The Emotional Foundation of the Child

18.7.2022

Autor: Tobias O. R. Alke

A standpoint, not a lexicon entry. A scholarly work by Tobias Alke – source-based, with a holistic perspective. Background knowledge: the lexicon entry Consciousness and mind.

A note before reading. This article renders an expressly personal, worldview-based opinion of the author. It joins sociological research with a holistic, in part spiritual perspective (among other things reincarnation, telepathy and parapsychological studies) and voices pointed, subjective criticism. It is not an assertion of fact, not a scientific consensus and not medical, legal or religious advice. It is left to everyone whether to read it. — Translator’s note: the primary quotations are retained verbatim in the original German from the cited editions, with page references preserved; the bibliography and source citations likewise remain in the original.

Prenatal socialisation — biological environment — individual chronicle

An extension of Jean Piaget’s stage concept by the stages

Introduction

The consideration of emotions among the „[…] europäischen […; Gründervätern] der Soziologie, […] Georg Simmel, Max Weber und Emile Durkheim […]“ (Flam 2002: 9) was quickly forgotten again by their discipline in the vow of fidelity to rationality, and hushed up until the mid-1980s in order to do all honour to its generally usual emulation of economics. This present work will go one step further and also take the biology of the human being, ignored by most sociologists (cf. Simmons 1991: 11), into the analysis, in order to do justice to a holistic worldview which today, in the course of „[…] [m]onetaristische[n] Neoliberalismus […]“ (Biebricher 2012: 70-86), is being un-taught to the human being with much love of detail (cf. also Hüther/Krens 2011: 32). For a human being who is no longer able to see the great whole can also no longer form an opinion of their own, and is thereby in the first place receptive to steered polit-economic incentives. The significance of a holistic approach, especially in the context of emotions, becomes especially clear in the following quotation:

„Daher gibt es keinen einheitlichen Plan für die Organisation einer Klasse von Emotionen, und keine einzelne Klasse von Emotionen, und keine einzelne Komponente ist für die Genese und die Herstellung der Emotion primär.“ (Holodynski 2006: 29)

It should actually be completely normal to concern oneself also with the biological processes of emotional stirrings, since these are an essential component of the sensing of emotions, yet sociology is, as so often, of the view that our biology would stand in no connection with our social togetherness. That is why one speaks of (reproductive) drives, of the apparently fundamentally evil nature of the human being (thus Hobbes in the Leviathan — or also T. H. Huxley —, one of the central foundations of the rational-choice theories in economics, the traditional birthplace of monetarist neoliberalism). This ignorance of holistic connections becomes clear in the dealings with ourselves, especially towards our unborn and newborn, and throws a rather barbaric and medieval picture on us with regard to our societal development. Our technology has perhaps developed markedly further — although we still use fire as a primary source of energy, be it in motor-vehicle engines, coal-fired power stations or aeroplanes. As a species, however, we humans have not developed much further than in the times of the Inquisition:

„Noch vor wenigen Jahrzehnten wurden neugeborene Babys ohne Narkose operiert, weil man glaubte, ihr Schmerzempfinden sei noch nicht entwickelt. Neugeborene wurden nach der Geburt von ihren Müttern getrennt, damit sich die Mütter in Ruhe erholen konnten. Dabei ging man davon aus, dass die Neugeborenen noch kein psychisches Leiden empfänden.“ (Hüther/Krens: 2011: 8)

Such shock experiences are mirrored deep in our biology, shape our later action and our dealings with our fellow human beings, and can durably brake us in our development — or foster it, when they are of a positive kind. Already in the womb, socialisation begins with the moment of conception:

„‚Wenn dieses Milieu sehr beängstigend ist, dann werden eher die Synapsen (Nervenverbindungen) für Angst, Unruhe und Stress ausgebildet – und weniger diejenigen für Glück und Zufriedenheit. Wenn aber die Mutter in einem guten Verhältnis zu der Schwangerschaft steht, ist es umgekehrt: Dann fühlt sich das Kind auch gewünscht‘, glaubt Janus. Manche Forscher sprechen daher sogar von einer vorgeburtlichen ‚Programmierung‘ eines Menschen, die lebenslang nachwirke, wie Professor Nathanielsz von der Cornell University im Bundesstaat New York (USA): ‚Sie können das schönste Genom (Gesamtheit der Gene) der Welt haben – wenn die Einflüsse im Mutterleib negativ sind, kann ein ziemlich schlechtes Endprodukt dabei herauskommen.‘ Bereits noch im Mutterleib, so beobachten Wissenschaftler im Ultraschall, reagieren die Babys offenbar schon sichtbar auf negative Gefühle der Schwangeren: Die einen werden unruhig, ihre Bewegungen sind fahrig. Die anderen machen sich klein und ziehen Arme und Beine dicht an den Körper heran.“ (Möller 2012)

How far this prenatal development of the human being goes, and how strongly we limit ourselves in our development solely for reasons of adaptation, I will deepen in the following chapter, which consolidates the basis of the assumptions put forward here and substantiates them with empirical results. Among the „[…] amerikanischen [Klassikern der] Soziologie […]“ (Flam 2002: 9), „[…] Charles Horton Cooley […], Pitrim A. Sorokin […] und Talcott Parsons’ Emotionen […]“ (ebd.) especially stood out as significant for sociology, and in the English-speaking sphere one began, despite the special proximity to monetarist neoliberalism, to concern oneself again more strongly with this theme:

„Obwohl die Soziologie der Emotionen in den USA und England sehr stark vertreten ist, hat sie bisher in Deutschland nur wenige Befürworter gefunden. Ihr Anfang wird auf Mitte der 1970er Jahre datiert. 1975 erschienen bahnbrechende Texte von Arlie Hochschild und Randall Collins, die Emotionen ins Zentrum der Analyse stellten. Die interdisziplinäre International Society for Research wurde 1984 gegründet. Die Etablierung einer Sektion für Soziologie der Emotionen beim amerikanischen Soziologieverband folgte 1986.“ (Flam 2002: 9)

Thus it is not astonishing that our dealings with regard to emotions and our unborn and newborn are, in this respect, still very ambivalent in quality and circumspection. Our scientific understanding of emotions alone, especially in sociology, is so ambivalent that it can still take years until these by now trivial connections of competing disciplines (in the first place in questions of the distribution of funding) are accepted — namely in the broad mass of science and not only by ridiculed outsiders who are ready to dare something new. This ambivalence of our conception of emotions in sociology is mirrored very well in the collective work of Schützeichel (2006) — therein: Bolle; Döring; Esser; Flam; Kessel; Meer; Neckel; Nullmeier; Pettenkofer; Rössel; Schnabel; Vester; Winkel. Apart from the disagreement in the approaches (which, depending on the angle of view, has its respective justification for existence), I must ascertain the greatest deficit in a more or less complete ignorance of the biological connections in this work. Flam (2002) too scarcely takes account of this aspect, although she does not wish to lay claim to definitional authority, but gives the sociologist an entry into the traditional anchoring of emotions in sociology. What today suddenly gains in significance as an important component of sociology has already been put forward/introduced in the highly respected classics listed further above, and has been thanked by almost all of their students, to this day, with ignorance. The decisive foundation stone for the understanding of emotions should, in my view, be an introduction and fundamental consideration of the general biological processes in the organism of the human being. A factor of prenatal socialisation that the fewest sociologists take account of, and which are unwelcome in institutes without respect for these perspectives. Epigenetics has only recently delivered impressive evidence for an inheritance of learned behaviour of the parents to the children (see below). The concern of my work is to give a short and concise entry into the many-layeredness of this theme and to establish a symbiosis between biology, (para-)psychology and sociology. This is to make room for a more strongly holistic frame of consideration, which in our present-day society (depending on the prevailing cultural attitudes), but above all in the ever more specialised sciences, is granted ever less regard:

„[…] die Grundlagen für alle späteren Leistungen des Menschen [werden] bereits während der embryonalen Frühentwicklung angelegt […]“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 61)

Aspects of Jean Piaget’s stage concept I will use as a bridge between the facets of biology and of sociology, since Piaget there describes processes that one could simply describe as stages of socialisation and which possess just as much validity for biological processes. Manfred Spitzer (2006) conveys a good transition for this, and already AlkeDH (2000a: 98) delivers, with a reference to “engrams”, concise points of intersection, abstracted from pure socialisation, extended to all developmental aspects of the child in the process of its formation of identity.

I will introduce this work with the biological foundations of prenatal socialisation. Here it will be a matter of pregnancy, and how the human being develops in the first days, months and years after birth:

„All das, was ein Neugeborenes an Fähigkeiten und Fertigkeiten mit auf die Welt bringt, hat es also im Mutterleib bereits in der einen oder anderen Weise kennengelernt, sich angeeignet und geübt.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 22f)

Following on from this, I will illustrate this primarily emotional development of the child by aspects of Piaget’s stage concept, whereby I will place special attention on the assimilation and accommodation structures in Piaget, less on the concept itself down to the smallest detail, which is to serve merely as a template for its extension.

This division is to convey an impression of what influence primarily the first nine months have on the child in the womb — but also aspects of epigenetics (see below) as well as of reincarnation — and, in this period, shape and condition its emotions for later life, whether it becomes a self-confident strong human being or an anxious, withdrawn human being who puts up with everything or does not. These first moments influence, to a special degree, whether we as newborns will later develop a tendentially socially disturbed or socially stable behaviour. This prenatal socialisation with its biological connections is of special significance for the understanding of emotions and our dealings with them in everyday life and in science, no matter of which discipline:

„Durch die über [die; …] Sinnesorgane [des Ungeborenen] eintreffenden Informationen hat es für sein Überleben wichtige Aspekte der Welt schon im Mutterleib kennengelernt.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 89)

With this, the work can at the same time be understood as a starting point for the understanding of our prosocial nature, which is still today massively called into question precisely by rational-choice theorists and economists, and which instructs young students in this false self-image of the human being. This may serve neoliberal systems of the mass consumption of mostly useless products, or doctrinaire outdated ideologies that want to preserve their power, but not human development or even our society as a whole.

Biological foundations of prenatal socialisation

How, then, are these differentiated socio-biological, social-psychological, psychobiological and (para-)psychological connections constituted, which I regard as an essential basis of my work? The connection between the biology of the human being and their psychology is not new and finds broad consideration precisely in the mental analysis of the human being. To make this clear, I want to introduce this section with a short quotation from Holodynski (2006: 29):

„[…] Emotionale Zustände, die sich auf die phänomenalen Aspekte eines emotionalen Zustands beziehen, setzten sich aus multiplen Komponentenprozessen zusammen. Dazu zählen sie Appraisals als motivrelevante Interpretationen, affektauslösende Systeme wie zentrales und autonomes Nervensystem und Körperreaktionen, die die Gefühlstönung erzeugen, und das offene Handlungssystem, das sich aus unwillentlich mimischen und vokalen Reaktionen sowie willentlichen Handlungen zusammensetzt. […] Emotionale Erfahrungen entwickeln sich durch wechselseitige Regulation der Komponentensysteme über die Zeit und in spezifischen sozialen Kontexten. […] Komponentensysteme sind kontextsensitiv, d. h. sie passen sich auch den kontinuierlichen Veränderungen im sozialen Kontext an.“ (nach Mascolo/Harkins/Harakal 2000 in Holodynski 2006: 29)

This social context, the socialisation of the actor, I will now extend, with the help of Hüther/Krens (2011), by a phase of biological socialisation. It is known that our emotional state, our moods, are bound up with changing bioelectrical impulses (EEG (Zimbardo et al. 1983: 479)) in the body. Our skin resistance changes and gives information about whether we feel relaxed or tense, and scarcely perceptible muscle contractions give expression to our states — transmitted through our limbic (cf. Rohen 1985: 188ff) and vegetative nervous system (cf. Mörike/Mergenthaler 1970: 321; Schulz 2003: 9ff), bound up with the most varied hormone secretions (cf. Senger/Huber 1989; Crapo 1987) in the human organism (cf. AlkeDH 2002; AlkeTOR 2016a). My assumption in this work is the first socialisation through our experiences in the womb, in the stage (α) from the first cell division up to the birth-readiness of the baby. And as this chapter will show, there are even inferences that make it possible to include the experiences of earlier lives, summarised as stage (Ω), if one believes the research projects of the University of Virginia and projects of the CIA at the Stanford Research Institute that were released to the public some years ago. In doing so, I am not specifically concerned with the conveying of particular movements, acoustic signals, cultural conventions or other specific social learning processes (whereby these, through stimuli which the unborn experiences in the womb, already play a central role). I am concerned in the first place with the fundamental emotional impulses that express our sensing with regard to positive and negative emotions such as fear or love, and many gradations between these levels, whether these now stem from stage α or Ω (more on this in Chap.: Emotions and Piaget’s stage concept).

