen Zorn und sein Schwert hat, und dem die Schwachen, Leidenden, Bedrängten, auch die Thiere gern zufallen und von Natur zugehören […].“ (JGB § 293; Nietzsche 2010: 235 f.) [our translation: “A man who says: ‘this pleases me, I take it as my own and will protect it and defend it against everyone’; a man who can lead a cause, carry through a resolve, keep faith with a thought, hold on to a woman, punish and overthrow an audacious one; a man who has his wrath and his sword, and to whom the weak, the suffering, the oppressed, even the animals gladly fall and by nature belong …”]

They go their own way without wilfully forcing others to cooperate with them or to subject themselves to them or their dogma: „[…] kurz ein Mann, der von Natur Herr ist, — wenn ein solcher Mann Mitleiden hat, nun! dies Mitleiden hat Werth!“ (JGB § 293; Nietzsche 2010: 236) [our translation: “in short, a man who is by nature a master — when such a man has pity, well! this pity has value!”] This particular human being is able to remind even the masses of their own hidden „Gewissen“ [“conscience”] (GM II § 2; ibid.: 294), one who has „Macht über sich“ [“power over himself”] (ibid.) and has not ceded it to a veiled dogma (cf. ibid.). A capacity that demands of them „[…] ‚Selbstüberwindung‘ […]“ [“‘self-overcoming’”] (cf. GM III § 27; ibid.: 410 – there “self-overcoming” as the law of life, by which Christian morality, too, overcomes itself). Nietzsche, however, also says: „der Egoismus gehört zum Wesen der vornehmen Seele“ (JGB § 265; ibid.: 219) [our translation: “egoism belongs to the essence of the noble soul”] – his strong human being is not an altruist in his eyes. I read him as one who can become one.

Thus, as a natural powerful one, they are a threat to the ascetic priest, who – so my reading – may likewise have sprung from the strong human being and abuses their natural power in order to force their will on others, their right of the stronger, on the basis of the morality of suffering, a slave morality. In this sense a „[…] Machtbewusstsein der Gesellschaft nicht undenkbar, bei dem sie sich den vornehmsten Luxus gönnen dürfte, den es für sie giebt, — ihren Schädiger straflos zu lassen.“ (GM II § 10; Nietzsche 2010: 309) [our translation: “a consciousness of power in society is not unthinkable at which it could allow itself the noblest luxury there is for it — to let those who harm it go unpunished.”] To show oneself as power-conscious and to let mercy prevail in place of revenge in the form of punishment, and to show strength, to grant the rule-breaker, the one who dares to think and to become intelligent, their freedom and to let them go their way.

This would be, in my reading, real altruism – Nietzsche himself calls this mercy „das Vorrecht des Mächtigsten“ [“the privilege of the most powerful”] (GM II § 10; ibid.: 309) and giving out of abundance a selfishness to be called “hale and holy” (Za I, “Von der schenkenden Tugend”) – and not the revenge for the preservation of past structures (whose best-known representative is probably „Thomas Hobbes“ (Nagel 2005: 19)) and moral conceptions embodied in their sole truths. And thus it becomes clear that the strong human being can be both egoist and altruist, in an up and down between faithful asceticism and priestly representation of it, or unfaithful joy in life and the taking of „Selbstverantwortung“ [“self-responsibility”] (Nagel 2005: 129) and „Rücksicht“ [“consideration”] (ibid.: 134) for the interests of others through their respect for them, in that they grant them and let them go their way.

In this sense I read Friedrich Nietzsche as an advocate of a holistic manner of considering the world surrounding us, and above all of considering the totality of consequences of an action (cf. JGB § 31–32; 2010: 50 f.) – he himself describes how the morality of consequences gave way to the morality of intention, and calls for overcoming the latter too:

„[…] man foltert seine Begeisterung durch den Zweifel, ja man fühlt schon das gute Gewissen als eine Gefahr, gleichsam als Selbst-Verschleierung und Ermüdung der feineren Redlichkeit; und vor Allem, man nimmt Partei, grundsätzlich Partei gegen ‚die Jugend‘. — Ein Jahrzehend später: und man begreift, dass auch dies Alles noch — Jugend war!“ (JGB § 31; Nietzsche 2010: 50) [our translation: “… one tortures one’s enthusiasm with doubt, indeed one already feels the good conscience as a danger, as it were as a self-veiling and a fatigue of the finer honesty; and above all, one takes sides, takes sides on principle against ‘youth’. — A decade later: and one comprehends that all this too was still — youth!”]

