Machine-translated: This page was translated with the help of AI. If anything is unclear, we welcome your suggestions for improvement.

Fairness in economic decisions (Ockenfels)

For Axel Ockenfels, fairness in economic decisions means that people care not only about their own gain, but also about their position relative to others. For him, fairness and reciprocity are not a deviation from rational action, but part of what people want – in markets too.

This entry deals with this one idea and what it means for the image of the human being in economics, not with the work as a whole. For the concept itself, see Altruism; for mutuality, Reciprocity.

About the person. Axel Ockenfels (born 1969) is an economist at the University of Cologne and one of the best-known German representatives of experimental economics. His doctoral thesis Fairneß, Reziprozität und Eigennutz (Fairness, Reciprocity and Self-Interest, in German) appeared in 1999.

What does self-interest mean – and what does altruism mean?

Ockenfels draws a precise distinction. He calls only that behaviour self-interested which is driven solely by one’s own material gain. Altruism, by contrast, he takes broadly: as an interdependence of preferences – one’s own goals depend on the well-being of others. Fairness and reciprocity are expressly part of it.

In doing so he gives up an assumption that long counted as a basic law of economics: that people look only to their own advantage. The assumption that people act rationally he does not give up. He merely widens what their reason is directed towards.

What does the ERC model explain?

Together with Gary Bolton, Ockenfels developed the ERC model – Equity, Reciprocity and Competition (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000). It assumes that, besides their own gain, people pay attention to their relative position, that is, to their share of the whole. Most do not want markedly less than the others, and many do not want markedly more either.

A single assumption thus explains what otherwise seems contradictory:

Alongside ERC stands the model of inequity aversion by Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999), which emphasises the comparison with each individual other person. Both models explain many findings similarly well; they stand side by side. For more on Fehr, see Altruistic punishment (Fehr/Gächter).

What does the East–West comparison show?

In the 1990s, Ockenfels and Joachim Weimann had students in Magdeburg play the same games that students in Bonn had played before (Ockenfels & Weimann 1999; Selten & Ockenfels 1998). The students in Magdeburg paid less into a common good and gave less in a solidarity game. A second finding was decisive: each group expected from the others pretty much exactly what it did itself.

The authors therefore expressly consider it misleading to call the one group “less fair”. Different norms apply – and measured against them, each group acts fairly. Where the differences come from, they leave open; as conjectures they name the experience of the planned economy and the notion that, after reunification, self-interested behaviour might be considered “typical”, that is, customary, in a market-based order (Ockenfels & Weimann 1999: 285).

For us this is the most important lesson of this finding: fairness is not the same measure everywhere. Differences between groups stand side by side, not one above the other. A political order that monitors the lives of individuals down into the private sphere and enforces conformity leaves traces in trust – that is a critique of the system, not of the people who lived in it.

Does talking help people cooperate?

Clearly. People who can talk with one another before a decision cooperate in social dilemmas on average much more often (Sally 1995). Besides the words, voice, tone and facial expression have an effect. Feelings in a face can be read somewhat more easily within one’s own culture than across cultural boundaries – and that applies in both directions (Elfenbein & Ambady 2002).

We therefore note: even in “anonymous” situations, people perceive more of one another than a game set-up assumes – expression, language, bearing. A laboratory experiment shows behaviour under its own conditions; in life, experience and impression are always added.

Does money crowd out one’s own motivation?

Under certain circumstances. Whoever does something on their own initiative can lose that drive if they are paid or controlled for it – especially when the payment is experienced as mistrust or steering (Frey & Jegen 2001). This does not always apply, nor completely; appreciative reward can also strengthen motivation.

Our reading: the market needs fairness – and freedom

Even in the market, people decide not only according to their own gain, but according to their position relative to others. Fairness and reciprocity are not disturbances, but part of preference – Ockenfels thereby opened a way for economics to take the social seriously.

From this, a distinction follows for us. The free exchange of many individuals brings forth prices in which dispersed knowledge is contained – Friedrich August von Hayek described this. Whoever, by contrast, wants to measure all areas of life in a single quantity and steer them from above claims a knowledge that no one has. It is not the market that pushes fairness back, but an order that replaces exchange with direction.