Since feelings such as love, joy, well-being or ecstasy can, depending on the subject, evoke completely different reactions and are dependent on particular situations or expectations of the subject, I do not want to enter into conceptual finesses of the explicit definition of these, when not even the process of the formation of emotion or of its conditioning has been formulated in any form or brought into a holistic context. These kinds of nuancing without a real engagement with the biology (and its connections to psychology) of the human being serve, against the background of this work, merely the self-preservation of (social) theorists who seek a basis for securing their post at the chair. They are of no significance for the following exposition, and I will restrict myself in this work to the formulation of positive and negative emotions, all the more so as they can, depending on culture and milieu, turn out again and again somewhat differently, although the inner biological processes remain more or less identical, and this already from conception (the moment of conception):

„Der Psychotherapeut Dr. Ludwig Janus ist sich da absolut sicher. ‚Wenn wir mit einem anderen Menschen so eng zusammen sind, wie das vor der Geburt der Fall ist, nehmen wir dessen Affektivität (= Gefühle) auf sehr vielen Kanälen war‘, betont er in einem Interview*. Janus glaubt sogar: ‚Die vorgeburtlichen Prägungen sind die tiefsten’. […] Als sicher gilt, dass unter anderem bestimmte mütterliche Hormone als Botenstoffe wirken. Sie machen An- oder Entspannung, Trauer, Zorn oder Freude der Mutter für das Baby fühlbar, denn die Plazenta gibt diese stofflichen ‚Boten‘ an das Kind weiter.“ (Möller 2012)

This phase of human development, of its socialisation in the womb, I want to designate as the biological environment (stage α), which restricts the social environment of the child primarily to that of mother and also the father (especially on the basis of the findings of epigenetics (see below)), that is, the immediate social partners of the mother — primarily of an intimate but also regular and close kind. Why do I already extend the social environment within this biological environment to a primarily social context? In accordance with the more recent results of epigenetics, the earlier „[…] erworbene […]“ (Beckers in Schultes 2016) behaviour of both parents tends to influence the developments of their child in the future, according to Prof. Johannes Beckers and Prof. Martin Hrabe de Angelis (both of the Helmholtz Centre Munich). Both the biological and the social factors play a large role in the development of the human being:

„Obwohl wir uns nicht bewusst an vorgeburtliche Erlebnisse erinnern können, scheinen sie dennoch tief in unseren Körpern und Seelen verwurzelt zu sein.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 16)

„Ebenso bedeutsam für die Lebenswelt des ungeborenen Kindes ist die Qualität der Beziehung, die seine Eltern miteinander leben.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 27)

More detailed explanations I will take up through Hüther/Krens, yet I would like at this point to bring in a somewhat longer passage from one of my older works, which gives an impression of the capacities of our newborns, and how our socialisation restricts our natural, innate capacity for perception and differentiation to a considerable extent (AlkeTOR 2016b: Chap.: The perception of our newborns):

Very interesting works on the perceptual capacity of young children, well before puberty or the phase of the development of intelligence in the child according to Piaget (1986), are summed up very well by Sanders (2016). In one study, Pascalis/de Haan/Nelson (2002 in Sanders 2016) ascertained that children up to an age of six months „can perceive subtle differences in the faces of monkeys as easy as pie [while children from an age of nine months and adults] are no longer able to do this“1 (Sanders 2016). Their capacity to perceive light frequencies too [cf. on this also Hüther/Krens (2011: 85) on light-sensitivity in the unborn] is, in three- to four-month-old children, pronounced in ranges that we no longer perceive as we grow older (ibid.)2:

‚Mit der Erfahrung lernen Kinder vermutlich, dass diese subtilen Unterschiede nicht so wichtig sind. ‘Als Resultat dessen, verlieren Kinder diese bemerkenswerte Fähigkeit,‘ [wie] Yang [et al. 2015] sagt.’3 (Sanders 2016)

Likewise, children at the age of „[…] 6 bis 7 Monaten […]“ (Sanders 2016) are able to perceive the finest differences in verbal (Werker et al. 1981 in Sanders 2016) and non-verbal (Palmer et al. 2012 in Sanders 2016) language [cf. on this also Hüther/Krens (2011: 88) already in „unborn“ children4]. A capacity that they lose again at an age of about one year, as „[…] die Kindersprachexpertin Janet Werker von der University of British Columbia und Kollegen herausfanden […]“ (ibid.)5. The sense of touch too (Ali/Spence/Bremner 2015 in Sanders 2015, 2016) is much more precisely pronounced in 4-month-old children than a further two months later (Sanders 20166). Sanders (20167) grounds this decrease in the perceptual capacity of babies in the reduction of perception to what is necessary for the baby in order to interact with its environment. Schmidt/Sommerville (20118) go here more strongly into the socially shaped context and were able to ascertain, already in 15-month-old children, the capacity for considerate dealings with fellow human beings, whereby they, already in these few years of life, possess moral and prosocial behaviour [— so much for the evil nature of the human being (see above; cf. on this also Hüther/Krens 2011: 35, 47f, 55, 58)].
In view of these findings, one can assume that our offspring possess, in principle, a very high capacity of comprehension, in the social as well as in the perceptual sphere [and possibly even in spheres outside our generally recognised senses (see below)]. And it is probably up to us as parents whether we foster these capacities of our children or not. And since children with a higher capacity for perception and differentiation tend to act more unselfishly than children with more strongly restricted capacities, we should probably foster them [the capacities of our children]. The state, with its standardised systems, seems to me the wrong point of contact here, even if it could create better framework conditions for such fostering, which does not seem to be in its intention or by now eludes its reach of action, as the socio-political developments show:

‚Natürlich muß sich auch jede Bürokratie vor Bestrebungen schützen, die sie nicht durchschauen kann, die aber sehr wohl das kritische Denkvermögen der echten Suchenden schärft. Welcher Politiker will schon gerne von selbstbewußten Menschen durchleuchtet werden.‘ (AlkeDH 2004a: 25)

These results contradict the assumption of Hüther/Krens (2011: 63-65) that the human being learns especially slowly. On the contrary, we can learn extremely quickly and at the same time take in very complex connections (cf. Spitzer9 2006 — the results also contradict Spitzer in the sense that he presupposes more rudimentary capacities in the child than in the adult), while we as newborns first rather throttle ourselves back to a socially acceptable (intelligence) level — be this now for the guaranteeing of a stable interpersonal communication or simply out of convenience, since our current society-conforming degree of perception and socialisation is so low. Low in the sense of reduced perceptual capacities, which often show themselves only in autistic people, but in many cases also among normal people.
Already „[…] im Alter von acht Wochen reagiert der Fötus, wenn er an den Lippen berührt wird […]“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 80; cf. on this also Möller 2012) and, through touches in the womb, gathers manifold experiences with itself and its environment (cf. ibid.: 81):

„Föten im Alter von 19 Wochen, die einer schmerzhaften Prozedur […] ausgesetzt sind, geben als Antwort darauf Stresshormone ab. Auch wird berichtet, dass manche Föten bei einer Abtreibung zwischen der 21. und 23. Schwangerschaftswoche hörbar schreien. Wegen der unklaren Sachlage fordern einige englische Wissenschaftler bei Abtreibungen ab der 17. Schwangerschaftswoche vorsorglich Anästhesie für den Fötus. Interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch, dass schmerzhemmende Systeme erst gegen Ende der Schwangerschaft wirksam werden, sodass man sogar davon ausgehen muss, das Föten ab dem Ende des zweiten Trimesters eher Schmerzen wahrnehmen als Neugeborene.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 83)

Such damaging behaviour towards the unborn and children fosters, in my eyes, precisely the formation of antisocial behaviour, and the malevolence of nature generally presupposed by Hobbes/Huxley is probably rather a product of their negative life experiences and of a barbaric/medieval socialisation! The starting point for a socialisation of the emotions through the biological environment is, in the first place, probably the emotions of the mother. If she feels, for instance, a feeling of joy (eJ), a bioelectrical impulse eJ is triggered, which in turn triggers the secretion of hormones (HJ). Even tasting the child learns already in the womb:

„Je nach Ernährungsweise der Mutter bekommt das Fruchtwasser eine etwas andere Geschmacksrichtung.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 83) — „Es ist bekannt, dass die Ernährungsgewohnheiten der Mütter die geschmacklichen Vorlieben ihrer neugeborenen Kinder beeinflussen. Föten lieben aber vor allem »Süßes«: Je süßer das Fruchtwasser, desto mehr trinken sie. […] Das Kind erkennt seine Mutter später nach der Geburt am Duft der Muttermilch wieder.“ (ebd.: 84) — „Bekannte Geschmacks- oder Duftnoten werden mit der Mutter bzw. mit dem mütterlichen Milieu assoziiert.“ (ebd.: 85) — „Auf jeden Fall löst ein auditiver Reiz zwischen der 20. und 24. Schwangerschaftswoche eine motorische Reaktion beim Fötus aus.“ (ebd.: 86)

„Wenn wir unsere Welt wieder in einen harmonischen Zustand bringen wollen, brauchen wir insbesondere bei den Wissenschaftlern und ihren Geldgebern eine andere Haltung. Nehmen wir ein Beispiel. Die Chemiker produzieren E 605/DDT, um unerwünschte Insekten zu vernichten. Da das Gift sofort mit dem Grundwasser fortgewaschen wird, ist es ’weg’ und scheinbar alles okay. Jetzt, 30 Jahre nach dem Masseneinsatz dieses Umweltgiftes in Europa, sterben bei den Eskimos viele Kinder an DDT und viele werden mißgebildet geboren, weil das Gift aus unseren Wäldern und durch unsere Flüsse in das Plankton der Meere gewandert ist. Das Plankton ist nicht gestorben sondern über die Nahrungskette der Fische bis in den Robbenspeck und schließlich in die Muttermilch der Eskimofrauen gelangt“ Der Mensch ist das Ende der Nahrungskette, ebenso der Eisbär. Auch dort werden bereits viele Bärenkinder tot geboren!“ (AlkeDH 2000a: 73)

Since the human being possesses, as is known, an electromagnetic field and is influenced by outer electromagnetic fields, the child perceives this interaction between bioelectrical (e) impulses and particular hormones (H) in its biological environment (stage α), since neither the electrical impulses (e) remain isolated from the child nor the hormones (H) of the mother are completely isolated from the embryo by the placenta (cf. Hüther/Krens 2011: 56). Certainly, in early phases of embryonic development the nervous system of the unborn (which forms from the outer cell-layer of the „[…] Gastrula [, … dem; …] Ekdoderm […]“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 58)) is scarcely comparable with that of a mature human being, yet in the course of the 10-month pregnancy ever more similar areas are formed in relation to the mother — glands which secrete explicit hormones and nerve pathways which conduct the bioelectrical impulses on in ever more differentiated tracks in the child’s own bodily economy (cf. Hüther 2011: 58f, 72, 75, 78):

„Die Ausbildung embryonaler Strukturen ist zu jedem Zeitpunkt der vorgeburtlichen Entwicklung an die Übernahme spezifischer Funktionen gebunden. Strukturelle und funktionelle Reibungsprozesse sind also niemals voneinander zu trennen. […] Die untrennbare Verbindung zwischen Struktur und Funktion zeigt sich auch darin, dass die sich herausbildenden Nervenbahnen nicht von vornherein »wissen«, wohin sie wachsen und wie [sie] sich verknüpfen müssen. Die auswachsenden Fortsätze können nur in bestimmter Weise miteinander verbunden und zu funktionellen Netzwerken ausgeformt werden, wenn sie auch in bestimmter Weise beansprucht, also genutzt werden. […] Schon während der Ausformung des Körpers werden die jeweiligen Funktionen eingeübt.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 60)

When the actor is born, „matured“ for the biological environment (and thereby enters into stage 1 according to Piaget (see below)), it is to be assumed that it is especially the emotional reactions of the mother which the child can recognise and interpret with more or less precise results (cf. Hüther 2011), since in rudimentary form it expresses its own feelings in a similar way, or rather these feelings are the only ones which it has so far come to know (without the experiences accumulated over life of an actor socialised in the natural environment10, which have led and contributed to differentiations of the mode of expression and perception in the most varied ways, especially with regard to symbols, audiovisual signals, smells and physical sensations, which in the womb have not yet reached this far-reaching variety — so may every human being be wished to make such extensive and varied (positive) experiences). The child thus enters the natural and thereby also the social environment (more on this in the following chapter) with a quite differentiated and uninhibited template of emotional reaction patterns, and must, without bioelectrical and hormonal presets of the mother, react independently to its environment. If, alongside established facts such as bioelectrical impulses, hormones, auditory and visual signals as well as smells, tastes and touch contacts in the womb, one also takes into account phenomena such as telepathy (Jung 1990, AlkeDH 2002c) and astral travel (Dunne/Bisaha 1979; Puthoff 1996; AlkeDH 2002a/b/c, 2004, 2005), which have been/are researched among others by C. G. Jung (1990) and, for instance, the CIA (Puthoff 1996), the thought is not to be dismissed that even a rudimentary, primarily emotionally interpreted knowledge in the form of sensations, bound up with hormones and auditory, visual and kinetic signals, was conveyed to it — which the child could scarcely interpret rationally or in the specifically cognitive-scholastic sense, whereby even these restrictions are to be regarded with caution through studies on reincarnation experiences11 (AlkeDH 2002c: 171ff, 2004; Tucker12 2015) (stage Ω (see below)):

„Nach den ersten Versuchsserien wurde in einem Falle die räumliche Distanz zwischen Experimentator und V.P. bis zu 350 Kilometer ausgedehnt. Das Durchschnittsresultat zahlreicher Versuche betrug hier 10,1 Treffer auf 25 Karten. In einer anderen Versuchsreihe ergaben sich, als Experimentator und V.P. sich im gleichen Zimmer befanden, 11,4 Treffer auf 25; wenn die V.P. im nächsten Zimmer war, 9,7 auf 25; wenn sie zwei Zimmer weit weg war, 12,0 auf 25. Rhine erwähnt Experimente von Usher und Burt, die sich mit positiven Resultaten über 1344 Kilometer erstreckten.[…; Rhine: The Reach of the Mind, 1948, S. 49.] Unterstützt durch synchronisierte Uhren wurden auch Experimente zwischen Durham in North Carolina und Zagreb in Jugoslawien (etwa 5600 Kilometer) mit ebenfalls positivem Resultat durchgeführt.[…; Rhine/Humphrey: A Transoceanic ESP Experiment, 1942, S. 52] […] Die Wahrscheinlichkeit der Rhineschen Resultate mit dem Zeitexperiment beträgt 1:400 000, was eine beachtliche Wahrscheinlichkeit für das Vorhandensein eines von der Zeit unabhängigen Faktors bedeutet. Das Resultat der Zeitexperimente weist auf eine psychische Relativität der Zeit hin, indem es sich um Wahrnehmungen von Ereignissen handelt, die noch gar nicht eingetreten sind. In derartigen Fällen scheint der Zeitfaktor ausgeschaltet zu sein, und zwar durch eine psychische Funktion oder besser durch einen psychischen Zustand, der auch den Raumfaktor zu eliminieren vermag. […] Man muß daher von vornherein auf alle energetischen Erklärungsweisen verzichten, was soviel heißt, als daß Ereignisse dieser Art nicht unter dem Gesichtswinkel der Kausalität betrachtet werden können, denn Kausalität setzt die Existenz von Raum und Zeit voraus, indem aller Beobachtung in letzter Linie bewegte Körper zugrunde liegen.“ (Jung 1990: 21f)