The instruments of ascetic priests invert the actual truths of nature into many truths of the embodied dogmas, split the human being into behaviour and custom, and let only their limits count as realities of life, whereby they estrange the human being from themselves (cf. Nietzsche 2010: 83).

And however graceful the rulers may appear today, they were, following the law of history, always at first a „Barbaren-Kaste“ [“barbarian caste”] (JGB § 257; ibid.: 205 f.) that learned to strengthen its will and to dominate others – Nietzsche says this admiringly; the assessment as a Leviathan that follows is mine. Primarily through veiling and the instrument of punishment as mnemonics, their rule is of an unnatural kind, a Hobbesian Leviathan. If their rule is of a natural kind, their instruments are real love and knowledge; yet it is precisely these that the ascetic priests advertise as their ideals, in order to veil their actual intentions, while the natural ruler, the strong human being, lives these out and does not hawk them about (cf. ibid.: 233, 236, 252):

„Die Werthschätzungen eines Menschen verrathen etwas vom Aufbau seiner Seele, und worin sie ihre Lebensbedingungen, ihre eigentliche Noth sieht.“ (JGB § 268; Nietzsche 2010: 222) [our translation: “A person’s valuations betray something of the structure of his soul, and of where it sees its conditions of life, its real need.”]

And thus Nietzsche (GM II § 7; 2010: 302) also emphasises his rejection of this pessimism (cf. ibid.) of the masses as well as of the ascetic priests, in order to counteract this „Lebensüberdruss[…]“ [“weariness of life”] (ibid.). Here, in my reading, the „Affekt“ [“affect”] (cf. GM III § 15; ibid.: 374) can provide a remedy: the emotion as a strong, undampened affect which, felt as positive, contradicts the morality of suffering, lets the sheep awaken, animates it to reflect and lets it register the possibility of a different perception, in order to break through the cycle of suffering and possibly to let mercy prevail and to undermine the instrument of revenge, to break through the punishment, to allow an alternative, a foreign and deviant manner of action, and to let the human being develop further – and not, through the same affect in negative form, especially revenge, to inhibit and blind them still further, as a saying often attributed to Gandhi puts it: an eye for an eye, and the whole world goes blind.

Source, Fig. 2: own depiction based on Nietzsche; notes: the red lines mark the lines of conflict between strong and weak human beings. The horizontal line of conflict marks hierarchical differences on the basis of power and influence, as found for example in political parties, religious offices, company departments, scientific renown and cultural prominence. Thus the employee has to subordinate themselves to the head of department, and the regional politician to the state minister. The vertical line of conflict distinguishes here specifically between the deviation from the dogma of the mass, and can, through a sense of responsibility and a cultural maturity, contribute to a considerable increase in welfare, or, in an immature human being, lead to the abuse of power and the assertion of their interests, and through raw violence contribute to a harming of overall welfare. A limited legitimation of the Leviathan is thereby present. Nonetheless, this permanent suppression of too great changes in society inhibits its development and thus provides for a strong dampening of overall welfare, whereby the possible positive climate is harmed by a few individual immature and power-obsessed actors. Specific explanations are to be taken from the exposition of Nietzsche (see above).

