Altruism in Comte

In Auguste Comte, altruism means the precedence of the benevolent over the self-interested inclinations – “vivre pour autrui”, to live for others. Comte coined the word in 1851 in the first volume of his Système de politique positive. He held the social inclinations to be innate but weaker than the self-interested ones; education and a new “Religion of Humanity” were to give them the upper hand. He did not demand the sacrifice of all one’s own wishes, but he did demand that the individual be fitted into an order directed from above – and that is where our critique begins.

This entry presents Comte in his own words: in French, with our own translation in each case (our translation throughout). For the Discours sur l’esprit positif we quote the German edition by Iring Fetscher (1994) with its page numbers, in German, again followed by our translation. On the term today, see Altruism; on our own position, Loving-kindness and altruism.

About the person. Auguste Comte (1798–1857), French philosopher from Montpellier, graduate of the École polytechnique and secretary to Saint-Simon, is regarded as the founder of positivism and in 1839 gave sociology its name.

Where does the word “altruism” come from?

The word first appears in the first volume of the Système de politique positive (1851): “beaucoup d’espèces trouvent donc dans l’altruisme la source d’une harmonie” – many species thus find in altruism the source of a harmony (p. 614). A few pages later Comte spans the scale: “Entre l’égoïsme complet et le pur altruisme” – between complete egoism and pure altruism (p. 693). The title page carries the motto “Vivre pour autrui”.

In the Discours sur l’esprit positif of 1844 and in the Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842) the word does not yet occur. The year 1842, often given, therefore cannot be upheld.

What does Comte mean by “living for others”?

Comte demands precedence, not sacrifice. The principal human task, he says, is “à faire graduellement prévaloir la sociabilité sur la personnalité, quoique celle-ci soit spontanément prépondérante” – to let sociability gradually prevail over personality, although the latter predominates by nature (Catéchisme positiviste, p. 8). He calls the benevolent inclinations the „Hauptquelle des persönlichen Glückes“ – the main source of personal happiness (Discours, Fetscher p. 80).

What is meant, then, is an ordering of one’s own inclinations: the benevolent ones are to lead, the self-interested ones to serve.

Is the human being social by nature, according to Comte?

Yes. Comte speaks of the “sociabilité fondamentale de l’homme”, the fundamental sociability of man (Cours IV, p. 539). In the Discours he names „die der menschlichen Natur eigenen wohlwollenden und desinteressierten Gefühle“ – the benevolent and disinterested feelings proper to human nature (Fetscher pp. 78 f.), which, however, possess „keine überwiegende Kraft“ – no preponderant strength (p. 80). In this he differs from Thomas Hobbes, for whom man seeks himself first.

What role does Comte’s doctrine of the brain play?

Comte relied on the cranial doctrine of Franz Joseph Gall. In his tableau cérébral he counts seven personal and three “penchants sociaux ou altruistes”, social or altruistic inclinations (Système I, p. 699), and turns against the “sophismes … contre l’existence propre des instincts sympathiques” (p. 700). Brain localisation of this kind is outdated today; the question whether compassion is innate still occupies research (see Empathy).

What does the law of three stages have to do with altruism?

According to Comte, thought passes through three stages: the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. The old way of thinking, he says, was “essentiellement individuelle, et jamais directement collective”, essentially individual and never directly collective (Discours § 55; Fetscher p. 79); the positive spirit, by contrast, is “directement social” (§ 56). For Comte, altruism is the morality of the positive age.

In doing so, Comte arranges the religions in a sequence of stages. We do not adopt this ranking; Comte himself demanded that “scrupuleuse justice” be shown to all forms of faith (§ 32; Fetscher p. 47).

What is the Religion of Humanity?

In his late work Comte puts Humanity, the “Grand-Être”, in the place of God, with a cult, a calendar and an immortality in the memory of posterity. The individual counts for little here: “Pour lui, l’homme proprement dit n’existe pas, il ne peut exister que l’Humanité” – for it, man in the proper sense does not exist; only Humanity can exist (Discours § 56; Fetscher p. 80). By his own account, Comte derived his motto from the Imitation of Christ; Christian love of neighbour and Comte’s altruism stand side by side here.

How did Comte want to enforce his order?

Comte separates persuasion from coercion. The new doctrine is to prevail only through assent: one must renounce making it “jamais prévaloir autrement que d’après le libre assentiment du public” – ever prevail otherwise than through the free assent of the public; “tout recours à la violence” – any recourse to violence – would be incompatible with this (Système IV, 1854, p. 374). He demands “une pleine liberté d’exposition, et même de discussion” – full freedom of exposition, and even of discussion – as a safeguard against degeneration into tyranny (p. 379).

Against individuals who withdraw from the order, however, he envisages a sequence of steps. Religion acts first on heart and mind, then it appeals to public opinion, “d’où résulte une force vraiment coercitive, mais toujours morale” – from which results a truly coercive, but always moral force; social exclusion follows. And: “Si cette influence indirecte devient insuffisante à son tour, il faut bien recourir à la force matérielle” – if this indirect influence in turn becomes insufficient, one must indeed resort to material force; the priesthood then hands the case over to the government (Système II, 1852, pp. 418 f.). The abolition of the death penalty would, according to Comte, violate the laws “qui sont propres à l’organisme collectif” – which are proper to the collective organism (p. 419).

The dictatorship of the transition

For the period until the positive order is complete, Comte expressly demands a dictatorship. He welcomes the coup d’état of December 1851: “notre situation républicaine permet et exige la dictature” – our republican situation permits and requires dictatorship (letter to Senator Vieillard, 28 February 1852, printed in Système II, preface, p. XXVII). In the Catéchisme he calls it an “heureuse crise”, a happy crisis (preface).