„Ungeachtet eigener Standpunkte, muss selbst ein leidenschaftsloser Beobachter die folgenden Tatsachen anerkennen. Trotz Unklarheiten, die mit der Art der Feldforschung in diesen Programmen einhergehen, beweisen die aufgeführten Ergebnisse eindeutig eine menschliche Fähigkeit Ereignisse, entfernt in Raum und Zeit, zu betrachten, wenn auch mit schwankenden Resultaten und ohne das wir diese kognitiven Prozesse genau verstehen. In den Jahren meiner Mitarbeitet als Forschungsleiter an diesen Programmen, bin ich zu der Überzeugung gelangt, dass diese Tatsache bei jedem Versuch die Realität zu beschreiben berücksichtigt werden muss, um ein unverfälschtes Bild der Struktur der Realität zu gewährleisten.“ (Puthoff 1996: 76)13

„Es ist die Überzeugung des Autors, dass die einstellungsbezogene Umwelt und die anfängliche Beziehung, die zwischen dem Begabten [percipient] und dem Beobachter [agent] bestehen, entscheidende Faktoren für den Erfolg des Remote-Viewing [Astralreise / Der Geist verlässt den Körper] darstellen. In allen Experimenten erzeugten wir eine Atmosphäre der Gemütlichkeit, Verspieltheit und Entspannung, in welcher Psi-Phänomene als real und natürlich gelten. […] Obwohl unser gegenwärtiges Wissen uns keine angemessene Erklärung liefert um das Phänomen zu erklären, ist die Tatsache das es sich hierbei um die Replik eines Experiments zu Remote-Viewing handelt, welches als experimentelles Design weitere Belege dafür liefert, dass weitere Wahrnehmungs- und Kommunikationskanäle jenseits unserer Sinne liegen als sie heute definiert sind, ein fundierter Anhaltspunkt für weitere Forschungen in diesem Bereich.“ (Dunne/Bisaha 1979: 29)

„Aus vielen Rückführungen konnten wir folgenden Ablauf erkennen: Nur wenn Vater und Mutter einen Teil der Lebensenergie aus ihrer eigenen Aura opfern, können lebensfähige Ei- und Samenzellen entstehen [Übergang von Ω zu α]. Kurz vor der Zeugung befindet sich der Geist, der sich inkarnieren möchte, bereits im Raum und schwebt über dem Paar [Stadium Ω], das mit sich und mit Sex beschäftigt ist. Ebenso anwesend sind natürlich die Eltern. Ihre psychische und mentale Energie ist für den Geist sehr genau zu spüren. Die Gefühlsstimmungen der Eltern bei der Befruchtung [Stadium α] haben einen starken Einfluß auf die Gemütshaltung des späteren Menschen. Ist es die große Liebe? Ist es nur Sex unter Alkohol oder eine Vergewaltigung? Will die Frau gar kein Kind? Will der Mann kein Kind und läßt die Frau sitzen? Die Gefühle der Eltern bei der Zeugung prägen das Lebensgefühl des Kindes.“ (AlkeDH 2002c: 625f) — „Die Problematik der bewußten Schwangerschaft (Empfängnis) ist heute besonders schlimm. Den Frauen wurde in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten das Bewußtsein des eigenen Körpers und ihrer intuitiven Kraft geraubt. Die Ideologie der Kirche, daß Beischlaf nur zur Zeugung erlaubt sei, scheint zu beinhalten, daß er dazu führen muß. Das stimmt natürlich nicht. Frauen sind in der Lage, das zu regulieren! Eine bewußte Frau braucht keine äußerlichen Kontrollen und Hilfsmittel. Sie ist bewußt fruchtbar oder unfruchtbar. Und sie spürt selbstverständlich, ob eine Befruchtung stattgefunden hat. Wenn eine Inkarnation erfolgt ist, spürt sie den fremden Geist, diesen Gast in sich. Sie kann fühlen, ob es ein Junge oder ein Mädchen wird.“ (AlkeDH 2002c: 630)

Here it is to be taken into account that every newborn must itself first learn to see, as we generally, as born and adult humans, are wont to do. What is normal for the „adult“ is, for the newborn (stage 1 according to Piaget (see below)), bound up with an added flood of unfamiliar stimuli; at the same time a multitude of stimuli fall away and become, with regard to light-frequency patterns, markedly less differentiated (see above). But from conception representational surfaces in the nervous system (cf. Hüther 2011: 71ff; Spitzer 2006) are formed. Manfred Spitzer (2006) here also speaks of “maps”, which first make possible the perceiving of the environment through visual stimuli, apart from the correct interpretation of objects and events in this natural environment. The vitally necessary foundations for perception, whether seeing, smelling, hearing or tasting, the child learns, however, already in the womb:

„Jedes Gehirn ist nichts anderes als das Protokoll seiner Benutzung.“ (Spritzer 2006) — „[…] [Da das Gehirn des Kindes] schon entwickelt war. Und das wissen wir heute, ist der Fall, im Mutterleib. […]“ (ebd.: 00:12:52)

Here the question arises, provided one accepts the phenomenon of telepathy (/thought-transference or also astral travel/remote viewing), from when a child reaches a consciousness within the biological environment, which, independently of telepathy or other phenomena, is an extensive matter of dispute in stem-cell research, up to which developmental stage an egg-cell is allowed to develop, that is, until its abortion counts as murder, or experiments with it count as violating human rights. Closely bound up with this is the question of the maturity of the brain15, which provides the nerve pathways necessary for the cognitions and, according to the understanding of the origin of emotions sketched here, is also an elementary component for these. It is thus in the interest of the pharmaceutical industry to regard the unborn as an incomplete human being, since only under this manner of consideration does it receive no legal protection through our Basic Law:

„Was man heute weiß, zeigt: Ein Baby ist schon im Bauch ein Wesen, das auf die innere Zuwendung und Liebe der Mutter (und des Vaters) angewiesen ist. Höhepunkt dieser Entwicklung ist, dass es vier Wochen vor der Geburt schon die Stimme seiner Mutter zweifelsfrei erkennt. Wenn diese spricht, wird sein Puls ruhiger. Andere Stimmen oder Geräusche haben nicht denselben Effekt, beobachtete der Psychiater Bill Eifer. Dr. Janus leitet aus solchen Forschungsergebnissen ab: ‚Das Kind hat ein Recht auf Beziehung bereits vor der Geburt. Es hat ein Recht darauf, als eigene Person gesehen zu werden, und dass man zu ihm bereits Kontakt aufnimmt. Weiterhin sollten alle medizinischen Untersuchungen oder Eingriffe während der Schwangerschaft und bei der Geburt auf ihre psychologischen Folgen hinterfragt werden.‘“ (Möller 2012)

„Wenn ein Interesse daran bestünde, die Menschheit so gesund wie möglich zu erhalten, dann wäre es angebracht, gerade junge Frauen in der ersten Schwangerschaft einschließlich des heranwachsenden Lebens liebevoll zu betreuen. Ziel müßte es sein, die junge Mutter anzuleiten, daß sie sich stark und gesund fühlt.“ (AlkeDH 2002c: 24) — „Der Keim für spätere Erkrankungen wird bereits in der Embryonalphase und den ersten Kinderjahren gelegt. Wenn Sie chronische Erkrankungen haben, sollten Sie im Rahmen einer Rückführung die Zeit von der Schwangerschaft (als Sie noch in Mutters Bauch waren [Stadium α]) bis zum 3. Lebensjahr untersuchen.“ (AlkeDH 2002c: 28) — „Die Prägung von Engrammen beginnt bereits im Mutterleib beim Embryo. Er bekommt alles mit, was die Mutter erlebt und erleidet. Er teilt mit der Mutter alle Gefühle, die Ernährung, eventuelle Ängste, Unfälle, Sex mit dem Vater, die Stimmungen des Vaters, was die Eltern reden, was die Mutter hört usw. Es kann also sein, daß wir bei der Ursachenerklärung eines schwierigen Engramms in der Rückführung bis vor die Geburt in den Mutterleib zurückgehen müssen. Und in ganz problematischen Fällen, wo sich keine Lösung abzeichnet, wo trotz Aufklärung der Fakten in diesem Leben keine Besserung eintritt, da werden wir die wahre Ursache wohl in früheren Leben suchen müssen [Stadium Ω]. Es wäre aber völlig verkehrt, gleich bei jedem hartnäckigen Problem die Schuld in früheren Leben zu suchen. Die meisten alltäglichen Probleme stammen aus dem jetzigen Leben.“ (AlkeDH 2002c: 98)

One can understand these engrams, these emotional reaction patterns, similarly to the cognitive representational surfaces in Manfred Spitzer (2006), which, upon occurrence A, trigger the reaction A, which runs through nerve pathway A and thereby secretes hormone A, with all the associated muscle contractions and, after entry into the natural environment (stage 1 according to Piaget (see below)), also intensified auditory stimulus-reactions. The prerequisite for this is that particular nerve pathways in the body are used. Thus Spitzer says that it is necessary to repeat an activity again and again, until the body really masters it well, completely independently of whether man or woman (which he describes by the fact that the highest accuracy in sport or other activities exists around the 45th year of life (Spitzer 2006), and that upon loss of limbs the body itself, even without the limb, still senses its presence (Spitzer 2006) and the associated pains – a state of shock that was stored by the biology of the human being, which, when they release, can cause trembling of the whole body, which in autogenic training (Schulz 2003) or in therapy work is designated as a nerve-storm (AlkeDH 2002c) – closely bound up with this the vegetative nervous system).

It is certain that a newborn (stage 1 according to Piaget (see below)) draws attention to its basic needs, for example hunger, with simple actions such as crying, and makes clear unpleasant feelings such as cold and wet. According to the classical model of Jean Piaget (1986), an actor develops only in the course of years into a differentiatedly perceiving and differentiatedly reacting actor, whereby the duration of this developmental process and the capacities for differentiation can be highly various depending on the actor (though certain tendency-ranges crystallise out in the form of age phases), apart from the variety of stimuli through the environment. The one “golden rule” of explicit upbringing or development does not exist, other than to foster one’s child in its development, which can contain highly various and completely individual measures, but should move in agreement with the child and may not only mirror the fantasies of the parents or of society.

As the results listed show, we as newborns are anything but undifferentiated beings — still less as unborn —, which in Piaget’s model, owing to his age and the scientific state of the time, could scarcely be taken into account. Many mothers and shamans were indeed already aware of it, and it is quite well known in parts of our culture that were not censored by the Catholic Church, yet science itself recognises these results only since more recent times, and even this only in part, with in part strong resistance.

It is a matter of finding a balance between stimuli through the environment and phases of rest for the inner processing of these environmental stimuli, similar to the definition of intelligence in Piaget (see below), which in turn can vary depending on the subject. A balance that is also of the greatest significance for the inner processes of the subject, as we have already seen and will also see further below.

According to this principle, of the bioelectrical and biochemical pre-programming and possible mental conveyance in the womb (stage α) — even experiences from earlier incarnations —, the unborn would, in the sense of G. H. Mead’s stage “one”, primarily copy the behaviour of its mother (play) and lay down a rudimentary template of reaction patterns. This template of reaction patterns probably serves in the first place the satisfaction of the basic needs of the (un-)born, a basic construction kit for the development of the habitus, in order to become capable of connection to society in questions of communication and behaviour. This template is formed with the help of flexible assimilation and accommodation schemata in the sense of Piaget (1986), which make possible the formation of one’s own individuality, with completely individual experiences, and allow a deviation from the socialisation through the biological and later also the social environment (cf. AlkeTOR 2016b).

Since the bond, especially between the mother and the newborn, is closer than with all subsequent social relationships, at least as far as this sphere of socialisation is concerned, the socialisation in the biological environment (stage α) influences the child durably in its development. Further, it is not to be dismissed that children, purely statistically, often follow in the footsteps of their parents — an insight that already held before statistics, for thousands of years, and which through epigenetics (see above) receives a whole new dimension.

Here one may suppose that a human being completely cloned in an artificial environment, without the variety of biochemical/electrical impulses of the natural biological environment (stage α) and the associated emotions, would have no reference points for stimuli and reactions through the social environment and would seem rather apathetic. Such an organism could presumably not correctly steer bioelectrical impulses, or at least establish no direct reference to explicit hormonal secretions, apart from particular bodily reactions such as muscle contraction and skin resistances, whereby epigenetics could here even clarify questions.

With this, the essential (socio-)biological connections with the emotional development of the child should have been explained and have given expression to the significance of emotions and their interplay with biology. It is indisputable that we as human beings receive, already in the womb (stage α), essential imprintings through our parents and our environment, and, if one wishes to take account of the circumstance, also bring engrams in the form of emotions and subtle modes of behaviour from earlier lives (stage Ω).

In order to bring some clarity to this variety of factors of influence, I will give a schematic overview in the following chapter, in order subsequently to deliver the assimilation and accommodation according to Piaget for the better description of the formation of engrams and their emotions. Following on from this will be a supplement and interpretative modification of a part of Piaget’s stage concept, in order to make room for these new findings, in order to arrive at a better categorisation of our stages of socialisation.

(Prenatal) socialisation, biological environment & individual chronicle

The depiction that follows here is meant, in the sense of the interaction membrane in Goffman (1961; AlkeTOR 2016d: Chap. The “interaction membrane” – Goffman’s sword of Damocles), to offer as universal a possibility of connection as possible. Should certain components nonetheless not have been taken into account, this is not meant to exclude from the outset their capacity for connection to this model.