Reflection of Friedrich Nietzsche on the discourse overview

If one now takes to hand the overview14 of the years from 1990 to 2013 and lays it beside the exposition of Nietzsche (see above), several parallels quickly become clear. Thus under the ascetic priest (especially in the area of politics) one can understand the Foucauldian social worker15, who through their empathetic16 professions of loving-kindness wishes to uphold the preservation of their dogma17, their political party or religious grouping, mostly through an existing generalised trust18 and through the building of social capital19 in associations and charities20 as well as religious communities. Precisely for this reason helpfulness can be observed especially where people seek security in community21 – in my reading as a kind of compensatory behaviour for the establishment of a social security, freed as far as possible from greater changes and development, in order to preserve the established order-structure: what Nietzsche calls slave morality. A loving-kindness that is prescribed as a duty towards the collective, whatever teaching it stems from, forbids the individual to effect real changes22 and development – which should not suggest the fallacy of a generally violent enforcement of changes. However, in this view one must also take into account different levels of ascetic priests, since not only the topmost politicians count as ascetic priests of politics! Thus the topmost politicians are the ascetic priests of their direct party comrades at state level, who in turn are the ascetic priests of their party comrades at regional level, and so on, down to the local level: this role – Nietzsche’s image of the ascetic priest – can appear at every level of a hierarchy. This by no means excludes influences of other ascetic priests from religion, economy, science and culture, but affects respectively specific areas of the personal dogma of an actor. The internalised slave morality expresses itself in a particular conception of loving-kindness and rejects reciprocity in connection with a good deed²³, and demands, in case of contravention, the punishment and discrimination of these “hypocrites”, who themselves draw a personal gain (such as the favour of a loved one24) from it, or even show self-destructive tendencies25 in order to pay respect to this loving-kindness as duty, to slave morality26 as a morality of suffering27. Studies of the mutual images that believers and non-believers hold show that both sides expect to be devalued by the other28 – whoever helps differently or believes differently is then easily not recognised as an altruist. In a Finnish survey, 7.1% were engaged wholly or partly in church institutions and 30.8% exclusively in other institutions29; 62%30 did no voluntary work, most of them of working age. Why people volunteer outside the church, the figure does not say; in the same study, those engaged in church settings even showed the highest willingness to help (Yeung 2004: 411). Nor can it be concluded from the 62% that there would be a clear surplus of egoists, especially since these people, in the sense of the mechanical activity in Nietzsche (see above), are occupied with providing for their livelihood. All the more so as informal volunteering has hitherto scarcely been analysed in this respect (see above: Institutional altruism in sociology). This, however, is by no means meant to stamp the influence of religion31 on helpfulness as unimportant (which Nietzsche paraphrases as a lack of knowledge of the religious connections of our cultural and historical origin (see above)) – whereby religiosity has only a slight influence on our well-being; altruism has a somewhat stronger effect, but personal success the strongest32. Nietzsche even held the great religions partly responsible for a developmental stagnation of our culture – that is his polemic, and we do not make it our own.

