Slave morality (Nietzsche)

Slave morality is Friedrich Nietzsche’s name for a way of valuing that arises from the resentment of the powerless: it declares what is strong to be evil and raises pity, humility and usefulness to the good. For Nietzsche it is not to be equated with altruism – the noble human being helps too, but out of abundance, not out of duty or pity. Master and slave morality are, for him, types of valuation, not social strata: they can coexist within the same person.

This entry explains Nietzsche’s terms as he uses them, with his wording and the reference. How we transfer them to present-day orders is set out in the standpoint The Good in the Human Being in Friedrich Nietzsche. For the term itself see Altruism.

About the person. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) was a German philosopher and classical philologist. The terms in this entry come mainly from Jenseits von Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil, 1886) and Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morality, 1887). Quotations follow the Kritische Studienausgabe or the Digital Critical Edition (eKGWB), in their spelling („Werth“, „Thätigkeit“).

Translator’s note: Nietzsche is quoted verbatim in the original German. Our own English rendering follows in square brackets – “[our translation: …]”, for short phrases simply “[…]”; these renderings are ours and not taken from any published English edition. Abbreviations: JGB = Jenseits von Gut und Böse, GM = Zur Genealogie der Moral, Za I = Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra), first part.

What does Nietzsche mean by slave morality and master morality?

Nietzsche distinguishes two ways of valuing: „Es giebt Herren-Moral und Sklaven-Moral“ [our translation: “There is master morality and slave morality”] (JGB § 260). In higher cultures, he says, both occur mixed, „sogar im selben Menschen, innerhalb Einer Seele“ [“even in the same human being, within one soul”] (ibid.). So these are types, not classes.

Master morality values out of the feeling of its own fullness; its opposition is good – bad. Slave morality values out of the situation of the oppressed; its opposition is good – evil: „Während alle vornehme Moral aus einem triumphirenden Ja-sagen zu sich selber herauswächst, sagt die Sklaven-Moral von vornherein Nein zu einem „Ausserhalb“, zu einem „Anders“, zu einem „Nicht-selbst““ [our translation: “While all noble morality grows out of a triumphant saying-Yes to itself, slave morality says No from the outset to an ‘outside’, to an ‘other’, to a ‘not-self’”] (GM I § 10).

What slave morality holds in honour, Nietzsche describes as follows:

„hier kommt das Mitleiden, die gefällige hülfbereite Hand, das warme Herz, die Geduld, der Fleiss, die Demuth, die Freundlichkeit zu Ehren —, denn das sind hier die nützlichsten Eigenschaften und beinahe die einzigen Mittel, den Druck des Daseins auszuhalten. Die Sklaven-Moral ist wesentlich Nützlichkeits-Moral.“ (JGB § 260)

[our translation: “here pity, the obliging helpful hand, the warm heart, patience, industry, humility, friendliness come to be honoured —, for here these are the most useful qualities and almost the only means of enduring the pressure of existence. Slave morality is essentially a morality of utility.”]

The “good man” of this morality is, he says, „gutmüthig, leicht zu betrügen, ein bischen dumm vielleicht“ [“good-natured, easy to deceive, a little stupid perhaps”] (ibid.). This is Nietzsche’s pointed typology, not a judgement on people who act in this way.

What is ressentiment?

For Nietzsche, ressentiment is the rancour of those who cannot defend themselves, and the source of slave morality:

„Der Sklavenaufstand in der Moral beginnt damit, dass das Ressentiment selbst schöpferisch wird und Werthe gebiert“ (GM I § 10).

[our translation: “The slave revolt in morality begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values.”]

What matters is the direction of the gaze: „Diese Umkehrung des werthesetzenden Blicks – diese nothwendige Richtung nach Aussen statt zurück auf sich selber – gehört eben zum Ressentiment“ [our translation: “This reversal of the value-positing gaze – this necessary direction outwards instead of back onto oneself – belongs precisely to ressentiment”] (ibid.). Whoever values in this way defines the good only through what they reject. Current research reads ressentiment as a psychological mechanism, not as a property of a group (Leiter 2019; Reginster 2021).

Who is the ascetic priest?