In the preceding chapter I have made clear the significance of a consideration of the biological environment in the prenatal development of the human being. The primarily empirical results show clear connections between our prenatal experiences and give an impression of the impressive capacities that we as humans already possess in the womb and only unlearn after birth. Since I have now handled a whole series of not more closely introduced terms, I want to give this comprehensive introduction a schematic structure, in order to divide these phases into logically connected areas, as far as possible without incisions in the flexibility and variety of their possibilities of combination and weighting and their significance in our socialisation. On ambivalences in the quality and homogeneity of the social relationships between the listed actors I will not be able to take account here, which must be decided/evaluated individually from case to case. This schematic depiction serves merely as an ideal-typical arrangement of possible frames of consideration.

As the illustration “Socialisation landscape of the human being” (see below) shows, the human being is, from the beginning of its conception, in the process of socialisation (stage α) within the biological environment. In this phase it has the most intimate contact with its mother and is stimulated especially through bioelectrical impulses and hormones. If one also gives regard to a genetic inheritance (cf. on this epigenetics (see above)), the genes of mother and father also play a special role, which is why the father is in part also ascribed to the biological environment. The father, as the second very intensive reference person, is regarded as an environment of his own, as the paternal environment, since without him the conception of the child is not at all possible (possibilities of cloning from stem cells we leave aside here and restrict ourselves to the natural process of reproduction — a-sexual reproduction forms a special role here and excludes the paternal environment in this sense). Together with the intimate partner(s) and sibling(s) of the child in its current incarnation (stages α to 6 (see below)), they form the intimate environment of the child, which contains only the closest and most intimate social contacts of the child. Intimate is, in this sense, not necessarily meant to mean sex, but a mutually deep opening towards the respective other. The intimate environment delivers, in connection with the social environment, a whole series of frames of socialisation, which I have arranged as follows:

1. Engrams
2. Emotions
3. Thoughts
4. Culture(s)
5. Conventions
6. Information

This order I have chosen since not every recollection or routine (engram) from an earlier life (stage Ω) must be of an emotional kind. Engrams simply represent solidified behaviour patterns, which can positively influence our action in situations envisaged for them (synonymously one can here speak of habitus). In situations in which it is necessary to deviate, engrams (and thereby the habitus) can become a fetter and disturb our quality in action and interaction. Emotions form a somewhat more specialised field than the umbrella term engrams, whereby they are, in course and effect, almost identical with these, with the only difference that they need not necessarily be sensed as positive or negative. An example: a martial artist repeats their combat exercises again and again and thus becomes a very capable and, above all, lightning-fast reacting fighter. They do this instinctively in order to be able to defend themselves as quickly as possible in situations necessary for it. They do this out of interest in the sport, out of passion, not out of any fears or desires for revenge. On the other side we see a martial artist who was often beaten in their life, who was an outsider, possibly mistreated by their parents and wants to show the world — they are receptive to the biblical texts of revenge. They reach an acceptable level, yet their martial arts never reach the level of the fighter acting out of interest. While the one acting out of fear and revenge can easily be thrown off balance by provocations (if they ever come to rest), the one acting out of passion perfects their bodily arts for the sake of precision, not because of the mistreatments they experienced in the past. The focus here does not lie on the actual martial art, but rather on the motivation for which it is learned. The one acts out of interest, it gives them balance and they can identify with it. The other has, deep in their subconscious, existential fears, wants revenge for the bad treatment in their childhood and simply wants to take revenge for what was done to them. In both cases emotions play a role, yet the one training out of passion forms primarily helpful engrams, they condition their body with (their) ideology (in order to establish a bridge to the biological environment through the social environment), while the other actually acts only emotionally in order to hide their fears behind aggressions and hatred.

The possibility, or rather the capacity, for self-reflection and, bound up with it, rationality, makes it possible for the actor in such extreme situations to regain a halfway clear head more quickly, or even to dampen the extent of an emotional overreaction, so as not to lose completely the view for the situation. This is not meant to suggest that emotions are something negative, on the contrary. However, the awareness of one’s own emotions, and also the experiences gained with these, decide significantly the action-potential of every actor and can both inhibit and foster them in their actions.

The starting point of the emotional state of an actor is, so it is assumed here, a fundamental, relatively homogeneous emotional state, which fluctuates slightly between positive and negative emotions (one could imagine it like a sine curve16), while special highs and lows lead to especially strong emotional reactions, which can express themselves in strong negative or positive emotions and likewise result in losses of existing objectivity for the duration of their dominating representation. If one takes into account, beyond this, findings of prenatal research (see on this Möller 2012 and the further literature therein – especially Hüther 2011), it depends strongly on the course of the pregnancy of the mother (stage α) whether the child comes into the world with a rather positive or rather negative well-being, since the well-being of the mother has a shaping effect on the child. That is, the actor comes into the natural environment with a pre-programmed basic tone of feelings, where it must now learn to react independently, without biochemical/electrical presets of the mother, to the environment — and possibly even brings subtle emotional patterns from earlier incarnations (n) with it (stage Ω):

„Kein Verhalten nämlich, selbst wenn es für das Individuum neu ist, bedeutet einen absoluten Neuanfang. Es wird stets auf schon vorhandene Pläne übertragen und bedeutet deshalb im Grunde nur die Assimilierung neuer Elemente an bereits aufgebaute Strukturen.“ (Piaget 2003: 54) — More on this in the following chapter (take into account in this context the aspects of reincarnation (see above/below) — stage Ω).

A biologically shaped habitus is formed, since the embryo is showered, in states of mind of the mother, in connection with auditory signals, muscle contractions (kinetics), chemical substances (medications, alcohol, drugs, etc.) and hormones. And even the placenta represents, like a capacitor, only a limited buffer, which cannot compensate longer-lasting hormone-floodings in order to guarantee the assured development of the unborn (Hüther 2011: 26ff).

The field of thoughts is somewhat more many-layered, since within it many complex fields meet. On the one hand I here make reference to the works of C. G. Jung (see above), Puthoff (see above), AlkeDH (see above) and Dunne/Bisaha (see above), but also to the spiritual commonalities that are common to many indigenous peoples, esotericists and the great religions, which, as we have seen, render real connections in the world. I am speaking here concretely of telepathy but also of channelling, which is basically the same as telepathy, of astral travel (with the possibility of access to stage Ω), of spirits and gods (as we and other peoples call them, with the in part most varied but also often very similar interpretations). The findings listed above more than suggest that here real forces are captured in some form. We are scarcely aware of our own capacities (see above). To exclude such phenomena and convictions from such an overview from the outset would be equivalent to the discrimination against ethnic minorities and cultural components of many peoples. The general rejection of such possibilities by (Prof.) Inquisitor, or even the fighting of them, can already be equated with a kind of racism and is reminiscent of totalitarian systems that readily tend to man-hunts and persecutions of people, as precisely the (Catholic) Inquisition with its witch-burnings and the mass executions of ethnically independent peoples such as the Cathars in the Middle Ages proved, or the dark period of the 20th century in Europe with the persecutions of Jews and the world-domination cravings of despots!

The factor telepathy is here to be taken into account as a possibility of a hitherto scarcely captured possibility of communication in the concept of thoughts, in which people with a relatively similar attitude and relatively homogeneous way of thinking can exchange information with one another, without speaking with one another or using other technical or mimic aids. Perhaps empathy here represents a preliminary stage to telepathy and we simply do not (yet) understand it. The field thoughts at the same time encompasses ideological anchorings through information-carriers of society and is thereby also anchored in the social space. Thus the opinions of the populations, and thereby also of our children, are influenced through targeted conveying of information and steered in particular directions. Here one may recall (monetarist) neoliberalism, but also religious rituals, fairy tales and, especially politically charged, the “(un-)modern” school system in its emblematic hindering of the development of our descendants (cf. on this also various writings of Hüther et al. and of many other authors (professors, doctors, pedagogues, entrepreneurs, mothers, etc.)).

The field of culture(s) encompasses a stronger anchoring in society, manifested ideologies in the mind of the human being, which shape their habitus. Engrams I here regard as distinguished from the habitus, since engrams can, through conditionings, be anchored much more strongly in the body, while the habitus aims more at the social space, although with this again engrams are bound up, especially as regards the fine differences (Bourdieu) in the respective etiquette. Conventions, on the other hand, are agreements that are not restricted solely to the habitus or cultural determinations. This can be a matter of intimate agreements in sexual dealings between two or more (intimate) partners, or of taking part in a (football) game.

As the most general field I further draw upon information, which can in part exist completely detached from all other fields and, where appropriate, need not even flow into the socialisation of the actor. And even if it plays an important role for the child in the incarnation (x), it can be completely irrelevant in subsequent incarnations (n) (stage Ω). The 6 fields thus touch all environments of the child, but can in part also pass it by completely and be insignificant. It is the pertinent experiences that shape the child, be it only for this or also other incarnations (stage Ω), and shape its action in these incarnations or only in following ones (stage Ω), while it has already, through past incarnations (stage Ω), undergone a shaping in this life.

Outside the intimate environment, more strongly restricted to the purely social environment, social encounters too contribute more or less strongly to the socialisation of the child in the societal context (here I lean on the work of Erving Goffman (1961) — AlkeTOR 2016d), whereby the social here also extends to the spheres of the paternal, intimate and biological environment.

The natural environment encompasses a multitude of further, not more closely defined factors (in the sense of the interaction membrane in Goffman), which on the one hand are not necessary for the fundamental understanding of this work and on the other hand also encompass such elements as play no role in the socialisation of the child, or else encompass our individual assimilation and accommodation structures apart from those listed here and can serve for the extension of the model listed here. In the natural environment the frame is thereby created also to take in other hitherto unknown factors and to formulate further environments.

With this the schematic depiction of the socialisation of the child is set out. Only the assimilation and accommodation according to Jean Piaget I have not yet explained more closely. Since assimilation and accommodation represent a central role in our socialisation, both in the formation of engrams, emotions, thoughts, culture(s), conventions and information and in our possibility of sharpening our perceptual capacities, of forming our identity (cf. Piaget (see below)), I will explain these more closely in the following chapter. When these have been sufficiently depicted and have given emphasis to the biological environment (stage α) in the shaping of our emotions, I will extend Piaget’s stage concept by the dimensions newly introduced here (stage Ω and α).

Assimilation and accommodation

Leaning on selected parts of the works of Jean Piaget (2003), I will in the following explain the significance of “assimilation and accommodation” (Piaget 2003: 53) for the (emotional) development of the child. The term of assimilation has again close relations to biology (cf. ibid.) and one generally understands by it „[…] die Integration externer Elemente in die sich entwickelnden oder abgeschlossenen Strukturen eines Organismus“ (ibid.). Once such external elements have been taken into the interior of the organism, into its biology, its physiology and psychology — its world of thought —, the „[…] die erforderlichen[n] »Reaktionskompetenzen« […]“ (ibid.: 54) are formed. Assimilation on its own, however, would be bound up with a bureaucratic utopia of unchangeability. Pure assimilation changes no maps (Spitzer (see above)) in the human organism, but merely supplements structures that already fit the existing ones, without changing old ones. Development would in this sense be impossible, and even the adaptation of other structures only conditionally possible:

„Biologische Assimilation gibt es jedoch nie ohne ihr Gegenstück, die Akkommodation. Beispielsweise assimiliert ein Phänotyp während seiner embryonalen Entwicklung die Substanzen, die er zur Erhaltung seiner vom Genotyp festgelegten Strukturen braucht. Doch je nachdem, ob diese Substanzen reichlich oder knapp vorhanden sind oder ob die üblichen Substanzen durch andere ersetzt werden, die leichte Unterschiede aufweisen, können nichterbliche Variationen (häufig »Akkommodate“ genannt) auftreten, […]“ (Piaget 2003: 55)

The integration of external elements into the psyche/world of thought of the child Piaget (2003: 56) describes as „[…] kognitive Adaption […]“, which expresses nothing other than the „[…] Gleichgewicht zwischen Assimilation und Akkommodation“ (ibid.). These formed structures, on which the behaviour, action and interacting with the environment of the child builds, one can generally describe as engrams (see above in AlkeDH). These maps of the psyche, our routines, flow through our psyche, our organism, our thoughts and our emotions in particular. The adaptation — the balance between assimilation and accommodation „[…] charakterisiert einen vollständigen Intelligenzakt“ (ibid.: 57) — applies just as much to our emotional development, which is closely linked with our biology and psychology. The imbalance between assimilation and accommodation applies just as much to it, when the external elements cannot be taken into one’s own organism, a failed adaptation.