He sums up his programme in maxims: “La république sociale doit être dictatoriale, et non parlementaire. (Crise de décembre 1851.)” – the social republic must be dictatorial, not parliamentary – and: “La république dictatoriale doit être temporelle, et non spirituelle, d’après une entière liberté d’exposition, et même de discussion” – the dictatorial republic must be temporal, not spiritual, with complete freedom of exposition and even of discussion (Système III, preface, 1852, pp. XLI f.). The formula behind it: “il suffit de concilier irrévocablement la dictature et la liberté, suivant le vœu systématique de Hobbes” – it suffices to reconcile dictatorship and liberty irrevocably, in accordance with the wish of Hobbes (Système IV, 1854, p. 378).

The positivists themselves are to prepare for this: “Les positivistes sont tellement appelés à gouverner l’Occident qu’ils doivent déjà préparer leur dictature systématique” – the positivists are so much called to govern the West that they must already prepare their systematic dictatorship (Système IV, preface, p. XXVII). Against unrest a militia suffices, “dont il importe que le régime dictatorial se trouve toujours préservé, pour que son essor ne soit pas forcé de se subordonner aux préjugés populaires” – the dictatorial regime must always remain preserved from unrest, so that it is not forced to subordinate itself to the prejudices of the people (p. 418).

In the last phase a triumvirate takes over: it is to exercise “la répression nécessaire des délits politiques”, the necessary repression of political offences, “sans la pousser encore jusqu’au terrible degré” – without yet pushing it to that terrible degree (p. 466). Without courts, the government announces “les proscriptions qu’il jugera convenables”, the proscriptions it deems appropriate: exclusion from civic offices, banishment, “complété quelquefois par la confiscation”, sometimes supplemented by confiscation of property (p. 467) – directed against the forces “qui repousseront la régénération occidentale”, which reject the regeneration of the West (p. 470).

Why do we view Comte’s model critically?

Our reading: We capture Comte’s programme with three terms of our own, which make visible a red line running to the same structures. Collectivism is our name for the precedence of Humanity over the individual, which in Comte goes so far that man in the proper sense does not exist. Mass is our name for the whole into which the individual is to fit – Comte himself rejected the rule of the mere crowd, but placed a spiritual authority above it. Surveillance is our name for the sequence of public opinion, exclusion and state coercion that catches everyone who withdraws from the order. These terms are ours, not Comte’s; the structures they point to stand in his own words above.

An altruism that fits the individual in from above and, in the end, brings him back by force if necessary becomes a prescribed duty. Comte’s separation – the doctrine persuades, the state coerces – does not convince us, because it does not abolish coercion but transfers it to another organ. We read the “altruistic punishment” of present-day economics as a return of this idea (see Altruistic punishment (Fehr/Gächter)). Our counter-proposal: altruism that is voluntary, comes from abundance and is carried by mature people.

Religion as order – where the Institute thinks differently

Comte raises a question that remains: what holds a society together when the old religion loses its binding force? His answer is a scientific Religion of Humanity, with scholars in the role of priests.

D. Harald Alke describes the same sequence – Church, Enlightenment, materialist science – and judges it the other way round: “Detachment from any religion has by now brought us more problems than most people have so far realised” (Energy for Millions, 1993). He views critically a science that itself becomes a substitute religion. What he sets against it is an honest religious life that fosters responsibility and includes every individual – “for the good of all, including ourselves” (The Ethics of the New Human, 1993). That is the counter-formula to Comte’s “to live for others”: not the other instead of me, but everyone including me.

Our view: A present-day example of a successful coexistence is China. Many people there practise several traditions at once – Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism and folk religion overlap so strongly that hardly anyone follows only one (Pew Research Center 2023). State, religion and science are separate; no religion determines politics, none is displaced by science. We consider the boundary the state draws to be justified: it is directed not against faith, but against organised structures that endanger the peace of the population as a whole for the benefit of a small group. This counteracts fanaticism and religiously motivated extremism such as political Islam (Islamism) – not Islam as a faith. It is precisely this separation that creates room to respect the concerns of others.

Which passages in Comte are controversial?

Comte’s work includes judgements that no longer hold today. We reproduce them in his own words so that his thought is fully visible.

Stages of religion and “races”. Comte assigns the phases of theology to groups of people. He sees fetishism “chez la moins nombreuse des trois grandes races qui composent notre espèce” – among the least numerous of the three great races that make up our species (Comte’s words; our translation); polytheism “chez la plus nombreuse des trois races humaines, outre l’élite de la race noire et la partie la moins avancée de la race blanche” (Discours §§ 4–5; Fetscher p. 7). That is Comte’s classification of 1844. We adopt neither the division of human beings into races nor any ranking of religions or cultures; for us they stand side by side.

The sexes. Comte turns against “la prétendue égalité des deux sexes”, the alleged equality of the sexes, and describes the female sex “en une sorte d’état d’enfance continue”, in a kind of continuing childhood; sociology, he says, should show “l’incompatibilité radicale de toute existence sociale avec cette chimérique égalité des sexes” (Cours IV, 1839, pp. 569 f.). This too is Comte’s position, not ours.

What has remained of Comte’s altruism?

Herbert Spencer adopted the word, and in Victorian England it became the watchword of a morality without the Church (Dixon 2008). Émile Durkheim called altruism the “base fondamentale” of society (see Solidarity through the division of labour (Durkheim)). Present-day research on empathy and cooperation goes on asking what Comte asked: how strong the benevolent inclinations are by nature (see The prosocial nature of human beings, in German). What has remained is the word – the path of enforcing it is one we do not follow.

Related terms

Altruism · Egoism · Loving-kindness and altruism · Collectivism and individualism · Altruistic punishment (Fehr/Gächter) · The Gift (Mauss) · Empathy

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By Tobias O. R. Alke