And something else belongs here: those who, in their studies, learn above all the model of the self-interested human being tend to behave accordingly in game experiments (Frank, Gilovich & Regan 1993) – how much of this is learning and how much self-selection is disputed. An image of the human being does not remain without consequences when it is taught.

What we read differently in 2017

In Selected Perspectives on Altruism (2017, in German) we explained the East–West finding by an aversion to the West – that is not what Ockenfels and Weimann say; they leave the cause open. We also attributed to Ockenfels the claim that strongly self-interested people were found almost only among economists; in fact, people who gave nothing were found in all subjects, and a difference by field of study showed up only among men. Our critique of an image of the human being that knows only self-interest remains – it now stands on the more precise finding.

Frequently asked questions

What does Axel Ockenfels mean by fairness?

For Ockenfels, fairness is not a disturbance, but part of what people want. He calls only that behaviour self-interested which is driven solely by one’s own material gain. He understands altruism broadly: as the dependence of one’s own goals on the well-being of others – fairness and reciprocity included.

What is the ERC model?

ERC stands for Equity, Reciprocity and Competition. The model by Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) assumes that, besides their own gain, people also pay attention to their share of the whole: they do not want to receive markedly less, but often not markedly more either, than the average. This explains why in some games they share fairly and in markets nevertheless compete hard.

Why do people reject unfair offers even though they lose by doing so?

In the ultimatum game, whoever rejects an offer receives nothing at all – and yet very low offers are often rejected. In Ockenfels’ view, for many people their relative position counts for more than a small gain. Those making the offers know this and offer more, because they fear a rejection.

Are people in the east of Germany less fair?

No, the finding cannot be read that way. Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) found that students in Magdeburg paid less into common goods in their games and gave less for solidarity than students in Bonn – but each group expected from the others exactly what it did itself. The authors expressly call it misleading to describe one group as less fair on that account: different norms apply.

Does talking help people cooperate?

Yes, clearly. People who can talk with one another before a decision cooperate in social dilemmas on average much more often than without conversation (Sally 1995). Besides words, voice and facial expression contribute – while feelings can be read somewhat more easily within one’s own culture than across cultural boundaries, in both directions.

Change history · last updated on
  • — The authors’ conjecture about the East–West differences has been stated more precisely on the basis of the original.
  • — First publication of the English version of this entry.

Sources

  • Axel Ockenfels: Fairneß, Reziprozität und Eigennutz. Ökonomische Theorie und experimentelle Evidenz (Fairness, Reciprocity and Self-Interest. Economic Theory and Experimental Evidence). Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1999.
  • Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels: ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition. In: American Economic Review 90 (2000), 166–193. doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.1.166
  • Axel Ockenfels & Joachim Weimann: Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-German comparison of cooperation and solidarity. In: Journal of Public Economics 71 (1999), 275–287. doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00072-3
  • Reinhard Selten & Axel Ockenfels: An experimental solidarity game. In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 34 (1998), 517–539. doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00107-8
  • Axel Ockenfels & Werner Raub: Rational und fair (Rational and Fair). In: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, Sonderheft 50 (2010).
  • Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt: A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. In: Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (1999), 817–868. doi.org/10.1162/003355399556151
  • Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen: Motivation crowding theory. In: Journal of Economic Surveys 15 (2001), 589–611. doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00150
  • David Sally: Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas. In: Rationality and Society 7 (1995), 58–92. doi.org/10.1177/1043463195007001004
  • Hillary Anger Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady: On the universality and cultural specificity of emotion recognition: A meta-analysis. In: Psychological Bulletin 128 (2002), 203–235. doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.128.2.203
  • Robert H. Frank, Thomas Gilovich & Dennis T. Regan: Does studying economics inhibit cooperation? In: Journal of Economic Perspectives 7 (1993), 159–171. doi.org/10.1257/jep.7.2.159
  • Tobias O. R. Alke: Ausgewählte Perspektiven des Altruismus (Selected Perspectives on Altruism). Kyborg Institut & Verlag, 2017. ISBN 978-3-96104-027-8 – chapters „Axel Ockenfels“, „Reflexion …“ and „Beiträge der Ökonomie zur Anregung der Soziologie“.

More from Kyborg Institute in Google Search — Set as preferred source

By Tobias O. R. Alke

Share this page