An example:
The mathematics teacher17 refuses the children deviations from the previous method of calculation and punishes this with bad marks, which in Germany is common practice, although these modified methods of calculation in many cases even represent improvements or can simply be grasped better by the respective child. The arising act of intelligence is here consciously sabotaged by the mathematics teacher and the developmental possibilities sensitively damaged. To recognise the achievement of the child would after all mean to treat it as equal! One would have to attribute to the child its own achievement, which possibly betrays a better understanding of the material than is possible for the teacher themselves — a striking flaw in our educational system. These deviating strategies of solution are precisely in the field of computer science very much in demand and often lead to striking process optimisations that were not previously known (or were already repeatedly nipped in the bud of their emergence early by a mathematics teacher (x)). This example is best depictable through references to mathematics, but is not restricted to fields of mathematics and is to be regarded as generally valid:

„Allgemein gesprochen, ist dieses zunehmende Gleichgewicht zwischen Assimilation und Akkommodation ein Beispiel für einen grundlegenden Prozess in der kognitiven Entwicklung, der sich als Zentrierung und Dezentierung beschreiben lässt. Die systematisch verzerrenden Assimilationen der sensomotorischen oder ersten Repräsentationsstadien — die verzerren, weil sie nicht von angemessenen Akkommodationen begleitet sind — bedeuten, dass das Subjekt auf die eigenen Handlungen und den eigenen Standpunkt zentriert bleibt. Auf der anderen Seite ist das sich allmählich herausbildende Gleichgewicht zwischen Assimilation und Akkommodation das Ergebnis einer Reihe von Dezentrierungen [Abweichungen von bekannten Rechenwegen], die es dem Subjekt ermöglichen, den Blickwinkel anderer Subjekte oder den Standpunkt von Objekten einzunehmen. Früher haben wir diesen Prozess lediglich als Egozentrismus und Sozialisation beschrieben. Aber er betrifft weitaus genereller und fundamentaler die Erkenntnis in allen ihren Erscheinungsformen [— auch den Emotionen und oder bisher unbekannter Wahrnehmungsmöglichkeiten unserer Sinnesorgane (vgl. die CIA Arbeit weiter oben]. Denn kognitiver Fortschritt ist nicht nur Assimilation von Informationen; er enthält auch einen systematischen Dezentrierungsprozess, der eine notwendige Bedingung von Objektivität überhaupt ist.“ (Piaget 2003: 61f)

If an imbalance predominates in our assimilation and accommodation structures, this even fosters the formation of exaggerated egoism, whereby this is, to a special degree, instilled through the nature of our society — the evil nature of the human being (see above) is thus a product of our unbalanced upbringing, not of our innate nature! The bureaucratic utopia, pure assimilation without accommodation, is thus in the highest degree susceptible to exaggerated egoistic tendencies in the actor. Accordingly, the counterpart of egoism, altruism, would most probably be fosterable through a socialisation that fosters, to an especially high degree, accommodation processes in the development of the human being, especially in childhood, which is actively sabotaged by our educational system through, for instance, mathematics teachers. Not through mathematics, but the punishing of deviations, which damages accommodation processes in this special case and even prevents future accommodation processes. A calculable and steerable bureaucrat is born, when the mathematics teacher has durably damaged the accommodation capacity of the child. This connection becomes especially clear in the following quotation:

„Wenn die Assimilation die Akkommodation übertrifft (d.h., wenn die Merkmale des Objekts nur insoweit berücksichtigt werden, wie sie mit den gegenwärtigen Interessen des Subjekts übereinstimmen), entwickelt sich das Denken in egozentrische[18] oder sogar autistische Richtung.“ (Piaget 2003: 57f)

It would be just as wrong to assert that pure accommodation without assimilation fosters the altruistic nature of the human being and counteracts an exaggerated egoism. Rather, the balance between the two, the adaptation, is decisive for a healthy development of the child. The example of the mathematics teacher describes in the first place cases in which obviously special developments in children are hindered, and I assume that most mathematics teachers (x) are not even aware of it — recalled once more: the example is not restricted to mathematics and by no means presupposes such behaviour in every teacher, but according to my school experiences and the problems of our educational system very broadly known in scientific circles, probably represents rather the more rare exception. Without ever new assimilation measures of the child, it can also carry out no accommodation measures, just as vice versa. If the child is not able to abstract from the learning of driving a car to the learning of riding a motorcycle, because it does not regard the motorcycle as a vehicle (put pointedly), it will have difficulties assimilating and accommodating (cf. in this connection also Piaget 2003: 85f). Thus an actor without basic knowledge of programming can (compre)hend no complicated source texts for an operating system, or without a basic understanding of communication learn a language, which the unborn receives rudimentarily in the womb (stage α), just as its emotional maturity and development. Its personal subjective perspective of the environment (here of programming) denies it the objective view of the necessary structures of a program code, with its own purposeful grammar (syntax). And against the background of different incarnations (n) (stage Ω), this capacity for adaptation is by no means restricted to the processes and courses in incarnation (x).

With this, the significance of assimilation and accommodation in our development as human beings should have become clear and be sufficiently understandable for the illustration “Socialisation landscape of the human being” (see above). In the following I now want to concern myself in simplified form with Piaget’s stage concept itself and extend it by the new dimensions (Ω and α) from the preceding chapter and adjust it accordingly.

Emotions and Piaget’s stage concept

After the many-layeredness hitherto unconsidered by science (stages Ω and α) has been made clear, and far more dimensions flow into our human development than is generally recognised or than people are aware of, I will apply this extension to the stage concept of Jean Piaget (1986). According to Piaget, the development of the subject begins only with birth, where his stage concept too — especially the sphere of the „[…] senso-motorische[n] Stufe“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 13), also „[…] senso-motorische Intelligenz“ (ibid.: 15) — begins with six spheres. In this phase of the six spheres the child, according to Piaget, already possesses a pre-linguistic „[…] Intelligenz […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 15) which allows the child „[…] die Wirklichkeit gemäß einem System von raum-zeitlichen und kausalen Strukturen zu organisieren“ (ibid.). All spheres are based on assimilation and accommodation activities. The spheres subdivide as follows:

1. „Das Stadium I […] spontane und totale Tätigkeiten des Organismus […] und […, der] Reflex […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 17)

2. „Das Stadium II […] die ersten Gewohnheiten […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 19)

3. „Das Stadium III […] das Sehen und das Greifen [werden] koordiniert […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 20)

4. Das Stadium „[…] IV […] vollständigere Akte praktischer Intelligenz“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 21)

5. Das Stadium „[…] V […] »Unterlagenverhalten« […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 21)

6. „Das Stadium VI […] innere Kombinationen […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 22)

In the first stage it is not the reflexes themselves, but the spontaneous and total activities of the organism, which can also find their expression in reflexes. The child repeats „[…] spontan […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 17) the most varied courses and begins to form first recognisable habits. Once such a habit is formed, the child is in the second stage of senso-motoric intelligence. However, these are not yet especially targeted in their relation to the environment and restrict themselves purely to the reaching of „[…] erstrebte[r] Zweck[e] […]“ (ibid.: 19) of the child. As soon as the child begins to use its habits in a coordinated way in order to reach a particular goal, and (still) only by chance applies a habit fitting for the purpose, the child is, according to Piaget, in the third stage, „[…] der Schwelle zur Intelligenz […]“ (ibid.: 21). As soon as the child no longer by chance but in a targeted way applies a fitting habit for the reaching of a purpose, Piaget speaks of practical intelligence, „[…] die angewandten Mittel werden ausschließlich bereits bekannten Assimilationsschemata entliehen […]“ (ibid.). If the child now adjusts these means in a targeted way anew, „[…] durch Differenzierung der bekannten Schemata […]“ (ibid.), Piaget speaks of »underlay behaviour«. Here it adjusts, in a targeted and conscious way, known courses in order to reach the same goal with different means. The process of accommodation is now, in exchange with the environment, applied in a targeted way. In the last stage, the inner combination, the „[…] Vollendung […]“ (ibid.: 23) of the senso-motoric stage sets in. The child begins, without immediate interaction with the environment, to develop new solution-paths; the interplay between assimilation and accommodation can now take place purely in the mind of the child (cf. ibid.: 22), before it decides on a solution-path in interaction with the environment. Piaget frames this development in the period of the first 7 years of life (cf. Piaget/Inhelder 1986). Depending on the child and its disposition, deviations (cf. ibid.) can occur here.

This process of senso-motoric intelligence, which harbours a multitude of assimilation and accommodation schemata, is the foundation of the development of the child, of its developmental and intelligence potential. However, we have already learned in the chapter Biological foundations of prenatal socialisation that this socialisation, the development of the child, already begins with conception in the womb (stage α). And if we further take into account the aspects of reincarnation (see above — stage Ω) as well as epigenetics (see above — stage α: biological environment), here schemata from earlier lives (stage Ω) already intervene in the assimilation and accommodation capacities of the child, at least as regards the mental level of the child (cf. Fig. Socialisation landscape of the human being).

Against the background of the past chapter, we must extend the stage concept especially with a view to its deviations and the dimension of prenatal socialisation, just as through reincarnation (stage Ω) and epigenetics (stage α). One could basically supplement a stage α (Alpha — the first letter of the Greek alphabet), which stands for the prenatal socialisation of the human being — the incarnation (x) in accordance with the socialisation landscape of the human being —, all conditionings and socialisation processes in the prenatal stage. Stage (α) thereby restricts itself in the first place to the biological environment of the child, with strong influences from the intimate environment of the child, in this stage (α) in the first place through father and mother. The child must, in accordance with this view, thus let itself into a (largely — stage Ω) unfamiliar environment and now master many processes of its own body independently and without a physical connection to the mother. The first seven years of life of the intelligence-forming process according to Piaget are then possibly not a forming of intelligence as such, but the forming of an intelligence in the socially conforming sense. For this speak precisely the findings of AlkeDH (2000a, 2002c, 2004a/b), Yang et al. (2015), Tucker (2015), Ali/Spence/Bremner (2015) and others (see above) and imply imprintings especially in the form of emotions, engrams, cultural customs (culture(s)), conventions and simple information, all on a level very simple for our perception — but possibly also on a very complex level. This pre-conforming intelligence (stages Ω and α), as I here presuppose it, would accordingly be present in a stage that is to be set even before stage α and very subtle, which contains emotions and engrams scarcely comprehensible (for us in adulthood). For this I would like to introduce the stage Ω (Omega — the last letter of the Greek alphabet), which corresponds to the incarnation (n) from the illustration of the socialisation landscape of the human being. Ω counts, in the mythological sense, also as the completion of a process, of the creative force of nature when the circle closes and brings forth something new (cf. AlkeDH 2000c). Ω is thus meant to contain the totality of the incarnations (n) (the individual chronicle of development) and to serve as the basis for the most essential and most shaping engrams of the child in incarnation (x). Here we must distinguish two dimensions. Dimension (a) stands for the biological facet in the sense of epigenetics. The findings of epigenetics (Beckers/Hrabe de Angelis — see above) have proven that the parents pass on learned behaviour through their genetic material via sperm and egg-cell to their descendants. There thus takes place, on the biological level, a genetic imprinting of the tendential modes of behaviour of the children in particular life situations, in addition to the emotional imprinting through the mother, especially during pregnancy (stage α). The second dimension (b) aims at the aspect of reincarnation (AlkeDH; Tucker — see above) (stage Ω). Through this the child undergoes, through its incarnations (n), above all engrammatic imprintings, which distinguish themselves through particular memories of these lives or, through particular emotionally shaping experiences, influence or even determine particular modes of behaviour in incarnation (x). Conventions could probably be conveyed from these phases only through strong emotional and engrammatic imprintings and find their primary expression probably in the emotional state of the child and later of the adult human being. They can have their origin in culture(s) from an incarnation (n) or be bound up with highly individual experiences from one or more incarnations (n). Indeed, even the choice of parents is, through the biological influences of the choice of partner (Hüther/Krens (2011)) and influences on the mental level, not left to chance.

One can in a certain way suppose a causality in the choice of parents by the child, in that it chooses a pair of parents, and the parents the child, which fit one another in the degree of assimilation and accommodation, probably in the first place from an emotional point of view, not a cognitive one. The cognitive side depends primarily on the incarnation (x), possibly bound up with engrams from incarnation (n). An intelligence of some kind that eludes our conventional understanding of intelligence must thus be present. From this view one could contradict the statement of C. G. Jung (see above) that the findings of telepathy elude the laws of causality. Possibly there is a kind of causality (probably more certain than presumable), which, however, eludes our present-day understanding of space, time and causality. Be it that we have a lack of understanding, that the events elude our perceptual capacity, possibly because these are atrophied (cf. Yang et al. 2015), or because we do not want to perceive possible underlying causalities, since they elude our upbringing, our societal conditioning in its understanding of intelligence with the associated assimilation and accommodation schemata.

With this the stages Ω and α are each defined with their expressions and are ideal-typically defined as follows and placed before the stages 1-6 of Piaget:

Stage Ω: The sum of engrammatic/emotional imprintings from incarnation(s) (n).

Stage α: The biological imprinting of the child through the socialisation in the womb as well as genetic inheritance.

The stages 1-6 according to Piaget represent, following on from the stages Ω and α, the forming of an intelligence in the socially conforming sense and are influenced by the assimilation and accommodation structures that result from the stages Ω and α.

Before the conclusion of the work I now turn once more to the concrete emotion fear, since it is very central in our present-day society and is regarded by a whole series of academics as a natural state. As we have seen, the consideration of the stages Ω and α allows the conclusion that this is not so. More on this in the following chapter.

Fear is not a natural state: a critique of Erikson in Giddens

With this concluding chapter I would like to contradict a general practice among scientists who regard fear as a natural state of the human being and an omnipresent component of human life. This may indeed seem plausible to the occidental culture in its fidelity to the Bible and the ecstatic expectation of the Last Judgment, only I am of a different view.

The term fear (German Angst) is derived from the Latin word angustus (colloquially ango)19 and has, in this old origin, the following meanings20: in the spatial sense it means narrow, tight in space. In the sense of a bodily form it means narrow, in the temporal sense limited or short. With regard to possession it means scarce, limited, sparse or slight, and with regard to outer circumstances of life it means worrying, difficult. Further meanings speak of a narrow-heartedness (animi angusti est > it testifies to narrow-heartedness) or also of the meaning short (in brief).

To a connoisseur of economy-critical texts and the awareness of the close interlocking between religion and economy (I here allude to one of the best-known sociological texts: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism by Max Weber), the translations limited, scarce, slight should especially stand out, since they represent the basis of our entire (Protestant/religiously shaped) economy, for economics rests, according to the fundamental concepts of itself, on laws of scarcity, resources are limited and supply is slight. Since precisely economics or, in biblical style, the clergy/the ecclesiastical authorities profit from these fears and represent one of the best-known and probably most widely used instruments, I regard fear in the first place as a (socialisation) instrument of ethically-morally questionable actors in order to exercise (blanket) influence on other actors.

My critique is in the widest sense an excerpt from one of my earlier works on Anthony Giddens and Erving Goffman’s Encounters in comparison. Originally this work was written after the original version of the present emotion-work and takes account of a critique of a lecturer that in my view is ill-considered and untimely! Moreover it becomes clear that I tend, in my work, to follow the psychoanalytic school of C. G. Jung, while the model of Erikson stands in the tradition of Sigmund Freud. Here, then, competing psychoanalytic approaches too meet, and I give precedence to that of C. G. Jung, since this is more open and takes account of phenomena that Sigmund Freud ignored or fought and which today find growing consideration in individual milieus of the academic and public world.