If one is now ready to move away from this need for suffering that Nietzsche ascribes to the ascetic ideal (cf. GM III § 28), and to see charity also in such situations as build upon reciprocity, this can, overall, contribute to an improvement of overall welfare33. This does indeed contradict a strict interpretation of loving-kindness as pure sacrifice – though the Christian tradition itself also knows the “cheerful giver” (2 Cor 9:7), and other traditions know their own forms of joyful giving – since these acts of help can contain advantages both for the helper and for the recipient of this help (for instance someone donates, on their own initiative34, an amount X to a children’s home and feels good afterwards and has been shown gratitude); yet it cannot be denied that the improvement of the situation of the one in need of help and the personal success (see above) of the one giving help implies an improvement of welfare on both sides of the interaction. Perhaps simply through the feeling of confirmation of being needed35. The appeal, then, is obvious: to set oneself against this slave morality sketched by Nietzsche (see above) and to illuminate especially the positive aspects of overall welfare, which especially on the institutional level can contain a mutual, probably generally reciprocal advantage (cf. on this also Mauss (see below)). And with this one should generally direct the analysis towards positive aspects36 (among them feelings37) and not only try again and again to confirm what is negative and already known, and to try to declare it a condition of life – which, among other things, has led to the emergence of “positive psychology”38, as Nietzsche (see above) too generally appeals to science. And if one considers the strong human being in Nietzsche (see above) and imagines them as the founder whom Sigmund (see above) has described, then, in my reading, already in Nietzsche the description of an altruistic personality39 is present in outline. A self-confident40 individual character, ready to violate the dogmas of the masses and to allow development, a deviation from the norm of slave morality in order to effect and to receive something positive and thus to contribute to a real increase of overall welfare, and not, through obligated suffering (according to slave morality), to effect only a shift of prosperity, or even a lowering of welfare, should deeper-reaching disadvantages arise for the donor from their well-meant good deed which they did not take into account in the zeal of loving-kindness. Nonetheless it cannot be denied that this can also be a strategic action out of pure self-interest, whereby the strong human being in Nietzsche can also constitute an ascetic priest, who uses their competences, their empathy and their self-confidence in order to control other, weak human beings with fear41, suffering and violence (mnemonics/slave morality) and to present these to them as a necessity of the “civilised order”, or to act in the same function as a Foucauldian social worker. And precisely this connection makes altruism, or specifically the personality of the possible altruist, one of the most important areas of analysis for leadership42 and elite research43. Thus it shows that Nietzsche already, long ago, provided a very good assessment of societal power structures and thereby provided the framing of socially relevant factors of influence, and today has by no means lost validity and can be inspiring for altruism research, especially in relation to institutional altruism (see above). That mixed reasons – self-interested alongside altruistic ones – weaken appeals for donations has meanwhile been empirically demonstrated44; for me it is a further indication of this inhibition through slave morality (see above), whereby some reject the moralisation of this debate. Thus, on the one hand, prosocial behaviour45 is understood as a pronounced form of prosocial behaviour (which again suggests the altruistic personality of the strong human being), while others here more strongly wish to formulate an ethics, as Thomas Nagel now does in the following with increasing emphasis, one of the strongest advocates of altruism today. A short overview of the power structures in Nietzsche is depicted in Figure 2 (see above), which at the same time provides a first framework of the possibility of altruism, to which especially Thomas Nagel devotes himself in the following.