In the third part of the Genealogy of Morality the ascetic priest appears: shepherd and physician of those who suffer. „Er vertheidigt in der That gut genug seine kranke Heerde, dieser seltsame Hirt“ [our translation: “He does indeed defend his sick herd well enough, this strange shepherd”] (GM III § 15). He gives suffering a meaning by teaching the sufferer to seek the fault in himself: „der Priester ist der Richtungs-Veränderer des Ressentiment“ [“the priest is the changer of direction of ressentiment”] (ibid.).

Nietzsche lists his means against suffering: „die machinale Thätigkeit“ [“mechanical activity”], together with „die Freude des Freude-Machens (als Wohlthun, Beschenken, Erleichtern, Helfen, Zureden, Trösten, Loben, Auszeichnen)“ [“the joy of giving joy (as doing good, giving gifts, relieving, helping, encouraging, comforting, praising, honouring)”] and a will to community, the forming of congregations (GM III § 18).

Nietzsche also places philosophers, scholars and artists close to the ascetic ideal: science, he says, is „die beste Bundesgenossin des asketischen Ideals“ [“the best ally of the ascetic ideal”] (GM III § 25), and artists are „Kammerdiener einer Moral oder Philosophie oder Religion“ [“valets of a morality or philosophy or religion”] (GM III § 5). Our transfer of this figure to the religion, economy, politics, sciences and culture of today is set out in the Nietzsche standpoint; it is expressly ours.

Is pity bad in Nietzsche?

Nietzsche’s critique is aimed at the value of the „Unegoistischen“ [“unegoistic”], „der Mitleids-, Selbstverleugnungs-, Selbstopferungs-Instinkte“ [“the instincts of pity, self-denial, self-sacrifice”], which Schopenhauer had „vergoldet, vergöttlicht und verjenseitigt“ [“gilded, deified and projected into a beyond”] (GM Preface § 5). He calls modern morality a „Religion des Mitleidens“ [“religion of pity”] (JGB § 202).

Yet he distinguishes who it is that feels pity:

„wenn ein solcher Mann Mitleiden hat, nun! dies Mitleiden hat Werth! Aber was liegt am Mitleiden Derer, welche leiden!“ (JGB § 293)

[our translation: “when such a man feels pity, well! this pity has value! But what does the pity of those who suffer matter!”]

What is meant is a man who, according to Nietzsche, „von Natur Herr ist“ [“is by nature a master”]. So Nietzsche does not reject helping, but pity as the programme of those who suffer. To be distinguished from this is compassion that does not suffer along but understands – more on this under Empathy.

Does Nietzsche know altruism? The bestowing virtue

Yes – but he calls it something else. The noble human being helps the unfortunate, „aber nicht oder fast nicht aus Mitleid, sondern mehr aus einem Drang, den der Überfluss von Macht erzeugt“ [our translation: “but not, or almost not, out of pity, rather out of an urge generated by the superabundance of power”] (JGB § 260). In Zarathustra this becomes the bestowing virtue:

„eine schenkende Tugend ist die höchste Tugend. […] heil und heilig heisse ich diese Selbstsucht“ (Za I, Von der schenkenden Tugend 1).

[our translation: “a bestowing virtue is the highest virtue. […] hale and holy I call this selfishness.”]

Nietzsche sets this healthy selfishness against „die kranke Selbstsucht“ [“the sick selfishness”], which „immer stehlen will“ [“always wants to steal”] (ibid.). At the same time he holds: „der Egoismus gehört zum Wesen der vornehmen Seele“ [our translation: “egoism belongs to the essence of the noble soul”] (JGB § 265), and love of one’s neighbour is „eure schlechte Liebe zu euch selber“ [“your bad love of yourselves”] (Za I, On Love of the Neighbour). A German dictionary of sociology sums up Nietzsche’s view thus: he „fasste den A. als eine verdeckte, nivellierend wirkende Form des Egoismus schwacher Menschen auf (-> Sklavenmoral)“ [our translation: “regarded altruism as a concealed, levelling form of the egoism of weak human beings (-> slave morality)”] (Hillmann 2007: 23).

Our reading: Nietzsche’s word is selfishness. We read this giving out of fullness as genuine altruism. It grows out of the strong, free individual, not out of duty and not out of pity. Here Nietzsche meets our conviction that altruism is strongest where people give freely and out of their own strength.

Who is the strong, the noble human being?