I will introduce this retrospect with the interpretation of Erikson by Giddens (AlkeTOR 2016c: Chap. Influences on encounters), since it is necessary for the understanding of the actual critique, and then pass over to my original critique of Erikson in Giddens (AlkeTOR 2016c: Chap. A critique of Erikson in Giddens) in a form adjusted for this work:

Since Giddens criticises Goffman’s lack of engagement with motivation, he introduces, in critical reflection on Sigmund Freud (cf. Giddens 1997: 100), a consideration of this in modified form, which distinguishes itself by the fact that he grasps actions in a plural and not only singular „[…] Prozessualität […] begreif[t] […]“ (ibid.), which goes beyond the psychic factors and can also contain bodily as well as environmentally conditioned factors of the most varied historical events. These conglomerates of processuality thus lead to the routine of everyday life21 and are, from individual to individual and encounter to encounter, differently strongly pronounced, based on „[…] Seinsgewißheit […]“ (ibid.: 101).

This certainty of being, of psychic origin, lies, according to Giddens (1997: 101; leaning on Erikson 1973 in Giddens 1997: 101ff), „[…] in den fundamentalen Mechanismen der Angstkontrolle […], die als Komponenten der Persönlichkeit hierarchisch angeordnet sind“ (Giddens 1997: 101) and their development through „[…] Gefühle des Vertrauens […]“ (ibid.), which is a result of the „[…] fürsorglichen Routinen der Eltern […]“ (ibid.), as well as of a steady „[…] Autonomiezuwachses […]“ (ibid.) of the child itself. These feelings of trust are, according to Erikson, results of early-childhood experiences22, which, conditioned by fear (cf. ibid.: 104-108), first receive their actual significance and, through „[…] »Urvertrauen« und »Urmisstrauen« […]“ (ibid.: 104), accompany the actor their whole life long. If the actor now enters a critical situation23 (dealings with actors of another class affiliation; love at first sight, which immediately makes one forget the entire surrounding situation; an unexpected job offer with very good conditions; etc.), a state of fear is, according to Giddens, characteristic for this. This fundamental attitude must come to light already in a pre-linguistic stage24, since the actor, according to Erikson in Giddens’ words, already behaves so without linguistic skills and would act accordingly, whereby already „[…] Geburt […]“ (ibid.: 112) must be a fear-generating act, just as „[…] Tod […]“ (ibid.) a break in the life cycle:

Unter »kritischen Situationen« verstehe ich Ereignisse, die sich durch einen radikalen, nicht vorhersehbaren Bruch auszeichnen, der eine beträchtliche Zahl von Individuen betrifft; Situationen, die die Gewißheit der institutionalisierten Routinen bedrohen oder zerstören.“ (Giddens 1997: 112)

Only with his certainty of being does Giddens really bring in an element deviating from Goffman [into the model of encounters], which, leaning on Erikson, primarily through fear-control influences the life cycle of an actor in a preserving way and restricts itself largely purely to the individual actor. If one draws upon the byplay and postplay for the refreshing of an encounter in Goffman, even this section in Giddens’ model is no real innovation. However, I must in this connection put forward a critique of my own of Erikson, since I am not of the view that fear in its many-faceted forms is innate to every actor in an identical way and is thus by no means a natural state [but instilled, possibly via the ways of epigenetics (see above) — stage α].

According to this view leaning on Erikson, all reactions of peoples outside Western conceptions would represent abnormal reactions and would probably be classified as psychic illnesses, since they in part express something like fear in opposite situations. That would mean, for example, that festive celebrations with good cheer in honour of the deceased could only be explained through a psychic illness of the culture, since the Western [occidental] culture almost falls into self-pity and reacts almost apathetically when a death occurs, even when it concerns a completely unknown person at the other end of the earth. The core problem is thereby already named: it is a matter of cultural differences, which are also mirrored in the emotional state of the actors! Thus there are believing people who show fear reactions at the sight of a black cat, while others try to stroke it and […; about the fluffy animal] rejoice. Yet other actors sense ecstatic states in a parachute jump from several kilometres’ height, while others become unconscious from sheer fear before they even stand at the door of the aeroplane, apart from fear of flying itself, which again occurs only in particular people. One thus finds even in our own society actors who react to particular situations with great fear (up to unconsciousness, in rare extreme cases even up to death), while others remain completely calm, or even experience an ecstasy. From these everyday examples alone, a “natural state of fear in the human being” can only be contradicted and by no means seen as given, rather the opposite. Such a natural state of fear in all humans would have to imply a general homogeneity of emotional reaction patterns in society, which is simply not present!

Already „[…] 1919 führten John Watson und Rosalie Rayner jenes berühmte Experiment durch, das zeigen sollte, dass Angst konditionierbar ist (vgl. Watson/Rayner 1920)“ (Rinck/Becker 2011: 110), even if only with moderate success, apart from the ethical and moral problematic of the time of these experiments with humans. However, the proof of the learnability of fear succeeded through „[…] Tierexperimente […]“ (ibid.: 112), among others through the Pavlovian dog and analyses „[…] von Susan Mineka und ihren Kollegen […]“ (Bouton/Mineka/Barlow in Rinck/Becker 2011: 112). Beyond this it was already possible at the time, through conditioning and particular learning-successes, to erase fears and phobias in the later course of life. Ehlers/Margraf (1989 in Rick/Becker: 121) show, in their „[…] psychophysiologischen Modell der Angstanfälle […]“ (ibid.), that by no means every human being tends, in a situation of tension, to an „[…] Angstanfall […]“ (ibid.), a combination of „[…] Stressoren und äußeren Reizen […]“ (ibid.) which can become fear only through associations by the actor themselves. [The connection between biology and sociology becomes here likewise more than clear.] With this, reactions of tension must be distinguished from fear reactions, while the associations by the actor are of a cultural as well as an educational, or also experiential, kind [and build on differing assimilation and accommodation schemata]. And as a consequence of this, a natural state of fear in the human being can, according to Erikson, only be evaluated as a fallacy! Fear is, with the additional consideration of the results of prenatal research and of the neurosciences (Holodynski/Friedlmeier 2006; Spitzer 2006; Hüther/Krens 2011), an emotion instilled into the human being (Kandell 2009), which is/can be triggered primarily through social pressure, or arises through traumatic experiences, but also through the close symbiotic connection between mother and child during pregnancy. The child is confronted in the womb [stage — α] with all the hormonal stirrings of the mother (the placenta is far more permeable than generally known (cf. Hüther/Krens 2011 [see above])) and can in this sense receive an (emotional) imprinting through these, which has a decisive influence on all subsequent stirrings and (emotional) developments of the child. At the same time these findings contradict the assertion of Giddens that children in the pre-linguistic stage already have the same fear-reaction patterns as all actors of a society ([…]). It can thus serve as a control mechanism for behaviour and modes of action, as a limit for security-relevant barriers but also in order to suppress unwelcome behaviour, as well as as an instrument of power in order to guarantee allegiance, if one applies it accordingly.

And as has already been described, tension (for instance as a consequence of the sight of a longed-for person) need by no means always be the result of a negative experience and automatically trigger something like fear. If one plays football and is afraid the whole time of losing, one will scarcely stay concentrated on the ball and consciously in the team, in order to contribute one’s best to victory, let alone risk something in order to come closer to victory, while a healthy tension (every human being reacts differently) increases the readiness to act and attentiveness. All the more so as Giddens himself does not engage with tension and relaxation in the narrower sense, whereby he largely lacks a fundamental dynamic of social interactions in his model-draft, which Goffman, however, explicitly takes into account through tension and relaxation and which in Giddens is only to be found within the frame of seriality. With this, even the certainty of being, actually to be evaluated as new, is implicitly already contained in Goffman’s model, merely in a more abstract mode of formulation, without fixation on a state of fear, which offers more far-reaching possibilities of connection than would ever be possible in Giddens, and describes the core of the process itself, the societal dynamic. A process which, in the formulation of the interaction membrane in Goffman, first unfolds its universal reach.

With this it should have become clear that fear is not a natural state and why I do not regard this conditioned emotion as an elementary component of my emotion-work. I by no means want to exclude that, through engrams, something like fear itself can penetrate from stage Ω into the stages α-7, yet this is here (predominantly) likewise again a matter of socialisation/experience patterns from incarnations (n), solely through their completely individual and highly various pattern of occurrence. There are indeed commonalities, such as the fear of spiders or other animals, yet these are always bound up with an earlier experience or primary reference persons and were finally anchored in the human being through specific assimilation and accommodation schemata. Fear is instilled into us, it is not a natural component of our nature. The interplay between tension and relaxation, on the other hand, is a natural component of our physiology and (para-)psychology! The concluding outlook will once more briefly sum up the central insights and conclusions of this work and sum up suggestions for further analyses from this work.

Concluding word and outlook

As this work has shown, fear is by no means a natural state of the human being. Our often lamented egoistic behaviour can be traced back to (intentionally) faulty upbringing through our parents and the educational system. Conversely, through a holistic upbringing we can develop into circumspect human beings. The central sections of the work have made clear that we, through adaptation (Piaget), the balance between assimilation & accommodation — a complete act of intelligence — (Piaget), take up in ourselves, on many known and in part unknown levels, engrams in the form of (emotional) modes of behaviour, which essentially influence our social togetherness. It is precisely in our nervous system that, through the biological environment, central representational surfaces or, put simply, maps (Spitzer/Kandell) are formed, which shape us already in the prenatal (Hüther/Krens) stage α in our fundamental behaviour “from” our birth. In addition, especially strong engrams can, through hitherto scarcely captured transmission-structures (cf. Dunne/Bisaha 1979; Jung 1990; Puthoff (CIA) 1996; AlkeDH 2000a, 2002c, 2004a/b; Ali/Spence/Bremner 2015; Tucker 2015; Yang et al. 2015) such as reincarnation (embodied by the individual chronicle of development — stage Ω), telepathy, astral travel & remote viewing (stages Ω – 7) and genetic inheritance of learned modes of behaviour (epigenetics: Prof. Johannes Beckers & Prof. Martin Hrabe de Angelis in Schultes 2016 — stage α), shape the child in its development and its bearing and dealings in this incarnation (x) and foster or inhibit its reach of action, whereby the child will probably, in accordance with its pre-conforming intelligence, choose relatively fitting parents, who likewise decide for the choice of the child, in accordance with their society-conforming intelligence — it is a common process of the becoming family, even if this view will not suit some parents, when they have problems with their children and vice versa. Put more simply: the assimilation and accommodation structures of parents and child fit one another in the most fundamental structures, especially in emotional respects. And as the results gathered in Sanders (2016) have shown, we come into the world with extremely complex and manifold/many-layered perceptual and differentiation capacities, which we mostly unlearn again relatively quickly after birth, precisely in the sense of a conforming intelligence. Even moral decision-behaviour we already possess shortly after birth (Schmidt/Sommerville 2011) — or are we only able, with a few months of the children’s growing up, to capture this in them as observers?

The totality of the extended senso-motoric stages in Piaget can thus be summed up as follows and places the last letter of the Greek alphabet Ω (Omega), as the embodiment of a completed developmental process (of an incarnation (n)), the first letter of the Greek alphabet α (Alpha), as a new beginning of a developmental process (of an incarnation (x)), before it, in order to take account of the belief in rebirth present in many cultures and of the by now present research in this area, the ignorance of which is already reminiscent of discrimination by scientists and of the decadence of these:

Ω. The stage of the sum of engrammatic/emotional imprintings from incarnation(s) (n).

α. The stage of the biological imprinting of the child through the socialisation in the womb as well as genetic inheritance.

1. „Das Stadium I […] spontane und totale Tätigkeiten des Organismus […] und […, der] Reflex […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 17)

2. „Das Stadium II […] die ersten Gewohnheiten […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 19)

3. „Das Stadium III […] das Sehen und das Greifen [werden] koordiniert […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 20)

4. Das Stadium „[…] IV […] vollständigere Akte praktischer Intelligenz“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 21)

5. Das Stadium „[…] V […] »Unterlagenverhalten« […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 21)

6. „Das Stadium VI […] innere Kombinationen […]“ (Piaget/Inhelder 1986: 22)

Apart from this, the child is confronted, with entry into adolescence from the onset of sexual maturity, with a further flood of new emotions as well as the drive of reproduction and must, with growing up, cope with a far greater variety of emotions, apart from the rules of the game, role-plays and theatre-plays within society. Every subject experiences in this developmental phase emotional highs and lows, whereby the physiology too changes once more fundamentally and the organism is confronted with new hormones. These new emotions must be experienced by the growing child and the dealings with these learned (formation of further representational surfaces (Spitzer/Kandell) in the nervous system) in order later to lead an independent life, or rather to suffer no disadvantages on the basis of an emotional immaturity (for instance, in every potential conflict situation immediately to take flight and thereby never to learn to assert oneself, or conversely to seek confrontation in every situation, although a retreat would in particular situations be the long-term better choice — both of which, be it noted, are again closely bound up with Piaget’s intelligence and whether the child was primarily socialised with fear or a positive relationship to the environment). The ever more adult child attains, with its maturity, an ever more differentiated (and, in its social surroundings, more society-conforming) perception of feelings (and logical perceptual processes) with hundreds or thousands of nuancings, which require the processing of an enormous quantity of stimuli (information), which could consciously and logically only be captured over the course of years, but undergo dozens of simultaneous evaluations in the speed of seconds in order to end in a fine to expressive change of well-being and to react with different stirrings (mimic, bodily posture, acoustics of the voice, pronunciation, customs, conventions, role-behaviour, consideration of the needs of others, consideration of one’s own and others’ interests, etc.), which, put briefly, is only possible through emotions and engrams, provided these are, with their accommodative character, in a relative balance to assimilation.