Endnotes

1. In accordance with contemporary spelling!
2. Genesis 2–3, Elberfelder translation [URL: http://www.bibelstudium.de/bibelpopup.php?ref=1/3/0, 2014.02.24: 13:24]
3. Here one may recall the working customer of G. Günter Voß as well as his labour-power entrepreneur (Pongratz/Voß 1998, 2003).
4. „Man spürt, daß es keinen besseren Weg gibt, Menschen zur Arbeit zu bringen, als dadurch, daß man ihnen die Gewißheit gibt, ihr Leben lang loyal bezahlt zu werden für die Arbeit, die sie loyal ausgeführt haben, und zwar sowohl für andere wie für sich selbst.“ (Mauss 1990: 174)
5. Formulated, in accordance with contemporary spelling, as machinale Tätigkeit!
6. Recall at this point the displeasure of Martin Luther in Europe on being confronted with the indulgence slips of the Christian Church.
7. According to Nietzsche (JGB § 211–213; 2010: 147 ff.), the philosopher must gather experiences in order really to become a philosopher/scholar, for without these they fail to recognise essential components of societal reality and, strictly speaking, continue to move in the dark.
8. In the original: „Es ist in Sonderheit der Anblick jener Mischmasch-Philosophen, die sich ‚Wirklichkeits-Philosophen‘ oder ‚Positivisten‘ nennen, welcher ein gefährliches Misstrauen in die Seele eines jungen, ehrgeizigen Gelehrten zu werfen im Stande ist: das sind ja besten Falls selbst Gelehrte und Spezialisten, man greift es mit Händen! — das sind ja allesammt Überwundene und unter die Botmässigkeit der Wissenschaft Zurückgebrachte, welche irgendwann einmal ‚mehr‘ von sich gewollt haben, […]“ (JGB § 204; Nietzsche 2010: 131) [our translation: “It is in particular the sight of those hotchpotch philosophers who call themselves ‘philosophers of reality’ or ‘positivists’ that is capable of casting a dangerous mistrust into the soul of a young, ambitious scholar: at best they are themselves scholars and specialists, that is plain to see! — they are all of them defeated men, brought back under the dominion of science, who at some point wanted ‘more’ of themselves …”]
9. For understanding, refer here to the term and concept of the habitus in Pierre Bourdieu (1976, 1985, 1987a, 1987b, 1992), as the internalised cultural conventions in the form of norms and values which decisively influence our perception and our resulting action.
10. Even if this connection to the religious has long since escaped them (JGB § 219; Nietzsche 2010: 153).
11. „Sprach-Verwandtschaft“ [“linguistic kinship”] (JGB § 20; Nietzsche 2010: 34)
12. In the English original: „Consequently, green consumption may be stimulated by adding emotional experiences of the ‚nature-feelings‘ kind to the benefit perception of environmental products.“ (Hartmann/Apaolaza-Ibáñez 2008: 833); „The case of the green brand of the three analyzed energy brands illustrates how a brand, initially not perceived as environmentally friendly and not associated with nature, can be transformed to evoke virtual nature experiences in most consumers: by applying persuasive communication strategies, that is, through the use of emotional conditioning (Aaker & Stayman, 1992; Kim et al., 1998; Kroeber-Riel, 1984).“ (ibid.: 833f); „[…] Levi and Kocher‘s (1999) findings: people may eventually downgrade the value of local natural environments because of their experiences with virtual nature.“ (ibid.: 834); this, however, describes the manipulation of people, which has little to do with a real development of consciousness of the human being and results in undesired side effects, like a bureaucracy that rigidly follows its self-set guidelines and as a rule adapts to new circumstances only with considerable effort, thereby causing immense damage to overall welfare! Cf. on this especially Nietzsche’s slave morality and set it against emotional conditioning, as an instrument of practical application.
13. Cf. on this also Brown/Ferris (2007): „Individuals with greater stocks of networks based social capital tend to give more to religious causes and to give more to secular causes. Individuals with higher levels of norm-based social capital volunteer more and give more to secular causes.“ (96); that people with network-based social capital give more to religious as well as to secular causes I read as an indication of follower structures that can rest on social pressure – Nietzsche’s image of the herd (see above); „[…], the importance of norm-based social capital is significant in the two instances that are not religion specific.“ (96f); „[…] a belief in the civic life of a community in terms of trusting others is important in encouraging gifts of money for secular causes and volunteering time. […], our results indicate that the estimated direct impact of education is substantially smaller when social capital is taken into account.“ (ibid.: 97).
14. Here let it be noted that the discourse overview contains further background information on the following footnotes and that this depiction listed here serves merely as a search aid in the discourse overview. Here, especially in the digital version of the work, one can navigate very quickly with the “search” function [ctrl + f or cmd + f]. More detailed information is to be taken from the source citations themselves.
15. Margolin (1997 in Floersch 1999) 1999
16. Epley/Caruso/Bazerman 2006
17. Reyes 2011
18. Sargeant/Lee 2004: 198; Irwin/McGrimmon/Simpson 2008
19. Whereby this, according to Yeung (2004), is very conducive to the emergence of voluntary engagement.
20. Leal 2006
21. Carlo et al. 1991
22. Cowen 1993: 224
23. Runciman 2004: 7, 12
24. Newman/Cain 2014
25. Kierkgegaard 1980 in Hampton 1993: 135; Cowley/Paterson/Williams 2004
26. Piff et al. 2010
27. de Hooge et al. 2011
28. Saroglou/Yzerbyt/Kaschten 2011: 490ff
29. Yeung 2004: 409
30. Yeung 2004: 418
31. Brown/Ferris 2007
32. Meulemann 2010
33. Weinstein/Ryan 2010
34. Nelson/Norton 2005
35. Rosenberrg 1985 in Simmons 1991: 10
36. Goffman 1961: 10ff, 27f, 41
37. Simmons 1991: 9
38. Piliavin 2009: 221
39. varese/yaish 2005
40. Underwood 2005
41. Heger 2010; Rölle 2010
42. Sosik/Jung/Dinger 2009
43. Mills 1962
44. Feiler/Tost/Grant 2012
45. Batson et al. 1997

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