„Es ist die Sache der Wenigsten, unabhängig zu sein: – es ist ein Vorrecht der Starken“ [our translation: “It is the business of the very few to be independent: – it is a privilege of the strong”] (JGB § 29). The noble human being is „genöthigt zu einer eigenen Gesetzgebung“ [“compelled to a legislation of his own”] (JGB § 262); among the signs of nobility Nietzsche counts „die eigne Verantwortlichkeit nicht abgeben wollen, nicht theilen wollen“ [“not wanting to give up one’s own responsibility, not wanting to share it”] (JGB § 272). In the Genealogy he is called „das souveraine Individuum“ [“the sovereign individual”], with „Macht über sich und das Geschick“ [“power over himself and over fate”] (GM II § 2).

Honesty requires adding: Nietzsche’s strong man is not non-violent. He can „einen Verwegenen strafen und niederwerfen“ [“punish and throw down an insolent man”]; he is „ein Mann, der seinen Zorn und sein Schwert hat“ [“a man who has his wrath and his sword”] (JGB § 293).

What does Nietzsche say about punishment and mercy?

On punishment Nietzsche judges soberly: „damit zähmt die Strafe den Menschen, aber sie macht ihn nicht „besser““ [our translation: “in this way punishment tames the human being, but it does not make him ‘better’”] (GM II § 15). For him, the privilege of the most powerful is not revenge but mercy: it remains „das Vorrecht des Mächtigsten, besser noch, sein Jenseits des Rechts“ [“the privilege of the most powerful, better still, his beyond of the law”]; a society sure of itself could afford „ihren Schädiger straflos zu lassen“ [“to let those who harm it go unpunished”] (GM II § 10).

At the same time he mocks a morality that, out of fear, in the end takes the side „selbst für ihren Schädiger, den Verbrecher“ [“even of the one who harms it, the criminal”]: „Strafen: das scheint ihr irgendworin unbillig“ [“Punishing: that seems to it somehow unfair”] (JGB § 201). So Nietzsche criticises both – the cruelty of punishment and its abolition out of fear. For research on punishment and cooperation see Altruistic punishment (Fehr/Gächter).

Which passages are disputed?

In the first part of the Genealogy of Morality (GM I § 7–8) Nietzsche assigns the „Sklavenaufstand in der Moral“ [“slave revolt in morality”] to a place in the history of religion and speaks of a „Politik der Rache“ [“politics of revenge”]. That is his thesis, with his attribution to a people and a religion. We do not adopt this attribution; for us, religions stand side by side, not one above another. Scholars dispute whether these passages are to be read as anti-Judaism or as a polemic against a priesthood (Holub 2016; Niemeyer 2017); Loeb (2018) sees the origin in a priestly caste. How we place the passage is set out in the Nietzsche standpoint.

It is equally part of Nietzsche that he affirms an order of rank and holds slavery, „in irgend einem Sinne“ [“in some sense or other”], to be a condition of higher culture (JGB § 257). That is his position; anyone who reads him should know it.

Slave morality today: why good deeds are sometimes devalued

For the present, Nietzsche’s term is an interpretation, not a finding. What research shows: good deeds are not devalued as such, but under certain conditions.

• Those who do good and benefit from it themselves are often judged more harshly in an individual verdict than someone who thinks only of themselves (tainted altruism, Newman & Cain 2014; replicated in a pre-registered study by Alcala et al. 2022).
• People whose good behaviour is felt as a silent reproach are devalued; uninvolved observers, by contrast, appreciate them (Monin, Sawyer & Marquez 2008; Minson & Monin 2012).
• Conspicuously selfless people can even be pushed out of groups (Parks & Stone 2010). Generosity usually improves one’s reputation, but under certain conditions it can also cost (Raihani & Power 2021).
• Conversely, observers regard joy in helping as a sign of genuine concern; those who seek prestige or boast are devalued (Barasch et al. 2014).

The devaluation of good deeds is a general human mechanism, not a property of a social stratum, a religion or a “morality”. More on this in the section Warum werden gute Taten manchmal abgewertet? (Why are good deeds sometimes devalued?) of the German entry Altruismus.

Related terms

Altruism · Loving-kindness & altruism · Egoism · Empathy · Collectivism & individualism · The Possibility of Altruism (Nagel) · Religion

→ More on the reading: The Good in the Human Being in Friedrich Nietzsche – ascetic priests today and the strong human being.

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By Tobias O. R. Alke