For without assimilation the emotions and engrams would receive no stability, and without accommodation the established assimilation structures would undergo no changes, which, put briefly, would mean entropy or standstill and would leave no room open for development, at least not in a socially acceptable, autonomy- and individuality-fostering context, and would simply end in a “structural idiocy” of assimilation — a utopia of bureaucracy and the associated compulsions of control, probably created in the first place by fear-steered people.

An actor without this balance between assimilation and accommodation would probably react in extremes between absolutely serious (logically rational) and absolutely emotional (the feelings uninhibitedly block the view for the objective), as is to be observed in small children, who, for example, after sudden crying, perceive a new object in their immediate surroundings and direct their whole concentration on this object and thereby forget the entire surroundings, even that they cried shortly before.

The experience of emotions is thus, in the early phase of development, not adjusted to our societal conventions (pre-conforming intelligence), but is in any case already present within the biological environment (stage α) and increases up to adolescence (puberty) with a building-up balance between assimilation and accommodation, and reaches, with sexual maturity and the further course of development, a great range of experienceable emotions with ever finer nuances, which equally require more differentiated (more society-conforming) assimilation structures than in the case of a small child.

Emotions thus play a central role in the development of the human being and decide, to a special degree, the developmental capacity of every actor and thereby, in a transferred sense, also of the whole of society.

While the assimilation structures in the early development of the subject are still relatively pre-conformingly formed and the accommodation is permanently active on account of constant changes, to which the child is forced on account of its rapidly changing physiology and the constant increase of ever new perceptible stimuli, the child is, upon entry into the social fabric, primarily emotionally/engrammatically steered, whereby this steering has already undergone a (largely) pre-conforming imprinting/socialisation through the biological environment (stage α) and the individual chronicle of development (stage Ω).

With increasing development and (again) rising capacity for differentiation (that is, the society-conforming socialisation), the actor reaches a state of society-conforming intelligence.

This balance now equally affects the development of the emotional constitution of the human being, which, strongly shaped by the mother (biological environment), has a retroactive influence on the development of the intelligence of the child. In addition, the socialisation, with the formation of ever more differentiated (new) structures in the actor, is a lifelong process, only that with ever longer applied assimilation structures, deviations from these become ever less probable or more laborious, which describes the inertia and determinacy of the habitus (for instance the entanglement in a social standing) and emphasises the significance of the influence of the social and natural environment on the development of the child, especially of the imprinting in the early development of the child.

Our “modern” knowledge about our development as human beings leaves many gaps open — especially in the tradition of monetarist neoliberalism, but also of ecclesiastical history of domination — and it is regrettable that only so few scientists are ready to make use of the bearing backgrounds of myths and spiritual values in order thereby to draw inferences about our mental, biological and social development.

Footnotes

1. In the English orig.: „Six-month-old babies can spot subtle differences between two monkey faces easy as pie. But 9-month-olds — and adults — are blind to the differences.“ ↑
2. Cf. in the English orig.: Three- to 4-month-old babies can see differences in lighting that are undetectable to adults. This ephemeral superskill evaporates just months later, scientists reported in December in Current Biology.“ ↑
3. In the English orig.: „With experience, babies probably learn that these subtle differences aren’t usually important. ‘As a result, infants lose this striking ability,‘ Yang says.“ ↑
4. „Das ungeborene Kind nimmt auch nicht einzelne Worte, sondern die Sprachmelodie und die damit verbundene emotionale Stimmung des Gesprochenen oder Gesungenen wahr.“ (Hüther/Krens 2011: 88) ↑
5. In the English orig.: „[…], infant language expert Janet Werker of the University of British Columbia and colleagues found […]“. ↑
6. Cf. in the English orig.: „When our arms are crossed, we often mistake which hand is getting touched. Our worldly experience tells us that a touch on the left side of our body usually means our left hand was touched (but when our arms are crossed, our right hand is there instead). Young babies are no such fools. Four-month-olds know which crossed foot actually got a tickle — they don’t get turned around like adults do. Just two months later, this precision is gone, scientists reported recently in Current Biology.“ (Sanders 2016) ↑
7. Cf. in the English orig.: „As we get older, we stop paying attention to subtle differences in monkey faces and lighting, which usually aren’t relevant, but we get even better at spotting differences in people’s faces. And that makes sense: Our brains are sculpted to see, hear and feel sensations that are common, and meaningful, in our particular environment.“ ↑
8. Cf. in the English orig.: „First, in contrast to past work suggesting that fairness and altruism may not emerge until early to mid-childhood, 15-month-old infants are sensitive to fairness and can engage in altruistic sharing. Second, infants’ degree of sensitivity to fairness as a third-party observer was related to whether they shared toys altruistically or selfishly, indicating that moral evaluations and prosocial behavior are heavily interconnected from early in development.“ (Schmidt/Sommerville 2011: 1) – „The current study provides the first evidence that by at least 15 months of age, human infants possess the rudiments of a sense of fairness in that they expect resources to be allocated equally when observing others (third-party fairness). […] More specifically, even altruistic sharing exists in 15-month-olds: one third of infants shared the toy they preferred despite having the option to share a non-preferred toy (or to not respond at all); and virtually all of these ‘altruistic sharers‘ expected third-party fairness when observing a resource allocation situation in our VOE paradigm. […]“ (ibid.: 5) ↑
9. Cf. in the English orig.: „As we get older, we stop paying attention to subtle differences in monkey faces and lighting, which usually aren’t relevant, but we get even better at spotting differences in people’s faces. And that makes sense: Our brains are sculpted to see, hear and feel sensations that are common, and meaningful, in our particular environment.“ ↑
10. By natural environment I understand the summary of the biological and social environment, whereby “natural” beyond this refers to physical objects (living ones such as trees and dead ones such as concrete), which especially in the first years of life of an actor contribute to the differentiated perception of the environment (causal space-temporal perception), and are characteristic for the stages of development in Piaget (1986: 17ff). ↑
11. Rebirth and the moment of remembering earlier lives. ↑
12. „JIM B. TUCKER, M.D., is Bonner-Lowry Associate Professor of Psychiatry and Neurobehavioral Sciences at the University of Virginia. He is the Director of the UVA Division of Perceptual Studies, where he is continuing the work of Ian Stevenson with children who report memories of previous lives. […]“ (Tucker 2015: Backcover) ↑
13. Emphases by the author of this work — translated from the English original by the author of this work: „Regardless of one’s a priori position, however, an unimpassioned observer cannot help but attest to the following fact. Despite the ambiguities inherent in the type of exploration covered in these programs, the integrated results appear to provide unequivocal evidence of a human capacity to access events remote in space and time, however falteringly, by some cognitive process not yet understood. My years of involvement as a research manager in these programs have left me with the conviction that this fact bus be taken into account in any attempt to develop an unbiased picture of the structure of reality.“ (Puthoff 1996: 76) ↑
14. Emphases by the author of this work — translated from the English original by the author of this work: „It is the autors‘ belief that the attitudinal environment and the initial rapport established between percipients and agent are crucial factors in remote-viewing success. In all the experiments we have conducted, we have attempted to create an atmosphere of congeniality, playfulness, and relaxation in which psi phenomena are real and natural. […] Although our present knowledge does not enable us to explain adequately the phenomenon being investigated here, the fact that this paper represents a replication of an earlier experiment suggests that remote viewing as an experimental design provides additional evidence substantiating the existence of perceptual and communication channels lying beyond the senses as they are currently defined, and offers itself as a viable vehicle for future research in parapsychology.“ (Dunne/Bisaha 1979: 29) ↑
15. Cf. on this the last quotation from Spitzer, which basically answers the question ↑
16. Cordial thanks to D. Harald Alke for suggestions on this pictorial formulation. Similar views exist, in transferred form, in the teachings of Kundalini Yoga. ↑
17. Cf. various references to this in one of my earlier works (AlkeTOR 2016c) ↑
18. Emphasis by the author of this work! ↑
19. Cordial thanks to D. Harald Alke for this hint! ↑
20. Italic passages of this paragraph, with the exception of the term “Angst”, stem from the Pons (online) — URL: http://de.pons.com/übersetzung/latein-deutsch/angustus ↑
21. Cf. in the orig.: „[…] dem Phänomen der Seinsgewißheit, die im Rahmen voraussagbarer Routinen eine Autonomie der Körperkontrolle zum Ausdruck bringt.“ (Giddens 1997: 101) ↑
22. Cf. in the orig.: „Die Interaktion zwischen Kind und Mutter bettet das hernawachsende menschliche Individiuum in einen Zusammenhang ein, aus dem es, im Guten wie im Schlimmen, später kein Entrinnen mehr gibt.“ (Giddens 1997: 104) – This formulation is found in Bourdieu as internalised norms and values in the habitus of the actor. ↑
23. Cf. in the orig.: „Die Angst vor Abwesenheit wird durch die Belohnung der Anwesenheit aufgefangen, was den Boden für die Dialektik von Verbindlichkeit und Gleichgültigkeit bereitet, […]. […] Diese auf dem Phänomen der Identifikation gründenen Mechanismen werden später durch eine Vielzahl reiferer psychischer Formen überlagert. In extremen Bedrohungs- oder Krisensituationen treten sie indes wieder in den Vordergrund.“ (Giddens 1997: 105): The actor mostly regresses in extreme situations and falls back into old internalised behaviour patterns. Cf. also Giddens 1979a: 123ff in Giddens 1997: 112. ↑
24. Cf. in the orig.: „Es scheint unmöglich, zu bestreiten, daß ein neugeborenes Kind eine angeborene Wahrnehmungsausstattung besitzt. Es besitzt mit anderen Worten nicht nur die Sinnesorgane, sondern auch neurologisch fundierte Schemata, […].“ (Giddens 1997: 97) ↑

Quellenverzeichnis

Ali, Jannath Begum, Charles Spence und Andrew J. Bremner, 2015: Human infants’ ability to perceive touch in external space develops postnatally. In: Current Biology 25: R978-R979. In: Sanders, Laura, 2016 (08. Januar): Young infants have perceptual superpowers (Human Development). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-infants-have-perceptual-superpowers, 2016.02.06: 16:18 Uhr]. In: Sanders, Laura, 2015 (06. November): Young babies live in a world unto themselves (Human Development, Neuroscience). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-babies-live-world-unto-themselves?mode=blog&context=114, 2016.02.07: 11:17 Uhr].

• Alke__DH_, D. Harald,_ 2000a (1993): Energie für Millionen. Ungeahnte Reserven nutzen! Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag.
• Alke__DH_, D. Harald,_ 2000b: Astralreise. Geführte Meditation. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag. [Audio CD]
• Alke__DH_, D. Harald,_ 2000c: Numerologie, Kabbalah, Tarot und Symbolik. Einführung in die Esoterik. Band 1. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag.
• Alke__DH_, D. Harald,_ 2002c: Gesundheitslexikon der Esoterik. Gesundheit und Lebensfreude durch spirituelle Erkenntnis. Spirituelle Erfahrung und Selbsthilfe. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag.
• Alke__DH_, D. Harald_, 2004a (1991): Die Ethik des neuen Menschen. Ethik, Moral, Glaube und Verantwortung. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag.
• Alke__DH_, D. Harald_, 2004b (1990): Botschaften aus dem Licht. Gespräche mit Horus und anderen Lichtwesenheiten. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag.
• Alke__DH_, D. Harald,_ 2005: Reise zum Ursprung des Universums. Geführte Meditation (live). Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag. [Audio CD]
• Alke__TOR_, Tobias O. R.,_ 2016a: Resilienz und Kompetenzentwicklung im höheren Lebensalter. Der Nutzen von Atmung und Konzentration im höheren Lebensalter. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag. [eBook]
• Alke__TOR_, Tobias O. R.,_ 2016b: Identitätsbildung und Verantwortung gegenüber unseren Kindern. Beiträge zur Entwicklung des Menschen von G.H. Head und E. Goffman. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag. [eBook]
• Alke__TOR_, Tobias O. R.,_ 2016c: Unternehmerische Selbständigkeit in Deutschland. Der Arbeitskraftunternehmer in Klasse & Stand bei Karl Marx — Max Weber — Pierre Bourdieu. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag. [eBook]
• Alke__TOR_, Tobias O. R.,_ 2016d: Begegnungen. Ein Vergleich zwischen dem Original von Erving Goffman und der Modifikation von Anthony Giddens. Flörsheim-Dalsheim: Kyborg Institut & Verlag. [eBook]
• Biebricher, Thomas, 2012: Neoliberalismus zur Einführung. Hamburg: Junius Verlag GmbH.
• Bolle, Friedel, 2006: Gefühle in der ökonomischen Theorie. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 48-65.
• Bourdieu, Pierre, 1976: Die Illusion der Regel. In: Ders. (Hrsg.), Entwurf einer Theorie der Praxis. Frankfurt/M: 203-228.
• Bourdieu, Pierre, 1985: Sozialer Raum und Klassen. Lecon sur la Lecon. Zwei Vorlesungen. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
• Bourdieu, Pierre, 1987: Die feinen Unterschiede. Kritik der gesellschaftlichen Urteilskraft. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag.
• Bourdieu, Pierre, 1987a: Strukturen, Habitusformen, Praktiken. In: Ders. (Hrsg.), Sozialer Sinn. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag: 97-121.
• Bourdieu, Pierre, 1992: Ökonomisches Kapital – Kulturelles Kapital – Soziales Kapital. S. 49-79 in: Ders. (Hrsg.), Die verborgenen Mechanismen der Macht. Hamburg.
• Bouton, M.E., Susan Mineka und D.H. Barlow, 2001: A modern learning theory perspective on the etiology of panic disorder. Psychological Review, 108, 4–32. In: Rinck, M. und E.S. Becker, 2011: Lernpsychologische Grundlagen. S. 107-127. in Wittchen, Hans-Ulrich und Jürgen Hoyer et al.: Klinische Psychologie & Psychotheraphie. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag: 112, 921.
• Crapo, Lawrence, 1987(1985): HORMONE. Die chemischen Boten des Körpers. Heidelberg: Spektrum der Wissenschaft Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. [aus dem engl. Orig. von Dr. Ingrid Horn: Hormone. The mesengers of life. New York/Oxford: W. H. Freeman and Company]
• Döring, Sabine A., 2006: Warum brauchen wir eine Philosophie der Gefühle? In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 66-83.
• Dunne, Brenda J. und John P. Bisaha, 1979: Precognitive Remote Viewing in The Chicago Area: A replication of The Stanford Experiment. In: Journal of Parapsychology, Vol. 43: 17-30.
• Ehlers, A. und J. Margraf, 1989: The psychophysiological model of panic. In: P.M.G. Emmelkamp,W. Everead, F. Kraaymaat und M. van Son (Eds.): Fresh perspectives on anxiety disorders. Amsterdam: Swets & Zeitlinger. In: Rinck, M. und E.S. Becker, 2011: Lernpsychologische Grundlagen. S. 107-127. In Wittchen, Hans-Ulrich und Jürgen Hoyer et al.: Klinische Psychologie & Psychotheraphie. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag: 121.
• Erikson, Erik H., 1973 (1963): Kindheit und Gesellschaft. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta (Orig.: Childhood and Society. New York: Norton). In: Giddens, Anthony, 1997 (1995): Bewusstsein, Selbst und soziale Integration: 91-159. In: Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. 3. Aufl. Campus Verlag: Frankfurt/M., New York: 102-111.
• Esser, Hartmut, 2006: Affektuelles Handeln: Emotionen und das Modell der Frame-Selektion. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 143- 174.
• Flam, Helena, 2002: Soziologie der Emotionen. Konstanz: UVK Verlagsgesellschaft: 9-172.
• Flam, Helena, 2006: >>From Emotional >Man< with Love<<. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 195-222.
• Giddens, Anthony, 1984 (1973): Die Klassenstruktur fortgeschrittener Gesellschaften. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. (Aus dem engl. Orig.: The Class Structure of the Advanced Societas. London: Hutchinson University Library).
• Giddens, Anthony, 1997 (1995): Bewusstsein, Selbst und soziale Integration. In: Die Konstitution der Gesellschaft. 3. Aufl. Campus Verlag: Frankfurt/M., New York: 91-159.
• Goffman, Erving, 1961: Encounters. two studies in the sociology of interaction. Indianapolis, New York: THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY, INC.: 7-81.
• Goffman, Erving, 2009: Wir alle spielen Theater – Die Selbstdarstellung im Alltag. München: Piper Verlag GmbH.
• Hegemann, Lisa, 2016 (13. Mai): t3n 44 ist fertig: „Diplom? Geschenkt! Über die Zukunft der Bildung“. [URL: http://t3n.de/news/t3n-44-fertig-schwerpunkt-bildung-diplom-geschenkt-705169/ – 2016.06.13: 09:03 Uhr].
• Hillmann, Karl-Heinz (et. al.), 2007: Wörterbuch der Soziologie. Stuttgart: Verlag.
• Holodynski, Manfred, und Wolfgang Friedlmeier, 2006: Emotionen – Entwicklung und Regulation. Unter Mitarbeit von Wolfgang Friedlmeier. Mit 32 Abbildungen und 16 Tabellen. Heidelberg: Springer Medizin Verlag Heidelberg: 2-51.
• Hüther, Gerald, und Inge Krens, 2011: Das Geheimnis der ersten neun Monate. Unsere frühesten Prägungen. Weinheim/Basel: Beltz Verlag.
• Jung, Carl Gustav, 1990: Synchronizität, Akkausalität und Okkultismus. München: dtv.
• Karthick, S., 2013 (16. Januar): 9-year-old boy becomes youngest Microsoft tech specialist. In: The Times of India. [URL: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/chennai/9-year-old-boy-becomes-youngest-Microsoft-tech-specialist/articleshow/18040118.cms – 2016.06.15: 15:43Uhr]
• Kandell, Eric, 2009: Auf der Suche nach dem Gedächtnis – Der Hirnforscher Eric Kandel. Petra Seeger (95 Minuten Film)
• Kessel, Martina, 2006: Gefühle und Geschichtswissenschaft. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 29-47.
• Kuhlenkamp, Detlef, 2010: Lifelong Learning – Programmatik, Realität, Perspektiven (Studienreihe Bildungs- und Wissenschaftsmanagement). WAXMANN.
• Lepsius, M. Rainer, 1979: Soziale Ungleichheit und Klassenstrukturen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. In: Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (Hrsg.): Klassen in der europäischen Sozialgeschichte. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: 166-209.
• Maclean, M., C. Harvey und J. Press, 2006: Business Elites and Corporate Governance in France and the UK. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Marx, Karl und Friedrich Engels, 1890(1848): Manifest der kommunistischen Partei. In: Ders., 2004 (2. Aufl.): Ausgewählte Werke. Zusammengestellt von Mathias Bertram. Berlin: Directmedia Publishing GmbH, Digitale Bibliothek Band 11: 462-474.
• Mascolo, M.F., Hawkins, D. und T. Harakla, 2000: The dynamic construction of Emotion: Varieties in anger. In: Lewis, M. Und I. Granit (Hrsg.): Emotion, development, and self-organization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 125-152. In: Holodynski, Manfred: Emotionen – Entwicklung und Regulation. Unter Mitarbeit von Wolfgang Friedlmeier. Mit 32 Abbildungen und 16 Tabellen. Heidelberg. Springer Medizin Verlag Heidelberg.
• Mees, Ulrich, 2006: Zum Forschungsstand der Emotionspsychologie – ein Skizze. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.), Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 104-123.
• Möller, Gabriele, 2012: Schwanger: Was fühlt mein Baby schon? urbia.de. [URL: http://www.urbia.de/magazin/schwangerschaft/schwanger-was-fuehlt-mein-baby-schon – 2012.02.26: 17:25Uhr]
• Mörike, Klaus D. und Walter Mergenthaler, 1970 (6. Aufl.): Biologie des Menschen. Ein Lehrbuch der Anatomie Physiologie und Entwicklungsgeschichte des Menschen für Nichtmediziner. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer.
• Müller, Hans-Peter, 2008: Lebenschancen und Lebensstile. Die kulturellen Dimensionen sozialer Schichtung. In: Sigmund, Steffen, Gert Albert, Agathe Bienfait und Mateusz Stachura (Hrsg.): Soziale Konstellation und historische Perspektive. Festschrift für M. Rainer Lepsius. Studien zum Weber-Paradigma. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 177-206.
• Neckel, Sighard, 2006: Kultursoziologie der Gefühle. Einheit und Differenz – Rückschau und Perspektiven. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 124-139.
• Nullmeier, Frank, 2006: Politik und Emotionen. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 84-103.
• Pettenkofer, Andreas, 2006: Die Euphorie des Protests: Starke Emotionen in sozialen Bewegungen. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.), Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 256-285.
• Palmer, Stephanie Baker, Laurel Fais, Roberta Michnik Golinkoff und Janet F. Werker, 2012: Perceptual Narrowing of Linguistic Sign Occurs in the 1st Year of Life. In: Child Development 83(2): 543-553. [DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01715.x] In: Sanders, Laura, 2016 (08. Januar): Young infants have perceptual superpowers (Human Development). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-infants-have-perceptual-superpowers, 2016.02.06: 16:18 Uhr].
• Pascalis, Olivier, Michelle de Haan und Charles A. Nelson, 2002: Is Face Processing Species-Specific During the First Year of Life? In: Science 296(5571): 1321-1323 [DOI: 10.1126/science.1070223]. In: Sanders, Laura, 2016 (08. Januar): Young infants have perceptual superpowers (Human Development). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-infants-have-perceptual-superpowers, 2016.02.06: 16:18 Uhr].
• Piaget, Jean, und Bärbel Inhelder, 1986: Die Psychologie des Kindes. München.
• Piaget, Jean, 2003: Assimilation und Akkommodation. In: Ders.: Meine Theorie der geistigen Entwicklung. Herausgegeben von Reinhard Fatke. Aus dem amerikanischen von Heinz Kober. Weinheim: Beltz: 53-62.
• Pohlmann, Markus, 2008: Der diskrete Charme der Bourgeoisie – Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des modernen Wirtschaftsbürgertums. In: Sigmund, Steffen, Gert Albert, Agathe Bienfait und Mateusz Stachura (Hrsg.): Soziale Konstellation und historische Perspektive. Festschrift für M. Rainer Lepsius. Studien zum Weber-Paradigma. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften: 228-252.
• Puthoff, Harold E., 1996 (1970er): CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing Program at Stanford Research Institute. In: Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol. 10(1): 63-76. [URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/23728221]
• Rick, M. und E.S. Becker, 2011: Lernpsychologische Grundlagen. In: Wittchen, Hans-Ulrich und Jürgen Hoyer et al.: Klinische Psychologie & Psychotheraphie. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag: 107-127.
• Rohen, Johannes W., 1985: Funktionelle Anatomie des Nervensystems. Ein kurzgefastes Lehrbuch nach funktionellen Gesichtspunkten für Studierende und Ärzte. Mit 205 Abbildungen in 301 Einzeldarstellungen, davon 78 mehrfarbig, und 48 Tabellen. Stuttgart. Schattauer Verlagsgesellschaft mbH.
• Rössel, Jörg, 2006: Konflikttheorie und Emotionen. Zu Randall Collins‘ emotionssoziologischer Fundierung der Sozialtheorie. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 223-239.
• Sanders, Laura, 2016 (08. Januar): Young infants have perceptual superpowers (Human Development). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-infants-have-perceptual-superpowers, 2016.02.06: 16:18 Uhr].
• Schmidt, Marco F. H. und Jessica A. Sommerville, 2011: Fairness Expactations and Altruistic Sharing in 15-Month-Old Human Infants. In: PloS ONE 6(10): e23223. [DOI: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0023223].
• Schmidt, Nora, 2010: Auswirkungen des Strukturwandels der Wirtschaft auf den Bildungsstand der Bevölkerung. In: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland (Hrsg.): Wirtschaft und Statistik. Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland: 537-551.
• Schnabel, Annette, 2006: Sind Emotionen rational? Emotionen als Herausforderung für Rational-Choice-Ansätze. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 175-194.
• Schultes, Eva, 2016 (05.07.): Quarks & Co : Mach was aus Deinen Genen! In: WDR [URL: http://www1.wdr.de/fernsehen/quarks/sendungen/uebersicht-epigenetik-100.html]
• Schulz, Johannes Heinrich, 2003 (1932): Das autogene Training. Konzentration Selbstentspannung – Versuch einer klinisch-praktischen Darstellung. Mit einem Geleitwort von Siegfried Stephan (20. Aufl.). Stuttgart. Georg Thieme Verlag.
• Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.), 2006: Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag.
• Senger, Gerti und Johannes Huber, 1989: HORMONE – was sie sind und was sie bewirken. Genf-München: Aniston Verlag.
• Sigmund, Steffen, Gert Albert, Agathe Bienfait und Mateusz Stachura (Hrsg.), 2008: Soziale Konstellation und historische Perspektive. Festschrift für M. Rainer Lepsius. Studien zum Weber-Paradigma. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
• Simmons, Roberta G., 1991: Presidential Address on ALTRUISM AND SOCIOLOGY. In: The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 32(1): 1-22.
• Spitzer, Manfred, 2006: Lernen: Die Entdeckung des Selbstverständlichen. Ein Vortrag von Manfred Spitzer. (DVD) ca. 150 Minuten. Beltz GmbH, Julius.
• Tucker, Jim B., 2015(2013): Return to Life. Extraordinary Cases of Children Who Remember Past Lives. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
• Vester, Heinz-Günter, 2006: Die soziale Organisation emotionaler Klimata. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 240-255.
• Watson, John B. und Rosalie Rayner, 1920: Conditioned emotional reactions. In: Journal of Experimental Psychology, 3, 1–14. In: Rinck, M. und E.S. Becker, 2011: Lernpsychologische Grundlagen. S. 107-127. in Wittchen, Hans-Ulrich und Jürgen Hoyer et al.: Klinische Psychologie & Psychotheraphie. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag: 110.
• Weber, Max, 1980(1972): Stände und Klassen. (S. 177-180); Machtverteilung innerhalb der Gemeinschaft: Klassen, Stände, Parteien. (S. 531-540). In: Ders. (Hrsg.): Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 5. Auflage. Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
• Werker, Janet F., John H. V. Gilbert, Keith Humphrey und Richard C. Tees, 1981: Developmental Aspects of Cross-Language Speech Perception. In: Child Development 51(1): 349-355. In: Sanders, Laura, 2016 (08. Januar): Young infants have perceptual superpowers (Human Development). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-infants-have-perceptual-superpowers, 2016.02.06: 16:18 Uhr].
• Winkel, Heidemarie, 2006: Soziale Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der Kommunizierung von Trauer. Zur Codierung von Verlusterfahrungen als individuelles Leid. In: Schützeichel, Rainer (Hrsg.): Emotionen und Sozialtheorie. Disziplinäre Ansätze. Frankfurt/Main: Campus Verlag: 286-304.
• Yang, Jiale, So Kanazawa, Masami K. Yamaguchi und Isamu Motoyoshi, 2015: Pre-constancy Vision in Infants. In: Current Biology 25: 3209–3212. In: Sanders, Laura, 2016 (08. Januar): Young infants have perceptual superpowers (Human Development). In: Science News [URL: https://www.sciencenews.org/blog/growth-curve/young-infants-have-perceptual-superpowers, 2016.02.06: 16:18 Uhr].
• Zimbardo, P.D., Wilhelm F. Angermeier, Johannes C. Brengelmann und Thomas J. Thiekötter, 1983 (4. Aufl.): Psychologie. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.

The present work is a revised and substantially extended version of the following work: Alke, Tobias O. R., 2012: Emotionen und die Entwicklung des Subjekts. Von der Zeugung bis zur Adoleszenz. Seminararbeit. Heidelberg: Max-Weber-Institut für Soziologie.

Image source:

Cover image: © ingenium-design.de – Fotolia.com